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A STUDY OF CORPORATE DECISION BEHAVIOR
Daniel Joseph Power
Under the supervision of Professor George P. Huber
This field research study investigated corporate acquisition
decisions made by managers in U.S. manufacturing and conglomerate
firms.
The introductory chapters review organizational decision
theories and empirical research on organizational and acquisition
decision making. The thesis presents and investigates hypotheses
for two descriptive models: a prediction model and a
decision-process model.
Through mail questionnaires, data were gathered about 28
acquisitions completed between October 1, 1979 and March 31, 1980.
Managers were asked for retrospective information about decision
activities and for a current assessment of the acquired company's
performance .
Twenty-six companies made the acquisitions: nine very large
companies with 1979 sales of more than $450 million and seventeen
smaller companies. Of the 28 acquired companies, 14 had 1979 sales
of $1 to $10 million, 13 had sales of $10 to $35 million, and one
had sales of more than $350 million.
The results of correlation and regression analyses indicate
i
that moderate levels of participation in acquisition subdecisions
and direct contact with the prospect are related to successful
acquisitions, but higher levels of both activities are related to
lower levels of success. Also, increased participation did not
increase the perceived effectiveness of implementation activities.
The amount of formal analytical activity and CEO involvement
are not related to successful acquisitions. CEO involvement seems
to depend on the size of the acquiring company, with CEOs in smaller
companies more involved in making small and medium-sized
acquisitions.
Managers use more complex and extensive decision processes when
an unrelated business is investigated, but the process is apparently
often ineffective. Firms that had made more acquisitions also had
different decision processes, including lower levels of
participation and less use of information sources. Both experience
making acquisitions and acquiring a related business are good
predictors of a successful acquisition.
Finally, a planned search for prospects is not related to more
successful acquisitions. Only initiation by an unusual source
alters the decision process, and then more CEO involvement and
intensive search occur.
Professor George P. Huber
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Chapter 1
STUDYING CORPORATE ACQUISITION DECISION PROCESSES
Many American managers have chosen to increase sales and
diversify the product lines of their companies by acquiring other
companies. Thus, for them and their firms, buying companies is an
important corporate strategy. However, approximately 2Q% of
corporate acquisitions are perceived by the managers that made them
as unsuccessful (cf., Acquisitions Horizons Survey results. Wall
Street Journal, 1982). Given that significant failure rate and
managers' commitment to the strategy, both managers and
organizational theorists can potentially benefit from research that
investigates the organizational decision processes that result in
specific corporate acquisitions. Some decision processes may be
both more effective, i.e., resulting in acquisitions that meet more
organizational goals and needs, and more efficient, i.e., producing
desired results with a lower expenditure of resources, than others.
Also, some decision processes may be more appropriate in one type of
organization or decision situation than in another. This thesis
describes a research project that investigated these issues. The
project focused on decision making about small and medium-sized
acquisitions by manufacturing and conglomerate firms.
This first chapter contains an overview of and a specific
perspective on merger and acquisition activity; it states and
explains the study's major research questions, which are discussed
in more detail in later chapters; it argues that research about
acquisition decision processes is both necessary and important; it
defines introductory terms and reviews the jargon of mergers and
acquisitions; it presents three examples of corporate acquisition
search and decision processes; and, finally, it previews the content
of the remaining six chapters.
Perspective on Merger and Acquisition Activity
In the late 1970's, managers of American businesses turned to
acquisitions and mergers to promote growth and diversity. This
interest in acquisitions and mergers may have been caused by the
increasing risks of new product development; or possibly by high
inflation rates that made owning property more desirable than
holding cash; or possibly for other reasons, including economic gain
(cf., Cameron, 1977; Boucher, 1980). Some observers claim that 1977
marked the beginning of the fourth major merger/acquisition period
in the United States since 1887 (Salter and Weinhold, 1979; Allen,
Oliver, and Schwallie, 1981; Benston, 1980; Chavez, 1981; Curry,
1981). Scherer (1980) explains that "it is customary to distinguish
three major merger waves that swept the American economy — the
first roughly between 1887 and 1904, the second between 1916 and
1929, and the third peaking in 1968 (p. 119)."
Although the actual number of acquisitions completed in 1979
was lower than the number completed in 1968, the number had
increased from fewer than 1,000 a year in the mid-1 970 ,s to more
than 1,UOO in 1979 (see Figure 1.1). Perhaps more significantly, in
1979 the total yearly dollar value (not real dollar value) of all
acquisitions had exceeded 1969 levels and the average real size of
mergers and acquisitions for 1979-80 was more than double what it
had been in 1969-70 (see Figure 1.2 from Allen, Oliver, and
Schwallie, 1981; Chavez, 1981; W. T. Grimm & Co., 1981).
Controversy about the desirability of mergers and acquisitions
has also increased. While evidence about the effects of mergers and
acquisitions on corporate profits, economic efficiency, and
concentration is inconclusive, there are some indications for
concern (of., Scherer, 1980). For example, a recent Business
Week/Harris Poll survey of 600 high level corporate executives found
that two thirds of them felt that most mergers and takeovers do more
good than harm to the economic life of the United States (see
Business Week, October 25, 1982, p. 18). But 200 executives did not
agree with the statement.
Some managers and analysts feel that many of the mergers and
acquisitions of the past 30 years have been complete or partial
failures (Ansoff, Brandenburg, Portner, and Radosevich, 1971;
Benston, 1980; Bradley and Korn, 1979; Chavez, 1981; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). Seed (in Bradley and Korn, 1981) notes that "the
grim fact that one divestiture is announced for every two or three
acquisitions suggests that corporate combinations - even when
undertaken in the best of faith - are hazardous (p. 217)." Seed is
probably overstating the incidence of acquisition failure and he
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incorrectly equates divestiture with a failed acquisition, but his
view highlights the concern that many people express.
But there is also evidence that managers were making better
acquisition decisions in the late 1970,s than they had in the past.
For example, Bradley and Korn (1979) argue that "Today's merger
activity is distinguished from that of the 1960 's in several
important respects:
—A more sophisticated corporate view, with far more
intensive and realistic planning by management.
—Diversification is now related more to present activities
than entirely new fields.
—More consideration by internal staff of long-term
strategic objectives, alternate acquisition
possibilities, and post-merger management issues."
Baker, Miller, and Ramsperger (1981) make a similar argument.
Although acquisition decision making may have improved, we must
nevertheless predict that many acquisitions are likely to be
complete or partial failures. Next year manufacturing and
conglomerate firms will likely make more than 200 acquisitions of
small and medium-sized companies. Small companies with sales
ranging from $1 million to $10 million and medium-sized companies
with sales of $10 million to $100 million are primary targets of
acquisition activity. Some large companies with sales of $100
million to $1 billion are also acquired each year, and a few
mega-mergers with $1 billion plus companies being acquired also
occur infrequently. Yet many of these acquisitions will be judged
as unsatisfactory, liquidated, or divested.
Why do some acquisitions fail? Bing (1980; p. 72-78) and
Salter and Weinhold (1979) suggest the following causes: 1)
improbable events; 2) buyer deceived; 3) buyer acquires what is
available; U) people opposed to the original deal sabotage
implementation; 5) bad relations between executives at acquiring and
acquired companies; 6) buyer does not understand business; 7) lack
of agreed objectives; 8) unfulfilled buyer promises; 9) improper or
unstable reporting relationships to buyer's organization; 10)
unnecessary management changes; and 11) over-dependence on one
executive. Many of these factors suggest that an important reason
for failure is that managers do not effectively investigate and
evaluate the acquisition prospect or plan its integration into the
acquiring company.
Very little empirical evidence is currently available about
which acquisition decision process is appropriate for a given
situation. Too often managers are forced to rely on intuition,
distilled experience, and unsystematically gathered information.
Knowing what works and when is more a matter of luck than science.
This research project is one step toward making the acquisition
decision process more rational and systematic and therefore making
the outcome of an acquisition more predictable. Through interviews,
questionnaires, and a review of the literature on organizational and
acquisition decision processes, this project examines the following
8primary question: What factors determine the differences in
corporate acquisition processes and what are the consequences of
those differences?
Explanation of Research Questions
In an examination of the corporate acquisition decision
process, many questions need to be investigated. Some are more
difficult to resolve than others and some need research more
urgently than others. Following are the major questions posed in
this study: .
1) Do some decision process activities predict short-run
success for an acquisition? Are some activities unrelated
to success or related to failure?
2) How involved is the chief executive officer (CEO) in
acquisition decision processes? Does the amount of CEO
involvement predict success? Under what circumstances
are CEOs involved?
3) Does participation in the decision process by the
management team predict short-run success? When managers
have participated in decision making, is implementation
of the decision evaluated as more successful?
4) Do managers use more complex and extensive decision
processes when an unrelated business is acquired?
5) Do managers who are experienced making acquisitions
design and use substantially different decision processes
than inexperienced managers?
6) Does the decision process differ when the organization
initiates and plans a search for acquisition prospects
as compared to when there is an unplanned initiation by
the seller or a broker?
Most managers and acquisition specialists assume that the
activities of managers do primarily determine the success of an
acquisition (cf., Bing, 1980; Kellogg, 1975; Rockwell, 1968; Salter
and Weinhold, 1981; Scharf, 1971; Short, 1967; Stotland, 1976).
Many management theorists and theories provide additional support
for this assumption, for example, management process theories (cf.,
Koontz, 1980), managerial role theory (Mintzberg, 1973; 1975) and
strategic management (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Schendel and Hofer,
1979).
Knowing what activities are important and necessary and who to
involve in the process is, however, more problematic and more
difficult to determine. Current knowledge about corporate
acquisition decision processes is fragmentary and much of the
descriptive research has been case studies and unsystematic
interview studies with small numbers of managers recalling personal
experiences and second-hand information about events 2 to 20 years
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prior to the study (see Chapter 3 for a review). Although more
general research and theory on organizational decision making is
relevant to answering some of the above questions, it is equally
limited and perhaps more inconclusive as a guide to managers or
organization scientists. Current theory and research are especially
inadequate for explaining what factors determine decision process
differences, the amount and type of differences in corporate
acquisition decision processes, and the consequences of using
different processes. No one research project can resolve all of
these issues, but this project does investigate important research
questions.
This project attempts to 1 ) identify factors or determinants
that predict differences in the decision processes of businesses,
and 2) evaluate the effect of different processes on the perceived
success of acquisitions. Although many factors associated with the
environment of the business, characteristics of the business, and
characteristics of a specific decision situation may account for
differences in acquisition decision processes, not all of them can
be included in one study. The design of this study attempted to
control for some of these factors. Others are explicitly measured
and evaluated.
As noted, this research also explores the relationships between
decision process variables and the short-run success of an
acquisition. A number of alternative explanations and factors are
considered as part of the analysis of this question. For example,
11
the effects of implementation activities on the success of an
acquisition must be taken into account. Also, some of the factors
that account for differences in decision processes may also account
for differences in short-run success.
Importance of the Research Project
The study reported in this thesis is potentially an important
one for corporate managers, stockholders, and organization
scientists for the following reasons: First, managers and
stockholders may benefit through improved acquisition processes.
Second, the study will contribute to much-needed strategic
management research. Corporate acquisition decision processes is
currently a neglected research area (see Duncan, 1979). Third, by
focusing on one type of decision rather than examining many, this
project can provide some tests of organizational decision-making
theories and aid in extending and refining current theories.
On the first point, how can managers and stockholders benefit
from the study? Evaluating an acquisition candidate often means
large expenditures of time, money, and other resources. Actually
acquiring another firm puts stockholders at risk for substantial
losses. And the success or failure of the acquisition may affect
the careers of many managers. The results of this specific study
can aid managers when they plan and design acquisition programs.
They can compare their planned activities to the information
gathered about activities of other, similar firms that made
12
acquisitions. Stockholders can benefit because knowledge derived
from a systematically collected data base may improve the quality of
acquisition programs and ultimately the value of the stockholder's
investment.
On the second point, how can this study contribute to strategic
management research? Many organization scientists recognize the
benefits of additional strategic management research, but few
research projects have examined strategic decision processes,
specifically corporate acquisition decision processes. So this
study can increase our understanding of strategic decision processes
which can help us understand organizational strategy formulation
(cf., Stein, 1981). Also, the project develops new research
measures and discusses measurement issues. Additionally, this study
helps broaden the domain of strategic management research and
practice. Organization scientists in contrast to the financial
specialists traditionally involved with mergers and acquisitions
have the skills and knowledge to examine and perhaps recommend
organizational decision processes.
Now to the third point, why is it desirable to study processes
related to one type of decision in multiple organizations? Some of
the variability associated with decision processes probably occurs
because of differences in the type of decision, such as making a
corporate acquisition versus making allocations of resources (Bower,
1970), and because of contextual factors, such as organization size,
strategic risk of the decision, or experience making that type of
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decision. Determining what variability results from context
variables is much easier if only one type of decision is studied and
if multiple occurrences of the decision process in different
organizations are measured. Studying one particular type of
decision and its associated decision process can, therefore, clarify
and expand current theories of organizational decision making.
Also, organization scientists can use the results of this
research project to develop improved guidelines for designing
acquisition decision processes. Current prescriptions for
acquisition programs do not include contingencies like firm size and
experience with making acquisition decisions or the relationship of
process differences to success of acquisitions (see Paine and Power,
1982). Finally, this study provides information useful in refining
and testing a descriptive acquisition decision process model that
includes contingency variables.
Major Definitions and an
Explanation of Merger and Acquisition Jargon
The language of mergers and acquisitions is often both colorful
and confusing. This section defines three key concepts: mergers and
acquisitions, organizational decision processes, and acquisition
search and decision processes. Then some of the jargon of
acquisition decision making is discussed. A common language built
at this point can reduce misunderstandings and confusion in later
chapters.
14
Mergers and Acquisitions
The concepts mergers and acquisitions are often used very
casually among practioners. Mace and Montgomery (1962) note that
the words merger, acquisition, and consolidation are sometimes used
interchangeably. They were told that "when management
representatives of an acquiring company talked with executives of a
potential acquisition, the conversation was always in terms of
'merger' although it was implicit and apparent that Company A
proposed to 'acquire1 Company B. In these situations the
negotiating executive of the acquiring company would discuss
'merger' with the management of the company to be acquired, but when
he discussed the opportunity with his board of directors, he
referred invariably to the possibility of 'acquisition' (p. 3)." In
the early 1960's and today, the term merger seems to have an
inoffensive quality not found in the term acquire.
A more technical distinction is made in laws related to mergers
and consolidations. According to Clarkson, Miller and Blaire (1980,
p. 716), a merger involves the legal combination of two or more
corporations. After a merger, only one of the corporations
continues to exist. In a consolidation, two or more corporations
combine so that each corporation ceases to exist and a new one
emerges. Acquisition is apparently not used to identify a type of
legal combination.
Conglomerate mergers occur when the company acquired has
customers and technology different from those of the buying company.
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Conglomerate mergers result from what are often termed unrelated
acquisitions.
Four major types of related acquisitions can be identified. A
horizontal merger results when the acquired company is in the same
industry as the buyer, with approximately the same customers and
suppliers. Vertical integration occurs when a major supplier or
customer is acquired. Concentric market or technology mergers can
also occur. If the seller has the same customer types as the buyer,
but a different technology, then a concentric market merger has
occurred. If the technology is the same, but customers are
different, then a concentric technology merger has occurred (cf.,
Kitching, 1967, p. 85).
The terms merger and acquisition are used interchangeably in
succeeding chapters. Most often the term acquisition is used
because larger companies in the study were purchasing small and
medium-sized companies.
Organizational Decision Process
The terms decision making and organizational decision making
are understood at an intuitive level by many people, but some
clarification can help direct our attention to important issues.
Shull, Delbecq, and Cummings (1970) define an organizational
decision process as "...a conscious and human process, involving
both individual and social phenomena, based upon factual and value
premises, which includes a choice of one behavioral activity from
among one or more alternatives with the intention of moving toward
16
some desired state of affairs (p. 3D."
Decision making according to Simon (1960), "comprises three
principal phases: finding occasions for making a decision; finding
possible courses of action; and choosing among courses of action (p.
1)." Folsom (1962) discusses the complexity of the decision
process. He says that many people think of decision making as
something done by one person, e.g. the president of a company.
Although he notes that it is often true that one executive is
responsible for resolving a specific decision issue and must then
support his decision, nevertheless, there is much more to the
decision-making process. Folsom notes: "Decisions generally are the
result of a long series of discussions by both line and staff people
after the staff has collected the pertinent material. It is often
hard to pinpoint the exact stage at which a decision is reached.
More often than not, the decision comes about naturally during
discussions, when the consensus seems to be reached among those
whose judgment and opinion the executive seeks (p. 4)."
Huber's (1981) explanation of organizational decisions and
decision processes also clarifies the phenomenon that is
investigated in this research. He explains that "Organizational
decisions are decisions made on behalf of the organization. The
decision making units may be as small as an individual, e.g., a
manager, or as large as the entire organizational membership. While
personal goals often influence organizational decisions, the
decisions themselves are legitimized to other units and agencies as
17
fulfilling organizational needs (p. 2)."
Corporate Acquisition Search and Decision Process
For this research project, search and the decision process are
separate phases (cf., Simon, 1960). Search is defined as an
intentional process conducted by a buyer for locating acquisition
prospects. The acquisition decision process begins when a potential
buyer becomes aware of the acquisition prospect and ends when a
formal decision is made to acquire the other company (called
reaching an agreement-in-principal) or discontinue evaluation
activities. Both the search and decision processes consist of
specific activities of organizational members related respectively
to finding and then to evaluating the acquisition prospect. The
decision process includes a number of related decisions, e.g., to
make direct contact with a prospect, to enter negotiations, and to
chose the amount of a bid for the company. This study focused on
the corporate acquisition decision process.
Jargon of Mergers and Acquisitions
Shoot-outs, marriages, and courtships are part of the jargon of
mergers and acquisitions. Hirsch (1980) defines some of the more
common colloquial terms used on occasion by investment bankers,
brokers, acquisitions specialists and chief executive officers of
companies. According to Hirsch, studying language helps one to
understand organization relationships. Also language, especially
jargon, is important to understanding the richness of corporate
acquisition decision processes.
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Two terms used frequently are buyer and seller. Buyers make
acquisitions and sellers are acquired. The buyer is also sometimes
called the surviving company, especially in hostile takeovers.
In friendly acquisitions both sides negotiate and reach a more
or less harmonious accord for a sale. The managers of the selling
company usually endorse friendly acquisitions to their shareholders.
The decision process in these acquisitions is often described in
terms of a matrimonial analogy. For example, courtship and dancing
are used to describe the investigation activity of the buyer.
Marrying means that an acquisition has been completed. Finally, the
phrase "sex without marriage", according to Hirsch, means a company
had extended negotiations for a friendly merger, but talks were
eventually stopped. Merger brokers and investment bankers also get
drawn into the analogy. They are sometimes called Cupid or
matchmakers.
The language of hostile takeovers, where an unsolicited bid is
made to shareholders by a company, is much more aggressive than the
language of friendly mergers. The imagery is more from pirate,
medieval, and Western stories than from marriage and courtship. The
ambush and rape replace courtship and dancing. Black knights,
unfriendly acquirers, joust with white knights, friendly acquirers.
Sharks gobble little fishes. And brokers and investment bankers
become hired guns and headhunters.
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Examples of Acquisition
Search and Decision Processes
A review of case studies and journalistic accounts in business
publications suggests that there are many different approaches for
finding and acquiring companies. Many of these differences will be
discussed later, but a few examples of acquisition decision
processes, at this point, can establish a perspective for evaluating
the examples and results in later chapters. The following three
examples of the decision processes at General Signal Corporation, at
Trans Union Corporation, and at Chamberlain Manufacturing
Corporation are therefore only illustrative and not representative
of all acquisition decision processes. General Signal illustrates
high CEO involvement; both Trans Union and Chamberlain illustrate
more bureaucratic decision processes; all of the companies use
formal analytical tools and search for information about prospects;
all of the companies have made many acquisitions.
General Signal Corporation
Uttal (1980) examined acquisition decision making at General
Signal in a Fortune magazine article. General Signal was originally
a single-product company making railroad signals. It has been
transformed by acquisitions into a conglomerate that now produces
electric instruments, water-treatment equipment, and other
sophisticated control products. The following discussion is based
on that article (see pp. 58-6H).
In 1980, the Chairman of the Board and CEO of General Signal
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was Nathan R. Owen. For the previous 20 years he had played a major
role in acquisition decision making. Uttal sees Owen as the
quintessential white knight rescuing companies from corporate
raiders.
Apparently the respect given to Owen by many other managers has
given his company a unique advantage in finding acquisition
prospects. Uttal found that many managers seek out General Signal
in hopes that their company will be acquired. He states that "As
court of first resort for companies that have decided to sell out or
have been forced to, General Signal gets to pick and choose. Each
year, the Stamford, Connecticut, company looks at 100 to 200
prospective deals, including those it pursues on its own initiative,
(p. 58)."
On the content of the acquisition search process, Uttal
comments that Owen does not use finders and investment bankers,
rather he does his own deals. Owen says he learned two other
important lessons for making successful acquisitions: "'One was
never to try to outsmart somebody in a deal — that makes for a bad
marriage. The other was that unless you invest in good people, you
are building your house on sand' (p. 59)."
Uttal reports that Owen has personally made 27 deals during a
20 year period. He provides an example of how Owen investigated
industries prior to making acquisitions: Owen began thinking about
water-pollution control in the late 1960's and he methodically
studied the process of treating waste water, he broke the process
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into steps in order to isolate product niches. "Then he drew up
short lists of the leading suppliers. Although he put out many
feelers, Owen didn't make any major moves until 1972, when he picked
up five companies involved in pollution control, adding more than
$120 million to General Signal's sales (pp. 60,62)."
Uttal also provides an example of how Owen negotiated with
companies and closed acquisition deals. He states that:
Owen's patience and personality were critical in his
efforts to take on 'high grade' companies. Fred Gordon,
Mixing Equipment Co., the largest of the 1972 acquisitions,
greeted Owen's advances coldly at first, partially because
9 his company's growth rate was higher than GeneralSignal' s... But Owen kept at it for six months and finally
won out. As Gordon puts it, 'Money had nothing to do with
our decision to go with General Signal. We could have got
more from any of the others. It was Nate Owen himself that
made the difference. Instead of sending some flunky to
promise us pie in the sky, he did all the negotiating
himself.' (p. 62)
Nathan Owen and acquisition decision making were clearly
inseparable at General Signal.
Trans Union Corporation
In 1979 William B. Howell, then the director of corporate
development at Trans Union, wrote an article in Management Review on
acquisition decision making at his company. In a few years Trans
Union had acquired 42 small and medium-sized companies. Through
acquisitions, Trans Union was transformed from a tank car company
into a conglomerate. The following material is from his article
(see pp. 37-40): Acquisition decision making at Trans Union is
decentralized and analytical. Five people work at least part time
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on acquisitions. They all report directly to operating executives.
The managers believe that detailed analysis of prospects is
important .
Howell also comments on how acquisition prospects are
identified at Trans Union. He says that intermediaries are rarely
used, noting that of U2 deals, a broker was involved in only two.
In both cases the brokers represented, and were paid by the seller
(p. 38). Howell feels that "the services we are frequently offered
by investment bankers are not always consistent with what we think
we need... Another point intermediaries should understand is our
attitude toward introductions. In Victorian England, a suitor
needed a proper introduction if his intentions were to be considered
honorable. But today the annual report of a public company is
usually sufficient as an introduction. At Trans Union we've
initiated many direct contacts with owners, and we've found them to
be very responsive, even intrigued with our direct approach (p.
39)."
Howell says he recognizes that a methodical approach for
identifying prospects may miss desirable opportunities. Therefore,
if a finder or seller approaches Trans Union, the managers must
decide "whether the pursuit of the idea justifies our time.
Clearly, the less time required of us, the easier it is for us to
pursue an opportunity (p. 39)."
Many of Howell 's statements are normative and it is difficult
to sort out what actually occurs at Trans Union. Following is his
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description of the acquisition program at Trans Union and his role
in acquisitions:
Our acquisition program ... emphasizes in-depth analysis,
involves line management, and retains the initiative. But
what do we do to make things happen? My goal is always to
identify opportunities for top management and the board of
directors. They judge for themselves how well these
opportunities fit our skills and strengths. I identify
industries that seem to merit our attention and study them
at least to the point where we can tell if they have the
basic characteristics we seek. If they do, and if there
are only a few possible candidates in the business, we'll
make some initial overtures to see if any are interested
in joining us. If so, we can analyze the industry and the
candidate concurrently. On the other hand, if there are
many possible candidates, as, for example, in the life
insurance field, we will probably go on to identify the most
precise characteristics we'd like to obtain (p. UO).
The decision process at Trans Union seems to involve more staff
work than the prior example at General Signal.
Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation
In June 1981, Mr. John Sommers, president of Chamberlain, was
interviewed about acquisition decision making to gain background
information for designing the questionnaire developed for this
study. At the time when most of Chamberlain's acquisitions were
made, Sommers was a vice president of the company. Chamberlain used
an acquisition strategy for many years to grow in sales from $15
million to more than $250 million. The managers at Chamberlain
acquired mainly consumer-oriented manufacturing businesses.
Chamberlain was itself acquired by a private holding company in the
late 1970's.
Sommers noted that in the early stages of Chamberlain's
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acquisition program, only a very small group of managers were
involved in making acquisitions, primarily the president and the
chief financial officer. But as the company grew and gained
experience, "we became much more formal in our approach to gauge
what we wanted and we involved people primarily from the marketing
area." And he pointed out that over time more people from
personnel and the legal area got involved.
Sommers explained that an acquisition checklist was gradually
developed. But he noted that it "is far more extensive and covers
far more than we were really able to do for each and every
acquisition candidate ... I don't think we ever did finish a whole
checklist in terms of checking each and every item out." Managers
at Chamberlain apparently developed a systematic evaluation process
for prospects, but found it difficult and costly to apply.
Acquisition decision making at Chamberlain seemed to involve
sequential choices, rather than a comparison of alternatives.
Sommers said "I think only once did we really have two viable
acquisition candidates going at the same time." Managers at
Chamberlain apparently spent a great amount of time collecting
information for evaluating the prospects. The "financial, personnel
and the marketing people would all make their assessments. That
information was then brought to the president and we would then make
our recommendations of go or no-go, he would either agree or
disagree. If he did agree, then we would set forth our data and go
to the board of directors."
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According to Sommers, once Chamberlain had made a number of
acquisitions, the president became less involved in collecting
information about prospects. In the early stages of an
investigation, staff people were "digging out the details", but the
CEO would get involved about 30 days into the investigation to get a
progress report. He was apparently primarily interested in whether
anything had been uncovered that would make the acquisition a no-go.
At Chamberlain, "people generally handle acquisitions in
addition to their other duties," Sommers explained. He did mention
that for a brief period of time the company had a director of
planning who managed the search for and investigation of prospects.
But apparently the results of that change in the acquisition process
were unsatisfactory.
Sommers said that the "biggest key to a successful acquisition
is defining the objectives that the company is seeking." And he
noted that with greater experience making acquisition decisions,
"you obviously don't stumble as many times." He gave two examples
of "stumbles" made by managers at Chamberlain: 1) apparently labor
contracts were not examined prior to an acquisition and for five
years following the acquisition, Chamberlain was in court trying to
settle labor issues raised by the National Labor Relations Board;
and 2) on another occasion, "we really didn't pay enough attention
to the fact that local management didn't want to stay on even though
they said they did." Chamberlain ultimately lost a lot of time and
money replacing the management of that company.
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Implications
The acquisition decision process varies considerably in these
three companies. All three companies made small and medium-sized
acquisitions, but it seems that the amount of CEO involvement, the
amount of analytical activity, the number of people involved in
decision making and possibly the amount of information gathering
varies from company to company. Part of the difference may be due
to the perspective of the person describing the process. Uttal
apparently received much of his information from Owen, the CEO.
Howell reports his experiences as director of corporate development.
And Sommers was primarily an observer of the process. It is
possible that any of these men, especially Howell, may be
emphasizing his own role and neglecting the many contributions of
others. Although the bias that results from the perspective of the
informant is an important source of error, the research project
reported in later chapters systematically collected information from
managers in 26 companies about some of the decision process
differences that are evident in these three examples.
Preview of Future Chapters
Following is a summary of the remaining six chapters of the
thesis:
Chapter 2 summarizes and critiques descriptive
characterizations of the decision process and provides examples of
each from acquisition decision situations. Five characterizations
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are explained: rational analytic; bureaucratic; political;
incremental; and garbage can. Second, the chapter summarizes and
critiques descriptive characteristics models of the decision
process: the Snyder Model (1958); the Hage Model (1980) and the
Bradford Group Model (Astley, Axelsson, Butler, Hickson and Wilson,
1981; Butler, Astley, Hickson, Mallory and Wilson, 1979). Third, in
Chapter 2 descriptive phase and sequential models are reviewed.
Both a general model of the decision process and specific models of
the acquisition process are summarized and critiqued. Finally, an
overall summary and critique of relevant theories and models is
presented and the advantages of using the characteristics approach
for this research project are discussed.
Chapter 3 is a review of empirical research on organizational
and acquisition decision making. The chapter provides a short
summary of research on organizational decision making and a summary
of recent acquisition and merger case study evidence. It primarily
summarizes and critiques research on corporate acquisition decision
making.
Chapter 4 discusses the research hypotheses of this study. Two
competing models: the prediction model and the decision-process
model are presented and discussed. Three hypotheses are developed
from the prediction model. Twenty four hypotheses are developed
from the decision-process model. The decision-process model
hypotheses incorporate five process concepts: the amount of formal
analytical activity; the amount of intensive search for information
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about a prospect; the amount of discussion and participation in
decision making; the amount of CEO involvement; and the duration of
the decision process.
The research methodology is discussed in Chapter 5. The topics
covered in the chapter include selection of companies and research
design; data-collection procedures; sample and participant
characteristics; discussion of measures for variables; and an
overview of data analysis procedures for testing hypotheses.
Finally, the limitations of the design, method, and measures and
attempts to overcome them are discussed.
Chapter 6 presents the results of the research project. It
summarizes descriptive information about the corporate acquisition
decision process. Then the results of the tests of hypotheses are
presented. Some information from interviews conducted as part of
the overall study is also presented.
The final chapter, Chapter 7, presents conclusions and
implications of the research project for organizational and
corporate acquisition decision making. Both the implications for
managing corporate acquisition programs and the implications for
theories of organization decision making are discussed. Finally,
needs for future research and additional research questions,
methodological questions, and limitations of this research project
are evaluated and summarized.
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Chapter 2
AN EXPLANATION OF ACQUISITION DECISIONS
WITHIN A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The research questions presented in the previous chapter are
derived from and extend prior research and theory about
organizational and corporate acquisition decision processes. This
chapter discusses the important links between corporate acquisition
decision making and the theoretical foundations of decision making
research. Although organizational decision making theories are at
an early stage of development compared to the theoretical
foundations of individual and group decision behavior, a number of
"theories" have been proposed and serve as a foundation for this
research project.
The chapter summarizes and critiques five descriptive
characterizations of the organizational decision process and
provides examples of each from acquisition decision situations. The
following characterizations of the decision process are explained:
rational analytic; bureaucratic; political; incremental; and garbage
can. Second, the chapter summarizes and critiques descriptive
decision process characteristics models: the Snyder Model (1958);
the Hage Model (1980); and the Bradford Group Model (Astley et. al,
1981; Butler et. al, 1979). Third, in this chapter descriptive
phase and sequential models are reviewed. Finally, the advantages
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of using the characterisitics approach for this research project are
discussed.
There are many characterizations of how decisions are made in
organizations, but relatively little has been written until recently
about characteristics of the decision process. Also, some current
models include contingencies that may effect the process
characteristics, e.g., what occurs, when it occurs, who participates
and the consequences of alternative processes. During the past 15
years there have been many contributions to the organizational
decision making literature, yet there seems to be no current,
comprehensive literature review. Also, the literature is difficult
to use because there is no consensus among theorists about
terminology or variables. The variety of interpretations by authors
of what is supposedly the "same" model also causes confusion.
This chapter is not a comprehensive review and it does not
resolve all problems of terminology or theory construction. Rather,
its purpose is to generalize the ideas of many authors to help
explain what factors affect the corporate acquisition decision
process and to explain the consequences of different processes. The
following summaries and interpretations of decision process
characterizations, characteristics and phase and sequential models
is based on both the original sources and recent summaries of parts
of the literature by Chaffee (1981), Huber (1981), and Murray
(1978-79).
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A number of theorists, including Snyder (1958), Hage (1980) and
Astley, Axelsson, Butler, Hickson and Wilson (1981), have attempted
to change the emphasis of theory development from characterizations
of the decision process, e.g. as a rational analytical process or a
political process; to the development of models that explain and
relate characteristics of the decision process. A characterization
of an organizational decision process is not really a theory (of.,
Dubin, 1978; Hage, 1972; Zetterberg, 1966). Those "theories" that
are termed characterizations in this review are general descriptions
of the organizational decision process that fail to adequately
specify variables and relationships. Although the characteristics
models do specify variables and relationships, current models are
not as complete as normative standards for evaluating theories
require. A change to a characteristics approach for theory
development may facilitate empirical research and help resolve some
of the inadequacies of current "theory".
Descriptive Decision Process Characterizations
Characterizations of organizational decision processes are
valuable to review because they suggest the difficulties associated
with measuring and interpreting organizational decision processes.
Also, these characterizations are potentially descriptive of parts
of any given organizational decision process and for some types of
decisions, one characterization may be more appropriate than
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another. Also as Murray (1978-79) and Stein (1981) suggest, it may
be possible to develop contingencies or independent variables that
predict when one particular characterization is the most appropriate
description of an organizational decision process. This research
study can help identify contingencies for predicting when these
characterizations are most appropriate. Also, interpreting the
acquisition decision process in terms of these characterizations
suggests hypotheses that should be tested.
Many authors have developed characterizations of the
organizational decision process. For example, Lindblom (1959)
characterized decision processes as either rational-comprehensive
(synoptic) or incremental and he argued that an incremental
characterization was most descriptive. Etzioni (1967) expanded on
Lindblom' s ideas and described a rationalistic, an incrementalist,
and a mixed-scanning approach. Mixed-scanning had elements of both
rationalistic and incrementalist approaches. Etzioni suggests that
a mixed-scanning approach is most descriptive of the decision
process for fundamental or important decisions and that all other
decision making is best characterized as incremental.
Another political scientist, Allison (1969; 1971), uses three
characterizations to study the Cuban Missile Crisis: the rational
actor paradigm; organizational process paradigm; and bureaucratic
politics paradigm. He concluded that all three were useful for
understanding a specific, important organizational decision.
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Mintzberg (1973) and Nutt (1976) present very different
characterizations. Mintzberg identifies an entrepreneurial,
adaptive and planning mode for decision making. Nutt identifies
six models of organizational decision making: bureaucratic,
normative decision theory; behavioral decision theory; group
decision making; conflict-equilibrium and open system (similar to
incremental) .
Both Chaffee (1981) and Pfeffer (1981) are working with a
similar typology. Chaffee identifies four models: a rational model
where decisions are made by reasoned problem solving; a political
model where decisions are made through conflict resolution, a
bureaucratic model where decisions result from structured
interaction patterns; and an organized anarchy or garbage can model
where decisions occur more by accident than intention. Huber (1981)
uses a similar set of characterizations: rational;
political/competitive; garbage can; and program.
The five characterizations in this section are based primarily
on the prior work of Huber, Pfeffer and Chaffee. The incremental
characterization of Lindblom is also discussed. After the basic
idea of each characterization is presented, each is interpreted in
the context of the acquisition decision process. The five
characterizations are called rational analytical, bureaucratic,
political, incremental and garbage can. In all of these models, a
process of decision making is assumed. Choice does not happen at a
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precise point in time. But our attention is directed toward the
activities and events that preceed a choice. Each characterization
or model helps explain why a specific choice is made. All of the
characterizations recognize that the decision process occurs over a
period of time, involves multiple organizational actors and events.
Rational Analytical Charac terization
Both rationality and logical analysis are highly valued by
Western culture in the late 20th Century. A vast amount of
literature has been written about the phenomenon and its
applications and consequences. The literature on rational decision
making, including business decision making, is large. Also, many
specialized tools have been developed to support it, including
decision theory, systems analysis, and zero-based budgeting.
The rational analytical characterization is a mixture of both
descriptive and prescriptive theory. Huber defines a rational
action process model where organizational units purposely use
information to rationally make choices on behalf of the
organization. The rational analytical characterization presumes
that managers apply reasoning and analysis in an attempt to maximize
valued organizational outcomes, like profits. The rational
analytical characterization does not state that organizational
decisions are actually rational or optimal, but rather that decision
makers act in an intendedly rational manner.
This limitation of intended rationality rather than global
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rationality is based on Herbert Simon's (1976) work on bounded
rationality. He suggests that there are limitations on rational
action for individuals. In an organization the bounds on
rationality are probably much less restrictive than they are for
individuals because managers can remove some boundaries by involving
experts, by using extensive information processing, and by using
complex decision models and tools. Boundaries still exist that
limit the rationality of organizational decision making. Many
people believe that decision makers using the rational approach
reach a consensus of values and preferences before making decisions.
Chaffee (1981) discusses this issue and suggests that if managers
are trying to reach a consensus of values and preferences, that fact
provides an indication that an organization is following the
rational model. In the case of an acquisition, managers often
believe they are trying to maximize a criterion like return on
investment or profit. They may believe they are making decisions
rationally. Also, organizations that make comparisons of
alternatives to a set of criteria and that consider an array of
alternatives simultaneously, can probably be best characterized as
making rational analytical decisions.
Choice in the rational analytical characterization, is
perceived as deliberate and identifiable. Chaffee (1981) notes that
when, how, and by whom a decision is made should be identifiable.
Some corporate acquisition decision processes seem to have at least
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some characteristics that suggest that they can be characterized as
rational and analytical. In some organizations and for at least
some acquisition decisions, a number of companies are being
evaluated simultaneously during the search process and decision
makers seem able to specify the criteria used for evaluating
alternatives. Also, the choice among alternatives seems to have
been a deliberate action and when, how and by whom the decision was
made can be identified.
Leontiades (1980) provides an example that indicates a rational
analytical characterization is sometimes appropriate. He feels that
the acquisition movement has entered a period of increased
'rationality'; and that the Judgmental basis for making unrelated
mergers in the 1960s is no longer adequate. Leontiades provides an
example of Fuqua Industries. He states "it is still a company
diversifying and divesting — but with a difference. It is now
pursuing defined 'operational acquisitions': those additions which
will fill specific needs and take advantage of complementary
strengths (p. 11)."
Rappaport (1979) provides additional evidence of rational
analytical activity. He states "Recently Business Week reported
that as many as half of the major acquisition-minded companies are
relying extensively on the discounted cash flow (DCF) technique to
analyze acquisitions (p. 101)."
The Dresser Industries case in Paine and Naumes (1982) provides
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another example.
Dresser required detailed information concerning all
aspects of proposed acquisitions. Some key areas of
interest include legal, financial and market information.
The legal department must review the organizational
structure, Securities and Exchange Commission filings,
existing contracts and employee benefit programs of the firm
as well as any antitrust considerations. A preliminary
antitrust screening is conducted prior to any other
information collection.
Financial data must be current, accurate and reflect the
company's financial position within its respective industry
and as a separate entity. All relevant financial statements
are audited, and significant accounting policies-such as
inventory valuation, depreciation methods and research and
development costing-are analyzed.
Market information centers around the firms 's marketing mix:
its products and services, methods of promotion, channels of
distribution and pricing policies. Additionally,
competitors and customers are evaluated on both short-run
and long-run bases.
After considerable time and effort, Dresser synthesizes
these and countless other pieces of information into an
acquisition decision (p. 491).
Finally, the Omark Industries Case (Stanford, 1979) provides
another example that further suggests that acquisition decision
making is sometimes, if not often, both rational and analytical.
The author states, "Omark' s management had recently published a
written statement of corporate purpose, objectives, and philosophies
(p. 259)." And he explains that for a specific acquisition
prospect, RGBS, projections "were made by Omark at three confidence
levels: 10J, 50^, and 90 %. A summary of these projections was in
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the booklet to the board. .. , along with an estimate of the effect on
EPS of Omark....In this connection, an internal rate of return and
return on assets (constant $) was projected by Omark (p. 262)."
Bureaucratic Process Characterization
The rational analytic and the bureaucratic process
characterization have some similarities and it is possible that as a
decision issue becomes routinized and "rationalized", the
bureaucratic characterization becomes the better description of the
process. It is plausible that rational actions taken when managers
were initially confronted with a specific type of decision are
transformed into the programs and procedures that identify the
bureaucratic characterization. Crozier (1964) explains the possible
link between rational analytic and bureaucratic processes. He
states, "The invasion of all domains by rationality, of course,
gives power to the expert who is the agent of this progress. But
the experts' success is constantly self-defeating. The
rationalization process gives him power, but the end results of
rationalization curtail this power. As soon as a field is well
covered, as soon as the first intuitions and innovations can be
translated into rules and programs, the experts' power disappears
(p. 165)."
Chaffee (1981) identifies a bureaucratic model and she equates
it to Allison's (1971) Organizational Process Model. Huber's
program model is also similar to what is called a bureaucratic
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characterization. According to Huber (1981), in the program model
I
organizational decisions are consequences of the programs and
programming of the unit involved. The decision process is
characterized as following a set of programs and these programs can
be identified. These programs are also sometimes called standard
operating procedures (SOPs) and the programs or SOPs are the major
determinants of the decision that occurs. For a specific decision a
number of standard operating procedures may be used to either
provide information, evaluate or process information or arrive at a
choice among alternatives. In this model, according to Chaffee
(1981), "problems are not perceived intrinsically, but in terms of
the way the organization happens to be structured. New alternatives
are relatively unlikely to surface and solutions produced by any
given routine tend to resemble one another over time, building a
kind of tradition (p. 28). "
Decision makers apparently repeat past procedures because they
appear to work. Also, similar decisions will follow similar
processes within a given organization. The quality of decisions
that result from this bureaucratic process depend on the quality of
the procedures and programs used within a given organization. The
actual programs used within one organization depend upon the
organizational learning that occurs and the participants brought
into the organization from other organizations who transfer their
prior learning to the new organization. For the bureaucratic
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characterization it should be possible to identify the application
of a number of standard procedures for a decision task. Also, there
should be clear procedures for allocating participants and
procedures to a specific decision task.
The Trans Union and Chamberlain examples of acquisition
decision processes presented in the first chapter are perhaps best
characterized as bureaucratic.
Political Process Characterization
Characterizing organizational decision making as a political
process has been very popular in the last few years (cf., Pfeffer,
1980). If a decision process is characterized as political, one
implies that the participants in the decision process have
conflicting values and objectives related to that decision and that
decisions are determined by the self-interest of the persons
involved, rather than by the interest of the organization. Huber
(1981) states that in the political/competitive model
"organizational decisions are the consequences of the application of
strategies and tactics by units seeking to influence decision
processes in directions that will result in choices favorable to
themselves (p. 3)«" When two or more actors are involved, it is
possible that the decision process will become political. Also, one
participant may use power to force acceptance of his views. Power
according to Pfeffer (1980) is the ability to get others to do what
you want them to do.
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Actually determining that a decision process is political is
difficult. Examples of the use of power would help support the
claim that the process is political. Also, examples of information
distortion and possibly examples of conflicts and disputes would
also indicate that the process is political rather than rational or
bureaucratic. But, much political behavior is hidden by
organizational norms of rationality (March and Simon, 1958).
Therefore, it is very difficult to definitively state that a process
is political rather than rational or bureaucratic. Corporate
acquisition decision processes, at least in some cases, appear to be
political. In large corporations there are examples where one
manager supports an acquisition because that company will be
assigned to his or her division and that may give him power or
prestige. Another manager may fight the same acquisition because he
feels that the acquisition would enhance the power and prestige of
the first manager. Also, CEOs may purchase firms because of their
personal values rather than because the firm fits in with the needs
of the company and is an economically rational decision to make. A
number of examples of politics in corporate acquisition decision
making appear in the literature.
For example, Crane (1966) states "A great deal of detailed
analysis may be performed on information concerning the
prospects. .. .However, the final decisions frequently seem to be
based largely on politics or on "feelings" about certain companies,
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rather than on sound, logical considerations. The detailed analysis
may not be used adequately in the final decision at the board of
directors level because of the natural difficulty of digesting the
volume of paper and untangling the many interlaced decision elements
in relatively infrequent and brief board meeting (p. 581-2)."
The role of personal values and organizational politics in the
corporate acquisition decision process is also noted by O'Connor
(1980, p. 15). She states "In addition to the chief executive,
other members of top management influence the corporate development
organization by the personal biases they bring to corporate strategy
decisions. These are largely based on their own previous successes
and failures, training, education and history of the organization as
well. And even though definitive objectives and guidelines are laid
out, they may be skirted when it comes to the final decision, some
survey participants reveal. In some cases, strategic objectives are
not really defined in order to avoid the discomfort of justifying a
decision that is purely the bias of a key executive."
Finally, Bing (1980) states "A wise planning or acquisition
executive will recommend companies for acquisition that accommodate
the CEO's desires, whims, and preferences. The ultimate political
acquisition may be the leading industry either in the CEO's hometown
or the town where he went to college (p. 9)." And Bing (1980) notes
that "Few acquisitions are ever made in which someone in the buying
organization does not question the wisdom of an acquisition. The
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opposition may be open and hostile or subtle and restrained in the
probably correct belief that vigorous opposition would be
detrimental to their careers. A CEO enthused (sic) about an
acquisition is more likely to consider those opposed as having
doubtful loyalty and low intelligence instead of being vigilant
executives advocating and protecting the buyer's best interest (p.
32). "
Incremental Characterization
Lindblom (1959) explains the incremental characterization and
method of successive limited comparisons. He states that it
involves:
1) Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the
needed action are not distinct from one another but
are closely intertwined.
2) Since means and ends are not distinct, means-end
analysis is often inappropriate or limited.
3) The test of a "good" policy is typically that various
analysts find themselves directly agreeing that it is
the most appropriate means to an agreed objective.
4) Analysis is drastically limited:
i) important possible outcomes are neglected
ii) important alternative potential policies are
neglected
iii) important affected values are neglected
5) A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or
eliminates reliance on theory.
When the incremental characterization is formulated in this
way, the following indicators suggest an incremental decision
process: goals are not formulated prior to identification of an
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acquisition prospect; agreement of participants, especially experts,
is stressed in the process; and few analytical tools are used to
evaluate prospects.
A possible example of a firm where decision making may be
characterized as incremental is Gulf and Western. According to a
case in Paine and Naumes (1982), Gulf and Western will not make
acquisitions that are actively, and vocally, opposed by relatively
important groups such as regulators or management of the firm to be
acquired. Also, Gulf and Western emphasizes man-agement strengths in
acquisition analysis. The potential for future profits for the
industry are also considered.
Richard Smith, president of General Cinema, provides another
example. He says "I am doing most of the worrying about
diversification myself. The process is time-consuming; it took 15
months to work out the first soft-drink acquisition. We don't have
a planning or corporate development office at General Cinema. It
doesn't make much sense when you are looking for only one
opportunity (Uyterhoever, Ackerman, and Rosenblum, 1977, p. 459)."
He apparently seeks consensus and uses few analytical tools.
Perhaps the best example of an incremental approach is decision
making at Marriott. In a recent article (Shapiro, 1982), J. W.
"Bill" Marriott called the company's recent acquisition of the Host
chain of airport restaurants and gift shops so obvious that it was
'a no-brainer' (p. 9)." And Shapiro implies that Bill Marriott's
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interest in fast boats and things nautical prompted the company to
buy the Sun Lines cruise ships. Bill Marriott termed that
acquisition "...a big mistake. We thought it was floating hotels.
It's not." Sun Lines is profitable, but, Marriott says, "it's not a
business we can grow in (p. 19)."
These three examples are not clear indicators of an incremental
approach. However, Gulf and Western's limited analysis, the focus
on a single opportunity by Smith at General Cinema, and the limited
analysis and perhaps lack of clear goals at Marriott, do suggest the
decision process may have been incremental. In the case of
Marriott, the process may also be characterized as political.
Garbage Can Characterization
In the Garbage Can characterization, activities occur, but they
are not predictable, participants select themselves for decision
processes, participants come and go during the process, work on some
activities, leave but may return, and choice is a fortuitous coming
together of solutions, problems and participants.
Characterizing a decision process as haphazard or what Chaffee
(1981) says is an accident of timing and interest is repulsive to
zany managers and management theorists. But they are perhaps guided
more by the normative literature than by actual instances of
behavior in organizations. Decision processes characterized as
garbage cans involve opportunistic behavior in that a decision
occurs because there is some fortuitous intersection of problems
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looking for solutions, solutions looking for problems, and an
opportunity for making a decision.
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) originated the idea of the
garbage can characterization. They state "Although organizations
can often be viewed conveniently as vehicles for solving well
defined problems or structures within which conflict is resolved
through bargaining, they also provide sets of procedures through
which participants arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing
and what they have done while in the process of doing it. From this
point of view, an organization is a collection of choices looking
for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in
which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which
they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work (p.
2)."
Salter and Weinhold (1979) provide some evidence that the
garbage can characterization is appropriate for acquisition
decisions. They state that diversification through acquistion may
take only weeks to execute. "While such a strategy can be the result
of detailed planning, it often is not. Acquisition candidates tend
to become available without advance notice. Favorable environmental
conditions - such as the state of the equity market - can develop
and disappear without a clear warning signal. Unexpected
competitive bids for previously identified acquisition candidates
can often raise both the 'ante' and the pressure for corporate
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strategists. Swift, decisive action - not sustained planning - is
thus a hallmark of many diversifying acquisitions (p. U)."
Christensen, Andrews, and Bower (1978) state "..sudden
opportunity or major tactical decisions may intrude to distract
attention from distant goals to immediate gain. Thus the
opportunity for a computer firm to merge with a large finance
company may seem too good to pass up, but the strategy of the
company will change with the acquisition or its ability to implement
its strategy will be affected. A strategy may suddenly be
rationalized to mean something very different from what was
originally intended because of the opportunism which at the
beginning of this book we declared the conceptual enemy of strategy.
The necessity to accommodate unexpected opportunity in the course of
continuous strategic decision is a crucial aspect of process (p.
760)."
Finally, Bradley and Korn (1981) note "...that issues of
personal chemistry, chance occurrences, and subjective influences -
including the actions and opinions of peers - are usually as
important as rational quantitative analysis in making a final
corporate decision regarding an acquisition or merger (p. 213)."
Critique of Characterization Approach
The characterization approach stereotypes decision making and
offers little insight for changing or improving decision processes.
Also, despite some factors that may indicate that a specific
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categorization is most appropriate for a given decision process,
actually classifying decision processes is difficult. The
incremental characterization is especially difficult to apply to
single decisions. Also, having five discrete characterizations
makes it difficult to state that part of a decision process is
bureaucratic while another part is political. An absence of
contingency factors in characterization theories also limits the
utility of this approach.
Descriptive Decision Process Characteristics Models
Another approach to evaluating decision processes is to measure
characteristics of the process. Acquisition decision processes may
have characteristics that differ systematically depending upon the
context of the decision. Also, some characteristics of the
acquisition decision process may be unique or clearly identifiable
with acquisition decision making. Finally, some characteristics may
predict the success of acquisitions.
Duncan (197*0 develops and tests a model that links
characteristics of a decision-unit's environment to five structural
characteristics of the unit: 1) hierarchy of authority; 2) degree of
impersonality; 3) degree of participation in decision making; 4)
degree of specific rules and procedures; and 5) degree of division
of labor. This model has some similarities to the three models
presented in more detail in this section. Duncan's model may be
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useful in characterizing acquisition and corporate development units
in organizations that have them. Also, some of the concepts are
relevant for characterizing acquisition decision processes.
Now let's examine in some detail the characteristics models of
Snyder (1958), Hage (1980), and the Bradford Group (1981).
Snyder Model
Snyder (1958) develops a decision making approach for studying
political phenomena. In his paper, he identifies factors that may
explain decision making behavior. He makes only a limited
contribution to the development of concepts of decision process
content. His major contribution is a typology of decision
situations. Snyder argues that three key variables, in addition to
the decision situation, explain decision-making behavior: spheres
of competence, including specialized functions, authority relations,
basis of participation and reciprocal expectations; communication
and information; and motivation of the decision makers, including
personality of decision makers.
Snyder' s analysis emphasizes the interaction of the
decision-maker with the various elements of the situation. He
suggests this interaction affects the decision makers' scale of
preference and the set of rules that govern the actions of the
decision-makers, e.g., the manner in which alternative choices are
presented and the procedure for voting.
According to Snyder a "situation" is an analytical concept that
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points to a "pattern of relationships among events, objects,
conditions, and other actors organized around a focus (objective,
problem, course of action) which is the center of interest for the
decision-makers (p. 18). " He presents the following typology for
classifying decision situations:
a) Structured vs. unstructured situations - the relative
degree of ambiguity and stability
b) Situations having different degrees of requiredness -
the amount of pressure to act and its source
c) The cruciality of situations - their relatedness to, and
importance for, the basic purposes and values of the
decision-makers
d) Kinds of affect with which the situation is endowed by the
decision-makers - threatening, hostile
e) How the problem is interpreted and how its major functional
characteristic is assigned - political, moral, economical,
military, or a combination of these
f) The time dimension - the degree of permanence attributed to
various situations
g) The degree to which objective factors impose themselves on
the decision-makers - the number of uncontrollable factors
and imponderables
He says of this typology, that "perhaps the chief advantage of
such a breakdown is to remind us of the fact that certain objective
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properties of a situation will be partly responsible for the
reactions and orientations of the decision-makers and that the
assignment of properties to a situation by the decision-makers is
indicative of clues to the rules which may have governed their
particular responses (p. 18)."
Hage Model
According to Hage (1980) "Whether the decision is of high or
low risk, it goes through a process. To analyze this process, it
might be useful to think of the decision-issue as having a
trajectory. This trajectory passes from individual to committee to
individual to staff meeting and the like (p. 11 6)." Hage argues the
process by which decisions are made can be predicted even if it
appears to be a highly unique phenomenon.
Hage defines the following thirteen characteristics of a single
decision trajectory: 1) The degree of routinization is the extent
to which specified steps in the process are defined and used; 2)
The degree of delegation is the extent to which the bulk of the
process occurs at lower echelons; 3) Duration is the length of time
between the first proposal and final decision outcome; 4) The
intensity of participation is the amount of effort each interest
group expends; 5) The amount of discussion is the amount of time
spent considering verbally the decision-issue; 6) The extensity of
participation is the number of interest groups involved; 7) The
amount of information search is the extent to which the interest
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groups seek facts relative to a decision-issue; 8) The stability of
coalition refers to the extent of change in the combination; 9) The
amount of joint creation is the extent to which the final decision
outcome is the product of the ideas of various interest groups
and/or individuals; 10) The amount of negotiations is the amount of
time spent bargaining; 11) The amount of deliberate delay is the
amount of time spent in avoiding a final decision; 12) The amount
of conflict is the extent of disagreement among the interest groups;
and 13) The duration of conflict is the amount of time the
disagreement continues.
Hage also develops a model (see Figure 2.1) for what he calls a
single decision trajectory* Two variables determine the content of
the decision process in his model: risk and frequency of the
decision.
For high risk decisions, Hage hypothesizes that high risk of
the decision-issue is positively related to intensity of information
search, amount of discussion and stability of coalitions. Duration
of the process and amount of joint creation are considered outcomes
in Hage 'a model and both are positively related to information
search and the amount of discussion. The model has a number of
other relationships.
Low risk decisions, according to Hage, have different decision
processes that are determined by the frequency of occurrence of the
decision issue. Frequency is positively related to the degree of
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FIGURE 2.1
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routinization and delegation. Routinization is negatively related
to information search and the amount of discussion, but positively
related to extensity of participation. Degree of delegation is
negatively related to extensity of participation and intensity of
participation.
The Bradford Group Model
Astley, Axelson, Butler, Hickson and Wilson (1981), a group of
researchers at the University of Bradford, argue that there are two
fundamental factors that explain the nature of decision making: the
task complexity of the decision and the political cleavage of the
interests involved. They think that separately and jointly these
factors explain the content of the decision making process.
The Bradford Group defines complexity as the extent to which
the topic of the decision making process in intricate, is made up of
multiple considerations and is difficult to evaluate. They think
that complexity may be measured by a combination of indicators: by
the rarity or novelty of a topic, by the precision or specificity of
the criteria for evaluating a topic, and by the clarity of the
definition of the topic.
They define cleavage, a word taken from political science where
it denotes divisions in a community, as the extent to which
interested parties to the decision tend to split apart. They think
that cleavage may be measured by: the number of objectives
represented by interest groups involved in a decision; the
55
disparities between interest groups; and the distribution of
influence. They note that the two concepts of complexity and
cleavage are related and interact. For example a more complex topic
might draw in more interest groups, and more interest groups may
make the matter more complex.
They hypothesize that complexity and cleavage explain the
content of the decision-making process. Astley et. al (1981) build
on the work of Butler et al. (1979,80) to define concepts related to
the content of the decision process. Their purpose is to develop an
arena theory of the decision process. They state "the term arena is
used because the theory deals with all kinds of processes and not
only those that proceed through bargaining. It denotes that sphere
of action energized by the identification of the decision topic (pp.
9-10)."
The Bradford group defines the following concepts associated
with the content of a decision process: Scrutiny is the degree of
effort given to collecting, examining, and diagnosing information;
Negotiation is the degree to which involved interest units interact
in the arena to obtain mutual accommodation; Discontinuity is the
degree to which decision making is subject to disruptions, delays
and reconsideration; Routinization is the extent to which specific
steps in the process are defined and used and the precedent for
decision making; four characteristics of outcomes are also
identified, rapidity, incrementality, optimal! ty and crescivity. A
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crescive process is one that occurs without a premeditated plan,
participants cannot predict where the decision process will lead.
It seems possible but difficult to measure these outcome variables.
Critique of the Characteristics Models
Characteristics models are relevant for evaluating corporate
acquisition decision processes. The examples in the first chapter
suggest that processes in different companies may have different
characteristics. The acquisition decision situation can be
characterized along Snyder's dimensions or in terms of risk or
frequency from the Hage model.
None of the current models however, are directly testable in
there entirety in the context of a study of corporate acquisition
decision processes. Also, the large number of concepts makes it
difficult to include all of them in one study.
Descriptive Phase and Sequential Models
In phase models activities can be grouped into discrete phases;
certain phases occur; there may be cycling among phases, activities
may be repeated; activities are not necessarily continuous;
activities cross levels in the organization hierarchy; and some
control mechanism determines what activities occur and when (e.g.,
managers , policies ) .
Both a general decision process phase model and more specific
sequential models of the corporate acquisition search and decision
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process are discussed in this section.
Mintzberg General Decision Process Model
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) develop a general
decision process model. They categorize decisions (a) by the
stimuli that evoked them, (b) by their solutions, and (c) by the
process used to arrive at them. The material that follows is from
their paper.
Decisions may be categorized as opportunity decisions, those
initiated on a purely voluntary basis, to improve an already secure
situation, such as a financially healthy firm that intentionally finds
and purchases a company. At the other extreme are crisis decisions,
where an organization responds to intense pressure. Here a severe
situation demands immediate actions, for instance, seeking a merger
to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, opportunity and crisis decisions may be
considered to form the two ends of a continuum. Problem decisions
are then defined as those that fall in between, stimulated by milder
pressures than crises. For example, when a seller approaches a
buyer .
Decisions may be classified by the type of solution. First,
the solution may be fully-developed at the start of the process
which happens when a seller approaches a buyer. Second, they may be
found fully-developed in the environment during the search process,
as is the case when firms have a planned search for acquisitions.
Third, custom-made solutions may be developed especially for the
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decision which may be the case when only part of a company is
acquired. Finally, the solution may combine ready-made and
custom-made features - ready-made solutions are modified to fit
particular situations, such as modifying purchase agreements and
terms of a merger. In acquisition situations the last two types of
solutions are probably collapsed into one category.
Decision processes have a number of phases. The identification
phase comprises two routines: decision recognition, in which
opportunities, problems, and crises are recognized and evoke
decision activity; and diagnosis, in which managers seek to
comprehend the factors that initiate the process and determine
cause-effect relationships for that particular decision situation.
According to Mintzberg et al., the heart of the decision-making
process is the set of activities that leads to the development of
one or more solutions to a problem or crisis or that elaborate an
opportunity. Development activities are described in terms of two
basic routines, search and design. Search is evoked to find
ready-made solutions; design is used to develop custom-made
solutions or to modify ready-made ones. Search is most relevant to
the acquisition decision process.
Selection is logically considered to be the last step in the
decision process: however, because the development phase frequently
involves a series of subdecisions, each requiring at least one
selection step, a decision process could involve many selection
59
steps. Many subdecisions occur during an acquisition decision
process, e.g., to make contact, to make an offer.
Selection is best described in terms of screen,
evaluation-choice, and authorization, it is typically a multistage,
iterative process, involving a "progressively deepening"
investigation of alternatives. Two patterns of the three routines
seem to occur. First, the selection routines are applied
sequentially to a single choice. Screening is used to reduce a
large number of ready-made alternatives to a few feasible
alternatives and to select a course of action; finally,
authorization is used to ratify the chosen course of action at a
higher level in the organizational hierarchy. In the second
pattern, a single selection step is itself multistage or nested.
All alternatives may be evaluated in a general way, then in
succeedingly more intense ways, or one choice can be subject to
authorization at successively higher level in the organization.
Acquisition decision processes could conceivably follow either
pattern.
The evaluation-choice routine may be considered to use three
modes: judgment, bargaining, and analysis. In judgment, one
individual makes a choice using procedures that he does not, and
perhaps cannot, explain; in bargaining, selection is made by a group
of decision makers with conflicting goal systems, each exercising
judgment; and in analysis, factual evaluation is carried out,
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generally by technocrats, followed by managerial choice using either
a judgment or bargaining approah. These three approaches have
similarities to the decision process characterizations discussed
earlier in this chapter.
Judgment according to Mintzberg et al., seems to be the favored
mode of selection. They speculate that judgment is used because it
is the fastest, most convenient, and least stressful of the three;
they feel this mode is especially suited to the kinds of data found
in strategic decision situations. Bargaining is also common.
Three routines to support the decision process are also
described: decision control; communication; and political routines.
A number of dynamic factors associated with decision processes are
also discussed: interruptions caused by environmental forces;
timing delays and speedups; feedback delays while waiting for
information; comprehension cycles to understand and process
information; and failure recycles that occur when problems are
encountered. All of these dynamic factors seem relevant to
acquisition decision processes.
This general model helps one understand some of the dynamics of
the corporate acquisition decision process. The more specific
models that follow provide additional details of the process.
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Acquisition Search and Decision Process Models
Four models of the acquisition decision process are presented
in this section, i.e., the Fogg, Bradley and Korn, Parsons and
Baumgartner, and Boucher models. The models have many similarities
and they seem representative of the many models in the literature.
Different terms, sequences and number of steps are used in the
models, but the redundancy and repetition of concepts suggests that
some activities commonly occur in acquisition search and decision
processes.
Fogg Model. According to Fogg (1976) assuming that the
opportunity identification stage of planning has been completed;
that industries suitable for acquisition have been identified; that
adequate prescreening has occurred; and that established criteria
have been met. "Then the steps in the acquisition process are: (1)
preliminary market research; (2) set criteria for acceptance of a
candidate; (3) identification of candidates; (4) ranking of
candidates —preliminary screening; (5) initial contact with prime
candidate; (6) detailed information collection (a) internal to the
candidate (b) external information; (7) financial and market
analysis; (8) negotiation and agreement in principle; (9)
confirmation studies of (a) market information, and (b) internal
data and assumptions; (10) closing (p. 95). " This model seems more
prescriptive than descriptive, only steps 5 through 10 seem to occur
in most acquisition decisions. Steps 1 to U may occur when a formal
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search is used to identify prospects.
Bradley and Korn Model. Bradley and Korn (1981, p. 212)
propose the following protocol for the acquisition process: 1)
Determinative stage where managers clarify and state acquisition
objectives and determine top mangement and board commitment; 2)
Scouting stage in which managers search for and/or otherwise
identify acquisition candidates and make initial candidate
assessments; 3) Consultation stage where manangers in the
acquiring company consult with outside legal, accounting, banking
and other professionals; 4) Strategic stage where top managers and
staff determine the impact of the transaction on both parties and
managers in the acquiring company, develop a negotiating strategy
and a more detailed company analysis; 5) Sensor stage in which
managers determine likely potential interest by direct or indirect
contact; 6) Vamp stage where managers carry out the "act of
seduction" coupled with regulatory notice and approvals; 7)
Proposal stage; 8) Deal stage; and 9) Management
(post-acquisition) stage. They note that "it should be recognized
that every situation will be different, that some corporations will
have a more formal approach than others (p. 212)." This model is
more colorful than than the Fogg model, but not necessarily more
descriptive of the process. Steps 3 to 8 may be included in the
acquisition decision process in many companies.
Parsons and Baumgartner Model. Parsons and Baumgartner (1970,
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p. U3) also present a model of the acquisition process. They feel
that in essence the steps in acquiring a company are these: 1)
Determining objectives to be achieved by acquisition; 2) Setting
criteria governing candidates to be sought; 3) Preliminary
screening to develop a list of candidates; U) Preliminary
investigation to determine one or several prospects with whom to
negotiate. This investigation includes extensive analysis; 5)
Negotiation involves direct contact with the merger candidate. It
includes initial contact, plant visits, exchange of information and
bargaining; 6) The pre-closing investigation is a thorough audit,
study and analysis of the merger candidate to confirm tentative
conclusions or to detect discrepancies not previously revealed; 7)
Closing is the meeting in which all documents consummating the
merger are exchanged; 8) Post-merger integration, as the name
implies, consists of dovetailing the organization, functional
practices and administrative practices of each company with the
other.
Parsons and Baumgartner (1970) note that "the executive time
involved in winnowing out the final candidate for merger is
enormous. One estimate is 2,600 hours: 4 hours each for determining
the initial 100 prospects, 20 hours each for preliminary
investigation of twenty of these, 200 hours each for three or four
remaining prospects and 1,000 hours in final investigation and
closing. Each of these steps requires a higher level of talent,
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leading to direct involvement of the acquirer's chief executive
himself (p. 43) •" This model is similar to the Bradley and Korn
model, but the terminology is less colorful. This model may best
describe the process in firms' s that plan and search for prospects.
Boucher Model. According to Boucher (1980) simple sequential
acquisition models similar to those of Bradley and Korn and Parsons
and Baumgartner were considered by the participants in his study
(see Chapter 3) as "naive in the extreme and of no serious value in
depicting the merger process (p. 120)." But, his study did not
discover a better model. Rather, he found that at the most general
level acquisition decision processes have the following common
steps: initial contact, mutual evaluation, negotiation and
decision. He concluded based on his interviews "that mergers are a
very individual business (p. 120)."
Summary and Critique of Relevant Theories and Models
The acquisition decision process seems to: involve more than
one participant and many activities; emphasize rational, economic
concerns, but it does not exclude all political concerns; have
differentiated roles, and tasks are often delegated; involve some
people from outside the organization at one or more points in the
process; and involve a sequence of decisions made either implicitly
or explicitly.
Why should the characteristics approach be used to study
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acquisition decision processes? As noted previously, contingency
factors are included in the models; the decision process
characteristics can be measured; and such an approach can lead to
prescriptions for improving the process. At present we have some
knowledge of the characteristics of the acquisition process because
of the large amount of descriptive research and writing in this
area.
According to Duncan (1979), "If one understands what the
phenomena are and understands their characteristics, then one is in
a better position to start focusing on causes and relationships
among the various components of the phenomena and thus start using
quantitative techniques (p. U25)." Research on acquisition decision
processes has reached the point where causes and relationships can
be explored.
Finally, this project may also provide a link between the
characterizations and the characteristics approach. For example,
certain levels or ranges of specific decision process
characteristics or groups of characteristics may indicate that a
specific decision process characterization is the most appropriate
descriptor of the situation.
It should be noted that corporate acquisition decision making
is often very secretive and therefore it is difficult to get
accurate information for testing the above theories. Both the
potential buyer and seller want to keep decision process activities
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secret for a number of reasons: 1) knowledge of the search being
conducted by the potential buyer can lead to insider trading in the
stock of the potential seller; 2) potential competitors for the
seller may be alerted to the deal and make counter offers; 3)
employee morale at the potential selling firm may be hurt if the
possible acquisition is disclosed prematurely; and 4) in general,
neither party wants to raise unrealistic expectations. After the
acquisition has been made, managers are more willing to discuss the
process, but information remains difficult to obtain.
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Chapter 3
A REVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND
CORPORATE ACQUISITION DECISION MAKING RESEARCH
Research about organizational decision making has increased
during the past ten years, but no coherent pattern of methodologies
or results is apparent. The primary purpose of this chapter is to
summarize prior research and insure that this research project
incorporates and benefits from that research. This chapter briefly
discusses some recent research on organizational decision making;
and then summarizes ten major studies on corporate acquisition
search and decision making.
Research on Organizational Decision Making
Butler, Astley, Hickson, Mallory and Wilson (1979) reviewed the
history of research on organizational decision making. They noted a
research peak in the late 1950's and early 1960's and again at the
end of the 1960's. Since 1975 the number of studies has increased
and organizational decision making has become an important area of
research. According to Butler et. al (1979) research is also
changing. They state that "in 1976, first, there is a sudden jump
from industrial firms to educational organizations, namely,
universities and colleges. Second, and far more significant, is the
leap to a study of no fewer than 25 'strategic decision processes'
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by Mintzberg and co-workers (1976), historically a milestone of
skyscraper proportions. Not only are almost as many decision
processes recorded as by all other authors put together but they are
on manufacturing, service, educational, governmental, and health
organizations; and they form the first truly comparative study
across heterogeneous examples. All 25 are analyzed systematically
in the same terms, not just left to stand side by side unconnected
(p. 9)."
This section briefly summarizes some of the recent research on
organizational decision making. Pfeffer and Salancik (197U), Hills
and Mahoney (1978) and Chaffee (1981) have conducted longitudinal,
quantitative case studies of University budgetary decision making.
All of these studies tested the characterizations discussed in the
previous chapter to determine which was most descriptive of the
decision process. The bureaucratic and political characterizations
were both predictive of academic budgets in the Pfeffer and Salancik
study. The rational characterization received some support in the
Chaffee study. And according to Hills and Mahoney, a coalitional
model (Cyert and March, 1963) was most descriptive of budget
behavior when resources were relatively scarce.
Fahey (1981) examined the analytical and political processes
that may influence energy management decisions. He used interviews
to collect data in six large multi-divisional firms. His results
are general conclusions and impressions, rather than quantified
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data. Fahey also develops seven descriptive propositions about
organizational decision making based on his results. His general
conclusion is that "Strategic decision making emerges as a complex,
multi-organizational level phenomenon, with many individual
decisions simultaneously in process... behavioral and political
processes can critically impact any stage of a decision making
system or any phase of a specific decision process (p. 58). "
Duncan (1973; 1974), Stagner (1969), Stein (1981) and the
Bradford Group (1981) have examined characteristics models. Stagner
used a questionnaire to gather data about decision making from 250
corporate vice presidents. He used factor analysis to identify
three dimensions of the decision making process: managerial
cohesiveness; formal procedures in decision making; and
centralization-decentralization. Scores on these factors did not,
however, predict the profitability of firms.
A number of characterizations of the organizational decision
process were investigated by Stein (1981) using a decision
characteristics approach. He used questionnaires to collect data
from top managers in 64 companies about an important, recent
decision. Stein provided the managers process statements and then
used factor analysis to identify process dimensions. He found the
following four primary decision process dimensions: nature of
analysis; search activity; flexibility of definition of the problem;
and group behavior.
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In the Bradford Group (1981) study, the characteristics model
discussed in the previous chapter was tested. They collected data
on 150 decisions made in 30 British organizations, including a small
brewery, a symphony orchestra, a police organization and several
manufacturing firms. They used regression analysis to test their
hypotheses. The results indicate that complexity and cleavage
equally explain the amount of negotiation. Cleavage best explains
the amount of scrutiny. Complexity best explains discontinuity and
centrality. And neither variable explains any of the variance in
the duration of the decision process.
Duncan (197U) studied 22 decision units in 3 manufacturing and
3 research and development organizations. A major finding of his
study is that units experiencing high perceived uncertainty and
either high or low perceived influence exhibited more participation
in decision making, less rules and procedures, and less division of
labor in their non-routine decision making profiles.
Three studies have had more limited objectives and focused on a
single type of decision in multiple organizations. Daft (1978)
examined the effect of three organizational context variables, i.e.,
size, organizational affluence and employee education, on resource
allocation decisions in 91 Illinois public high schools. He found
that large and affluent school organizations allocated a greater
percentage of their budget to overhead functions than did other
schools.
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Patchen (197U) found that the number of participants in
purchasing decisions varied more because of the magnitude of the
decision involved than because of the company. For twenty decisions
rated by the researcher as being of moderate or major importance, an
average of 19.8 persons were mentioned as participants, while for 13
more minor decisions, the average was 7.9 persons. Patchen 's
results are based on interviews with purchasing directors in eleven
companies.
Strategic decisions made in government-controlled enterprises
were investigated by Mazzolini (1981). He used a conceptual
framework based on Allison's (1971) work when he collected data in
field interviews. A number of investigators conducted SOU
open-ended interviews in 123 organizations in the European Economic
community from 1975-1978. Mazzolini emphasized investment and
resource allocation decisions. He presented some frequency data,
but the results are primarily generalizations and impressions.
Among other conclusions, Mazzolini feels that his results show that
is is hard for managers to make a new type of decision and that in
those cases the decisions are not always appropriate. He also
states that "Decisions are implemented through existing routines,
often ill-suited to novel kind(s) of strategies. While leaders can
try to intervene to correct certain inefficiencies, their reach is
particularly limited here. It is only over time, with repeated
decisions of a given type and established operations in a given
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field, that such problems are alleviated (p. 29).M
Lyles and Mitroff (1980) studied the problem formulation part
of the decision process. Mintzberg et al. (1976), as noted
previously, investigated and developed a sequential, phase model of
the decision process. Witte (1972) also examined the phase model
and his research does not support the hypothesis that decision
processes can be defined in terms of discrete phases.
March and Olsen (1976) report a number of case studies that
examined decision processes from the perspective of the garbage can
characterisation. Pettigrew (1973) also reports a case study. He
investigated the politics of organizational decision making in the
adoption, installation, and use of new computer systems.
There are few research case studies on acquisition search and
decision processes. Both Carter (1971) and Dory (1978) collected
case studies, but their results are discussed in the next section.
There are however, many teaching cases that have been written that
present some information on acquisitions and mergers.
Some of the relevant case studies examined include Mobil Oil
Corp. (Soltys and Roth, 1977), Garnett Corporation (Grant, 1978),
Bishopric, Inc. (Hamermesh, 1977), Taylor Wine Company (Uyterhoeven,
Ackerman 4 Rosenbloom, 1977) and Anglo Norness Shipping Company
(Uyterhoeven et al., 1977).
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Review of Research on
Corporate Acquisition Decision Making
During the past 20 years, ten major research studies have
'
investigated issues related to corporate acquisition search and
decision processes. All of them provide descriptive information
about the content of corporate merger and acquisition decision
processes. The studies included in this review are: Ansoff,
Brandenburg, Portner and Radosevich (1971); Birley (1976); Boucher
(1980); Brown and O'Connor (1974); Carter (1971); Dory (1978);
Kitching (1967); Mace and Montgomery (1962); O'Connor (1980); and
Stahl and Zimmerer (1982).
Mace and Montgomery ( 1962)
The first major study of corporate acquisition decision
processes was conducted by Mace and Montgomery (1962). In their
study they interviewed executives of U.S. firms actively engaged in
the acquisition process. During the year and a half of the field
study, more than 275 executives in 75 manufacturing firms were
interviewed.
Selection of companies for this study was purposive and
reflected convenience more than design. Some executives were
referred to the researchers and some agreed to participate after the
researchers directly contacted their company. Companies contacted
by the researchers had been prominantly mentioned in newspaper
articles as involved in acquisitions. The executives who were
interviewed were either involved in making acquisitions or were
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employed by firms that were being acquired.
i
The study emphasized management problems of acquisitions. At
the time of the interviews, executives and their firms were at
!
various phases in the acquisition process and they were performing
various roles. Apparently, no systematic set of research questions
was asked of all executives, rather the researchers asked them more
generally about what was occurring during the acquisition process.
Many of Mace and Mongtomery's findings and conclusions are
relevant to understanding corporate acquisition search and decision
processes. They concluded that in general "the process of
acquisition ... is not a mechanical, sequential performance of
essential steps. Rather, the elements of acquisition are
intertwined — evaluation goes on during negotiations and the
problems of integration are profoundly affected by what is said by
representatives of the acquirer and the acquired during business
discussions (p. 8)."
Mace and Montgomery also believe that corporate growth programs
cannot be successful without a clear definition of objectives: they
found that "The failure to define objectives seems to result in a
sense of top management dissatisfaction, a feeling that something
needs to be done. Under these circumstances top executives may
become overanxious to buy something that looks good to them without
defining what is good, and too often they embark on purchase
programs later to be regretted (p. 65)." This finding supports the
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incremental characterization of decision making discussed in
Chapter 2.
Mace and Montgomery emphasize the importance of CEO involvement
in the corporate acquisition decision process. They state "in every
company in which there was a successful acquisition program, the
chief operating executive was personally involved. There were no
exceptions (p. 75)." They temper this conclusion somewhat a few
pages later when they state that in several cases success was
achieved by a senior executive who worked closely with the president
(p. 80). Also, they conclude that division and department general
managers should limit their role to identifying possible acquisition
prospects and that other acquisition activities should be carried
out by headquarters executives.
Based on their interviews, Mace and Montgomery determined that
staff groups concerned with acquisitions varied from a single
specialist in a small company to a 12 person unit in a very large
company.
Concerning the acquisition decision process, Mace and
Montgomery conclude there are many differences when compared to
administration of a business. They found that many concepts are
different, the process can be intricate, and inexperienced people
slow the process down. They state "many staff executives, however,
who have gone through the process once, have become immeasurable
aids in subsequent negotiations and agreements to acquire (p. 85)."
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They also note that to deal with some of the problems associated
with making acquisitions, managers hire consultants.
Once a possible acquisition had been chosen for investigation,
an extensive search for information occured in many companies. A
summary report was then prepared from published information. This
report was the basis for deciding to approach an acquisition
prospect. If it was decided to approach the company, a strategy of
approach based on the characteristics of the people involved seemed
to lead to the greatest success. The managers of the most
successful acquiring firms were prepared to discuss the questions
commonly asked by managers of the prospect company on the first
visit. These questions included "Where will we fit?" or "What plans
do you have for our key people (pp. 124-127)?"
A final issue raised by Mace and Montgomery is that analysis of
acquisition prospects can be either too detailed or too superficial.
"We found many examples of managements who made fast and superficial
evaluations of companies which were acquired (p. 152)." But, they
also found a preoccupation with too much detail. Also, some
companies established very specific criteria for evaluating
prospects, but the authors conclude that "many company managements
do a much more careful job evaluating one man for possible
employment than they do in evaluating five, ten, or fifteen people
who would occupy key positions if the purchase was consumated (p.
162)."
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This study has serious methodological problems and some of the
descriptive results may be dated, but it is both interesting and
informative. The results support a number of the characterizations
i
from Chapter 2, and it suggests process characteristics specific to
acquisition and mergers.
Kitching (1967)
i
Another qualitative interview study of corporate acquisition
decision processes was conducted by Kitching (1967). The objective
of his study was to establish the underlying causes for variations
-
in the performance of acquisitions. Kitching interviewed executives
in 22 companies. The participants held various top-management
positions, including chief executives, senior vice president for
i
finance, controller, treasurer and director of planning or
acquisitions. The sales volume of the companies in the study ranged
from $25 million to $2 billion. Acquisitions were classified by
type, e.g. horizontal or conglomerate. All of the data was
collected in retrospective interviews about acquisitions that had
been completed from two to five years prior to the study. He
collected information about the decision process and qualitative and
financial assessments of success of the acquisitions.
Kitching found that the executives he interviewed felt more
uncomfortable about the relatively high risk associated with making
an acquisition compared with an equivalent investment in a new plant
(p. 86). Also, his data indicate that there was an especially high
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risk of failure in conglomerate mergers of all types, but especially
for concentric acquisitions. Also, a "size mismatch" (where the
acquired company's sales were less than 2% of the parent company
sales volume before the merger) occurred in 84 percent of the
acquisitions considered failures. A factor he calls organization
format, e.g., reporting relationships or autonomy of the seller
following the merger, was changed in 81 percent of failures.
He concludes that the critical element in the success of an
acquisition is the availability of managers who can catalyze the
change process after a merger. But he also notes "companies that
merely react to opportunities to purchase are less successful in
their acquisitions than those with an overall strategy which
includes an acquisition program. The more successful companies will
often actively solicit the sale of companies which they wish to
purchase (p. 91)."
Kitching reports two final conclusions: companies that make
successful acquisitions formulate a set of acquisition criteria
consistent with overall strategy and rigorously apply them (p. 91).
And managers underestimate the future funds required and management
time demanded following an acquisition.
Ansoff , Brandenburg, Portner. and Radosevich (1971)
The most extensive study of corporate acquisition decision
processes and outcomes was completed more than 10 years ago by
Ansoff, Brandenburg, Portner, and Radosevich (1971). Their study
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involved collection of data from secondary sources and a two-part
mailed questionnaire. The purpose of the study was to investigate
how firms conduct mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, the
following issues were studied: the reasons motivating an
acquisition; the degree of pre-planning; the actual manner of search
for acquisitions prospects; post-acquisition activities; and
relations to overall success based on objective and subjective
measures.
Of U12 D.S. firms mailed questionnaires, 93 useable responses
were received for the study. But, in only 62 firms could
relationships be studied "among a number of features of management
decision processes, individual firms' perception of their own
successes, and more objective performance measures (p. 19)." Many
of the firms in the study had made multiple acquisitions in the
period from 19^6 to 1965 and respondents were asked about their
firm's aquisition program in general rather than about any one
specific acquisition decision process.
The acquisition practices of the 93 firms returning
questionnaires are of particular interest. The authors found that
"36/1 of the acquiring firms engaged in intensive search for
acquisition candidates, 35% used a planned but less focused
broadcast method and 29% were passive recipients of suggestions,
with no preconceived limitations on the candidates (p. 32)." Also,
they found that "of the candidates whose acquisition was consumated,
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69/1 of the initial contacts were made by the acquiring firm (p.
33) •" They note an anomaly in that "only 5% of the firms that did
extensive search felt that they achieved all of their objectives, as
compared to M% for those that did not use significant resources on
the search process (p. 33). " By way of explanation, they note that
this difference is probably because the group that did not use
significant resources, also did not state their objectives in
advance of search and therefore had no means of comparison (p. 33).
Ansoff et al. found that in the evaluation of acquisition
candidates: Few people worked full-time on acquisitions, although
some firms had as many as 6 full-time people assigned to
acquisitions. The authors also note that for every acquisition
completed an average of 1.5 prospects were thoroughly evaluated and
almost one case of extensive negotiation without acquisition occurred
for every acquisition that took place. They found that the typical
length of time from first recognition of a firm as a prospect until
completion of the acquisition was about ten months (p. 3*0.
Ansoff et al. examined the integration of acquisitions and
found that in most cases a separate executive or management group
had primary responsibility for the majority of post-acquisition
integration activities. When the assignment was made to the
president or a special staff director fewer integration problems
occurred. They report that "about 41^ of the acquired firms were
allowed to operate in a completely autonomous fashion; another
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installed uniform policies and procedures in the acquiring and
acquired firms; 16$ of the acquisitions resulted in the integration
of the functional areas only, while another 15$ integrated all
activities (pp. 36-37)." According to the respondents, 75 percent
of acquisitions were integrated in less than 2 years. It is not
clear how firms that were allowed to operate autonomously were
treated in assessing the time required to complete integration
activities.
In this study a high failure rate for acquisitions was
reported. About 20% of all acquisitions were considered outright
failures and in 18$ unanticipated integration problems occurred.
Synergy did not materialize in 11$ of acquisitions; personnel
problems occurred in 43$ of the acquisitions and sales and earning
forecasts were not achieved for 34$ and 45$ of the acquisitions.
According to Ansoff et al., firms either used planning and
decision-making practices throughout the acquisition process or
consistently used a very cursory analysis. The authors separated
firms on this basis into what were called "ideal" firms that
consistently planned and followed decision making practices and
firms called "random acquirers". They found that extensive search
and planning were not associated with perceived success. With the
exception of a vertical acquisition strategy, type of acquisition
had little affect on success. This finding is very different from
that reported by Kitching (1967).
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This study examined only firms which had completed acquisition
programs some period of time before data were collected. For that
reason, financial data could be used to. assess the success of the
acquisition programs. Major financial performance variables used in
the analyses were sales, earnings, stock price, debt-equity ratio,
earnings on common equity and earnings on total assets. The
planning variables in the study were highly correlated with
financial performance, especially earnings on common equity and
earnings on total assets. And firms evaluating only a small number
of potential acquisitions in great depth performed much better than
firms looking at many companies. Integration was found to have
little influence on growth or performance. Ansoff et al. conclude
that firms with formal planning systems performed better and with
less variation in their results.
Carter (1971)
Carter studied six decisions, including three acquisition
decisions over a three month period in one organization. Several of
the decisions were made while he was studying the organization, the
others had been made shortly before. Carter interviewed many
managers in the organization and also collected external information
about the organization and its decision making. To verify the
information about the decision processes he examined public
statements, used corraborating interviews and re-interviewed some
participants. In all cases he guaranteed personal anonymity.
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The organization studied is called Comcor. It was organized in
1962 with headquarters in the northeast United States. Comcor
operated branch computer centers and related offices throughout the
U.S. at the time of the study. Its main business was providing
computer equipment and professional services to many commercial,
governmental and educational institutions. The three acquisitions
made by Comcor and investigated in Carter's study were a geological
consulting firm, a computer-plotter manufacturer, and a programming
company.
According to Carter, "There are obvious parallels in the
acquisition and investment decision at Comcor. Each reflected the
personality of a forceful president who sought advice and
suggestions, but always made the decision (p. 420)." Carter also
found substantial differences in the processes. First, the decision
structure was more centralized in the acquisition decisions, perhaps
because of the relative expertise of the president versus his staff.
"Given the operating history of the acquisitions, evidence was
available for the decision, reducing the president's need for expert
appraisal of potentials, as was the case so often in the investments
(p. U20)." Second, "the generation of alternatives was also
different. The three investments were initiated within the firm,
two of the acquisitions, although supported internally, were first
brought to Comcor by outsiders. Furthermore, in all three
acquisitions, the owners were looking for a buyer (p. U20)."
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There were also similarities in the investment and acquisition
decisions in that the president, his financial vice president and
other top managers jointly screened possibilities and consulted on
the decision. Carter concluded that for the acquisitions, the
decision seemed to rest mainly on a simple financial goal, with some
reference to geographic dispersion and sales. He felt that "the
lesser degree of uncertainty relating to project performance present
in the acquisition cases supports the argument that fewer factors
would be analyzed (p. 423)."
In all of the decisions, Carter found that "By the time the
president acted, uncertainty in underlying data was suppressed prior
to the decision by various subordinates; after the decision there
was no concern over uncertainty, as indicated by the repeated lack
of any contingency plans and the absence of standards for control or
evaluation. The president acted on the basis of, in his words,
positive thinking (p. 426). " Decision making at Comcor seems to be
both bureaucratic and incremental.
Brown and O'Connor (197*0
As part of a larger questionnaire study on the role of
corporate planning executives, Brown and O'Connor (197U) collected
descriptive information about the role of planners in corporate
acquisition decision processes. They received information from 111
of the 209 planners in large U.S. firms who received the
questionnaire (a 52 percent response rate) . The role of planners in
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acquisitions was also discussed in personal interviews with an
unspecified number of planners in firms headquartered in five major
U.S. cities.
Of the 111 respondents, 75 reported that they had
responsibilities for "recommending firms for addition to, or
association with, the company"; 54 conducted negotiations with
acquisition, merger or joint venture candidates; and 21 reported
they were responsible for broker contacts, analysis of the candidate
and/or structuring the package.
Brown and O'Connor note three distinct processes, and
organizational arrangements for making acquisitions:
In one, acquisitions are carried out primarily
at corporate headquarters, although operating
units may make recommendations. In the second
situation, practically all acquisitions activity
takes place at the operating-unit level. In the
third, acquisitions occur at either level,
depending upon the size of an enterprise sought
after, or whether it fits in with an operating
unit's current interests or represents an entirely
new business for the company. In all three
situations, the corporate planning unit's
acquisitons responsibility almost always entails
developing criteria for adding new businesses...
A number of corporate planning units also investigate
and evaluate specific candidates for acquisition
or merger brought to their attention by divisional
management, corporate management, or headquarters
acquisitions specialist (p. 23).
They found that acquisition work can be very time consuming.
One chief executive officer provided Brown and O'Connor with a
striking example of this. During an interview he noted that "after
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the company had reached an agreement in principle to acquire another
firm, more than 300 man-hours of his acquisitions staff's time were
required to complete the detailed arrangements (p. 23)."
Brown and O'Connor reach the following conclusions about the
acquisition search and decision process involvement of corporate
planners. First, the corporate planning director is involved in
acquisition decision-making and, sometimes involved in prospect
contact, and action-taking (p. 24). Second, many companies have
separated corporate planning from acquisitions work. In some cases,
"because acquisitions are the principal interest of the chief
executive, and he has reserved the company's efforts in this area
for himself (p. 24). " Many of these findings were confirmed in a
study by O'Connor (1980).
O'Connor (1980)
O'Connor's (1980) study describes the Corporate Development
function in 177 organizations. She received responses to her survey
from 177 of 627 senior corporate development executives (27 percent
response rate). She also conducted 23 in-depth interviews. The
managers represented companies of all sizes. But sixty nine percent
of the managers worked for manufacturing companies.
She collected data on: when the corporate development function
was organized in the companies; the purpose of corporate
development; organizational relationships to other units and to the
CEO; data on the responsibilities of the corporate development
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director for acquisition and merger activtities (p. 20); and
acquisition guidelines from some companies .
O'Connor quotes a company vice president on CEO involvement in
the acquisition decision process. He states, "A meaningful
acquisitions program will be successful only if it has the personal
commitment of the chief executive officer. To get the necessary
commitment, the CEO must have a significant role in setting goals
and establishing criteria used in evaluating acquisition
opportunities (p. 13)."
Based on O'Connor's findings, there is some disagreement among
practioners about what and how much should be done to investigate
acquisition prospects. She notes "The practice of sending visiting
teams to examine the physical sites is a common practice, but one
study participant chides the use of team evaluation. On the other
hand, others have omitted this step and regretted it. Tales abound,
for example, of firms that failed to look at one small - albeit
ultimately crucial - item that cost the acquirer millions of dollars
(p. U2).rt She also notes that "The time required in the total
acquisitions process to make an adequate analysis of the situation,
and to engage in proper negotiation, is prohibitive, some survey
participants say. One corporate executive states that he has a
small staff, and cannot meet the deadlines in a deal... (p. 42). "
Based on her interviews, O'Connor concluded that an initial
screening occurs to determine if a company may meet criteria and
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guidelines. But as the investigation of a target company progresses
corporate development subjects it to closer and closer scrutiny.
Analysts examine in more detail every aspect of the company's
finances, operations, products and markets, management, and
organization. Also the impact of the company on the parent
company's future is also evaluated (p. U1)."
O'Connor notes that the outcome of acquisitions is important to
the corporate development function. And she thinks "the failure or
success rate surely affects, or is affected by, every phase of the
acquisition process - search, criteria, negotiations, and so on (p.
4U)." She also notes that managers who have avoided problems common
to post-acquisition arrangements are "particularly attentive to
pre-merger details and very careful about assessing management, in
particular (p. 4U).rt
Birley (197U; 1976)
In Birley 's (1974; 1976) study, interviews were conducted with
52 managers of 16 United Kingdom companies that had made a total of
20 acquisitions. The study examined factors that might determine
the nature of the corporate planning system for acquisitions and it
evaluated the effects of planning on both financial and subjective
measures of acquisition success.
In her study, Birley found that in more than half of the
companies there was a very low level of planning. There was a
positive relationship between company size and the planning score,
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the larger the company the more complex and formal the planning
system (p. 69). But she found no relationship between planning and
profitability. She found that executives from the same companies
agreed on only about half of the acquisition criteria that had been
used to make the decision. Birley notes that agreement about the
acquisition processes was highest for questions of fact. Also, she
thinks some of the disagreement is attributable to secrecy,
emotional involvement of the participants, and involvement in only a
small part of the process by some of the respondents. Her analysis
suggests that detailed discussion among executives was minimal. And
she concludes that until pre-acquisition analysis and discussion
within the boardroom of acquiring firms improves, acquisitions will
be risky (p. 72).
Her findings on the relationship between planning and a
subjective evaluation of success are opposite those of Ansoff et al.
(1971). She concludes:
those companies which used informal planning
systems either disagreed upon the eventual
outcome of the venture or felt negative about it.
In the latter case these were situations where
the original acquisition was of a defensive nature
where only one company had been considered. On
the other hand, those companies with the more
formal approach to planning tended to search for
possible acquisitions, set up some form of financial
criteria, however loose, and tended to be more
satisfied with the eventual outcome (p. 72).
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Dory (1978)
Dory (1978) prepared detailed case studies of the acquisition
scanning process in six companies that had made successful
acquisitions. The case studies were based on secondary data and
interviews with top managers involved with acquisitions in the
companies. The studies were grouped into 3 pairs based on similar
acquisition objectives and diversification strategies. Also, two
firms were selected from the abrasives industry; two were from the
tobacco industry; and two were conglomerates. The case studies were
analyzed to determine if there were differences in the firms'
acquisition scanning process in terms of six characteristics: 1) the
types of information gathered; 2) sources of information about
markets to enter; 3) sources of information about prospects to
acquire; 4) types of information processing; 5) participants in the
process; and 6) the sequence of scanning activities.
The sources of information about prospects to acquire and some
of the information on the participants in the process and the
sequence of scanning activities are especially relevant to research
on the corporate acquisition decision process. Dory hypothesized
that two major variables influenced the acquisition scanning
process: acquisition objectives and diversification strategies. He
found that most acquisition objectives range from aggressive to
defensive. "Acquisition objectives are typically aggressive when
the firm faces its environment with more resources than it can
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utilize efficiently within its current markets. ... Acquisition
objectives are typically defensive when the firm faces threats or
risks within its markets and diversifies to escape the threats or
reduce the risks (pp. 11-12)."
Dory hypothesized that firms with defensive objectives use more
limited sources of information or may rely on external information
processing capabilities. And such firms may also be less
adventurous in seeking prospects (p. 12). In terms of the influence
of diversification strategy, Dory found "many firms following
related business strategies maintain large corporate staff groups
which can gather information about many potential related markets
for entry. By comparison, a firm following an unrelated business
strategy many have considerably less access to sources of
information and less staff resources to gather and process it (p.
13)."
Dory concludes that "firms seeking to enter markets related to
their existing businesses generally identified markets for entry
before gathering much information about prospects for acquisition
and often sought smaller, privately owned companies which would be
easier to integrate with existing operations. Firms seeking to
enter markets unrelated to their existing businesses generally
identified acquisition candidates before selecting markets to enter
and often sought larger publicly owned companies about which
substantial amounts of published information was available (p.
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202 )." His research indicates that industry variables appear
related to scanning in two ways. First, industry variables limited
the early search for markets to those similar to the firm's existing
businesses. Second, and he felt more important, industry variables
influenced the perceived urgency of making acquisitions (p. 203).
Dory also notes "firms generally gathered significantly more
information about prospects which competed in related markets than
about those which competed in unrelated markets (p. 203)."
Three company variables, according to Dory, explain differences
in scanning processes and success of acquisitions: organizational
policies, the management's experience with successful acquisitions,
and the leadership style of the chief executive officer. In firms
with successful acquisition scanning processes, organizational
policies facilitated the participation of managers in scanning and
decision making. Policies that involved more managers in scanning
and encouraged those managers to have broad contacts resulted in the
greatest success. Also, Dory notes "boards of directors were more
willing to actively support diversifying acquisition programs after
the firm had completed several acquisitions (p. 206)." Finally, he
concludes that a somewhat democratic leadership style supported a
relatively efficient scanning process because available information
was quickly gathered when alternatives were identified. And then
additional scanning was applied only to the more promising
alternatives (p. 207).
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Boucher (1980)
Fourteen experts on mergers and acquisitions including lawyers,
investment bankers, company presidents and professors/consultants
participated in Boucher's (1980) modified Delphi study of the
merger/acquisition process for the Federal Trade Commission. Each
participant was interviewed twice about motives for mergers, who
participates, the sequence of activities and the consequences of
mergers. The participants provided opinions about acquisition
decision processes in general rather than describing specific
acquisitions with which they were familiar. The opinions collected
in the first round of interviews were tabulated and served as inputs
to the second round of interviews. Participants could revise or
clarify their opinions during the second round.
According to Boucher, "the panel agreed that mergers occur
because they make business sense. ... A company may have decided to
enter a certain business and then found that the best way to proceed
is by buying another company, or it may have discovered a good
company and then decided to enter that business (pp. 24-25)." He
notes that taking advantage of sudden opportunities, is accepted and
encouraged by some panel members. Boucher notes that "before a
decision is reached, however, the company will consider as many
factors as possible, and weigh them as carefully as it can (p. 26)".
According to the panel, in large companies this kind of analysis was
almost always carried out. Analysis incorporates factors other than
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basic economic considerations, including potential impacts on
employees, customers, the community, and other constituencies (p.
26). Boucher's panel described a rational analytical process.
But, he notes that the process does not always follow this
pattern. For example, when there is a lot of competition for an
acquisition, a company may get forced into a bad deal. One of his
respondents explains a major problem:
there is essentially no market feedback in the
merger/acquisition process. Consequently, the
decision process is usually internal. Factors
like career goals become influential and they
are compounded by opportunistic factors. In
this situation, decisions can be affected by
what the CEO had for breakfast. People who don't
understand that there are big information problems
in this market -- high information costs and no
feedback —• or who forget that real human beings
are involved, are likely to misunderstand what
is happening. Government may think that the
company is crazy or doing something evil (pp. 26-27).
About the content of the acquisition decision process, Boucher
speculates:
if the motives are narrowly economic, then it
might be expected that the process would be highly
explicit, well-structured, and unambiguous. If
the motives are idiosyncratic to the top
management, the process would probably be highly
intuitive, spasmodic, and murky (p. 115).
The panel disagreed about who was principally responsible for
initiating the acquisition decision process. Estimates of large
mergers originated by the buyer ranged from 10 percent to 90
percent. For those originated by sellers, it ranged from 2 percent
95
to 40 percent. For investment bankers, from 5 percent to 75 percent
(p. 116). The interview results suggest that "perhaps the least
influential originator is the buyer's own in-house acquisitions
officer (p. 116)."
The study found no common process model except at the most
general level (see Chapter 2). Boucher notes that "billion dollar
firms have a formal corporate staff and program for strategic
planning for acquisitions. . .In smaller corporations, the activity
tends to be much less formalized or systematic, though formal
committees are increasingly coming into use. This is not to say
that smaller corporations are less likely to be deliberative ... (p.
120)."
Boucher concludes that "the participation of the CEO is vital
(p. 123)." A panelist commented "If a company is to be successful
in its acquisition program, the CEO must be personally involved.
Because of the importance of timing in these deals, you need a
negotiator who can cut through red tape and make whatever
concessions and accomodations may be necessary to close the deal. A
deputy without authority won't do (pp. 123-124)."
Based on the panel's responses, Boucher assembled a taxonomy of
types of buyers and explained how the decision process for these
types differ. Very large publicly-held national or international
firms, that are already conglomerates, use either formal or informal
systems for merger activities. If a large firm would become a
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conglomerate by making the merger, a formal system is used. Medium
sized, regional firms that become a conglomerate when the merger
takes place have less formal merger activities, but the managers are
looking for "fit" and a deal that makes "business sense".
Stahl and Zimmerer (1982)
Stahl and Zimmerer (1982) used a mail survey to obtain
judgements from managers in 42 firms that had completed acquisitions
during the 18 months preceeding their study. The managers were from
both medium-sized and large firms. Thirty-one worked in
manufacturing firms and eleven worked in service firms. Fifteen of
the responding managers were the president or senior vice presidents
of their companies, and twenty four headed corporate development.
Based on six criteria derived from the acquisition literature,
i.e. relative price earnings ratio, relative purchase price,
anticipated discounted cash flow, relative market share, relative
productive capacity and vertical integration, Stahl and Zimmerer
constructed a simulated decision exercise. In the mail survey, they
presented managers hypothetical acquisition candidates. The
managers were asked to indicate the relative importance of the six
criteria by distributing 100 points among them for each hypothetical
acquisition candidate. Stahl and Zimmerer found differences in
decision policies concerning the six criteria they had managers use
to evaluate hypothetical acquisition prospects. They concluded that
an acquisition policy is firm specific.
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Conclusions
>
Prior research on organizational and corporate acquisition
decision making remains small when compared to individual and group
decision making research, but the number of studies is increasing,
evidence is accumulating, and patterns are emerging. The studies
are primarily field research in multiple organizations and
therefore, the samples are usually small, convenience is often a
criterion in identifying participants, and unstructured interviews
are commonly used. Also, retrospective information is often
collected in the studies.
Much of the research supports a rational analytical
characterization of the corporate acquisition decision process, but
the research also indicates that decisions also result from
bureaucratic, political, incremental and garbage can processes.
The research on corporate acquisition search and decision
processes suggests a number of factors that may result in successful
acquisitions: experience of managers, CEO involvement, type of
acquisition, the search and decision process, planning, and the
amount of participation in the search and decision process. Each of
the above studies has limitations and the findings are sometimes
contradictory so clearly more research is needed on the important
issues raised in these studies about how to design and manage
corporate acquisition search and decision processes and programs.
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Chapter 4
AN ELABORATION OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Although research questions were presented in Chapter 1, the
purpose of this chapter is to develop and state specific research
hypotheses related to the questions. Specific hypotheses clarify
what the researcher expects to find during an investigation and aid
in presenting and interpreting research results.
But before specific hypotheses are developed it may be helpful
to restate the research questions. They are:
1) Do some decision-process activities predict short-run
success for an acquisition? Are some activities
unrelated to success or related to failure?
2) How involved is the chief executive officer (CEO)
in acquisition decision processes? Does the amount
of CEO involvement predict success? Under what
circumstances are CEOs involved?
3) Does participation in the decision process by the
management team predict short-run success? When
managers have participated in decision making, is
implementation of the decision evaluated as more
successful?
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4) Do managers use more complex and extensive decision
processes when an unrelated business is acquired?
5) Do managers who are experienced making acquisitions
design and use substantially different decision
processes than inexperienced managers?
6) Does the decision process differ when the organization
initiates and plans a search for acquisition prospects
as compared to when the process is unplanned and
initiated by the seller or a broker?
A review of these research questions suggests that many of the
models and research results discussed in the two previous chapters
are relevant for making specific predictions about relationships.
Important Concepts
These research questions and the relevant literature suggest
that many factors may determine differences in corporate acquisition
decision processes and determine the consequences of those
differences. The Bradford Group's model implies that the
complexity and cleavage associated with a decision topic determine
the process. Snyder's (1958) model suggests that characteristics of
the decision situation and limitations internal to the
decision-making system such as organizational rules and procedures,
the communication and information system, and the motivation of
decision makers affect the content of the decision process. Hage
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(1980) suggests that the process differs for high risk and frequent
decisions. The Mintzberg et al. (1976) model suggests that how the
decision process is initiated, e.g. by a problem or an opportunity,
influences the content of the decision process. The Ansoff et al.
(1971) and Birley (1974; 1976) studies imply that acquisition
planning and planned search for prospects may affect the decision
process and the success of an acquisition. But in those two
studies, it is not clear how planning will influence the content of
the decision process.
The small amount of research using characteristics models makes
it difficult to determine which characteristics are most important.
Experience making acquisition decisions is included in this study
because a number of prior studies use this concept. Also
acquisition experience is part of the complexity construct of The
Bradford Group and is similar to the frequency concept in Hage's
model. The strategic risk of an acquisition is included in the
study because the risk associated with unrelated acquisitions is an
important issue in the merger literature. And this concept is
similar to the risk concept in the Hage model. Strategic risk is
the probability that a strategic organizational decision, like an
acquisition, will fail. Bettis (1982) concludes that "In empirical
research there is a necessity for more researchers to incorporate
risk variables into their analyses and models (p. 25)." Similarily,
source initiating the acquisition decision process is included
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because both Ansoff et al. (1971) and Dory (1978) suggest planned
search is an important factor. Additionally, Mintzberg et al.
(1976) suggest that how a decision process is initiated affects its
content. The size of the company making the acquisition is included
because this is a frequently used variable in organization theory
research and it has been found that processes differ depending upon
the size of a company.
Hage (1980) and The Bradford Group (1981) suggest a number of
process variables, including amount of discussion, amount of
information search, scrutiny, and routinization. The research
studies in the acquisition literature suggest that CEO involvement
and certain analytical activities are important in acquisition
decision processes.
Rees (1966) helps clarify the concept called intensive search.
He says that
The search for information in any market has both
an extensive and intensive margin. A buyer can
search at the extensive margin by getting a quotation
from one more seller. He can search at the intensive
margin by getting additional information concerning
an offer already received. Where the goods and
services sold are highly standardized, the extensive
margin is the more important; when there is great
variation in quality, the intensive margin moves to
the forefront ( p . 5 60 ) .
In the acquisition market, there is great variation in quality so
search at the intensive margin should be very important to success.
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Two Competing Research Models
Although model development and testing is at an embryonic stage
in this research area, two competing models offer alternative
explanations for the success of corporate acquisitions. One model,
termed the prediction model (see Figure 4.1), suggests that
investigating the activities of managers is not necessary to predict
the success of an acquisition. Rather, in the prediction model
environmental factors, characteristics of the acquisition prospect,
and characteristics of the decision situation are the best
predictors of the future success of an acquisition prospect. The
second model, the decision-process model (see Figure U.2),
explicitly includes characteristics of the decision-related
activities of managers. In this model, decision-process activities
characterize the decision process and their presence and the amount
of activity are important influences on the success of an
acquisition.
In the prediction model (Figure 4.1), strategic risk,
experience making acquisitions, source initiating the decision
process, size of the acquiring company, and implementation are
hypothesized as influencing the effectiveness of an acquisition.
Four other concepts suggested by Porter (1980) and others are
included in the model: the state of the economy, industry
characteristics, the financial state of the acquired company, and
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competition to acquire the prospect. No specific hypotheses are
developed about these concepts. The design of the study and the
criteria for selecting companies (discussed in Chapter 5) attempted
to control for the first two factors; data were collected about the
occurrence of the last two factors.
The decision-process model (Figure U.2) includes three decision
situation and organization context factors that are considered as
determinants of five decision-process characteristics. The concepts
of strategic risk, experience, and source initiating the process are
also included in the prediction model. The five decision-process
characteristics include intensive search, formal analytical
activity, discussion and participation in the decision process, CEO
involvement, and duration of the decision process. All of these
characteristics except CEO involvement are similar to concepts in
the Hage model. Also, CEO involvement is related to centralization,
but its use in the model is related more directly to the acquisition
literature. In the process model, these characteristics determine
the effectiveness of the acquisition. Size, implementation success,
and implementation activities are included as moderating variables.
Size is considered a moderating variable because it is included
in a number of studies in the organizational theory literature. The
Aston Group (Pugh, Hickson, Hinnings, and Turner, 1969) found that
size is related to structure. Blau and Schoenherr (1971) concluded
that size accounts for structural differentiation. Child (1973)
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found that size is positively related to specialization,
standardization, and formalization, and is negatively related to
centralization. Khandwalla (1977) found that size and
decentralization are positively related to the use of controls (e.g.
formalization). The following sections develop hypotheses related
to the prediction and decision-process models. (The following codes
are used to classify the hypotheses: PM = prediction model; D =
descriptive; DPM = decision-process model; and P = process.)
Prediction Model Hypotheses
The concepts of experience making acquisition decisions,
strategic risk, and source initiating the decision process are
evaluated in this section as predictors of corporate acquisition
success. The links between these concepts and decision-process
variables inevitably are part of the discussion, but the premise of
the model is that it is not necessary to explicitly account for
differences in process characteristics to predict successful
acquisitions.
What is the effect of experience making acquisition decisions
on success? Bing (1980), a merger specialist, believes that "An
advantage of a continuous acquisition program is that as experience
is gained, learning results from errors, certain characteristics
take on added importance, a buyer becomes more certain of what sort
of company he wants to buy, and he more easily recognizes a
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desirable company when he sees it (p. 141)." Although this statement
suggests the process changes with greater experience, it also
emphasizes the importance of experience for making successful
acquisitions.
Brockhaus (1975) supports this view. He reports "the evidence
indicates that ease and expertise in mergers and acquisitions come
only with the experience provided by six to eleven of these
reorganizations (p. U9)."
Parsons and Baumgartner (1970) cite Kelly's (1967) finding that
companies that have made five or more acquisitions have a
significantly higher percentage of "successful" acquisitions than
those with less experience. They note that "to determine what is a
successful merger, one must apply the twin yardsticks of time and
the question, "Would I do it over again (p. 28)7"
Allan (1966) reports that "For companies that have made only
one or two acquisitions, it has been estimated that 75 percent of
these acquisitions have been unsatisfactory but for companies with
five to ten acquisitions only 40 per cent have been unsatisfactory.
This certainly suggests that experience may be an important factor
(p. 107)."
In a related research study, Higgins and Finn (1977), studying
56 British organizations, found that those companies with more years
of experience in planning rated the relative success of their
corporate planning more highly than those with fewer years of
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experience. They interpreted these results in terms of the learning
curves of both managers and planners.
Lubatkin (1982) also argues that "...merger is an act of
strategy. This strategy, if it is new to the firm brings about
administrative problems. These problems are eventually noticed and
solutions for them eventually found (p. 13)." Experience making
acquisitions may result in learning by managers and planners, but it
is not clear in the evidence just cited what is learned. Therefore,
experience itself may be the best predictor that can be found to
insure that managers know how to design and manage acquisition
search and decision processes. Both opinion and research results
support the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis PM 1 . The greater the experience of
managers in the buying firm, the more satisfactory
and effective the acquisition.
What is the effect of strategic risk on success? One major
factor that seems to determine the strategic risk in an acquisition
decision is the business relationship between the buyer and seller.
For example, Baker, Miller, and Ramsperger (1981) state that
executives view horizontal mergers as most frequently successful,
followed by congeneric, conglomerate, and vertical mergers (p. 56).
But, Salter and Weinhold (1979) state that the general
proposition that related diversification is always safer than
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unrelated diversification i3 not always true. According to Salter
and Weinhold (1979), "This misconception rests on the notion that
operating risks are reduced when diversifying companies stick to
businesses that they think they understand . . .(S)uccessful related
diversification depends on both the quality of the companies
acquired and the organizational integration required to achieve the
benefits of synergy (p. 39)." This point of view emphasizes the
importance of managerial actions, decision processes, and
implementation .
Drucker (1981) makes a slightly different argument. He thinks
that to make successful acquisitions it is necessary to search for a
company with a common core of unity-technology, markets, and/or
production processes. Kitching's (1967), Kelly's (1967), and
Rumelt's (1974) studies provide some support for this rule. Recall
that Kitching's (1967) study of managers in 22 companies concluded
that there is an especially high risk of failure in conglomerate
mergers of all types but especially for concentric acquisitions (see
Chapter 3). Concentric acquisitions involve either common customers
or common technology. Kitching thinks that what happens is that the
parent company "gets lulled into a false sense of security and
neglects the technology aspect, or vice versa (p. 92)." Drucker's
rule promotes this false sense of security.
Rumelt's (1974) study of 273 large industrial corporations
showed economic performance higher for those firms with a majority
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of their activities related to some central resource skill or
competence. This differential in performance was confirmed by the
Bettis study (1981). He found that on the average, related
diversified firms outperform unrelated diversified firms by about
one to three percentage points for Return on Assets (ROA). Kelly's
(1967) research suggests that entering by acquisition into
completely new businesses causes an upward shift in average unit
cost, but that the form of expansion "does not determine success in
terms of rate of return (pp. 52-53)."
Other studies (Montgomery, 1979; Rumelt, 1979; Bettis 4 Hall,
1982), however, show that the higher economic performance of the
related-business firms is associated with market-structure
characteristics, e.g. market profitability, market share, market
growth, and concentration. Apparently related-business firms have
tended to take positions in industries characterized by high levels
of return on capital. These phenomena may reflect a more
fundamental determinant of profitability. The firms have developed
skills in product/market areas subject to product differentiation
and market segmentation.
The Ansoff et al. (1971) study of 93 companies also does not
completely support Drucker's concern about high-risk acquisitions.
They found that only vertical integration was positively related
with perceived success. Success, however, was perceived to be
associated with other factors, e.g. search and planning. Lubatkin
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(1982) found that firms making unrelated acquisitions may actually
be more successful financially than those making related
acquisitions. Much of the above discussion is from Paine and Power
(1982) who concluded that unrelated acquisitions should not be ruled
out by managers. The following hypothesis, however, seems
reasonable given the evidence:
Hypothesis PM 2. The greater the strategic risk
associated with a specific acquisition, the less
satisfactory and effective the acquisition.
What is the effect on success of identifying prospects by
planned search? According to Scherer (1980), J.K. Butlers and his
colleagues found that more than two-thirds of 80 early post-World
War II mergers were initiated by the acquired firms. Scherer feels
that "although the proportion of seller-initiated mergers has
probably declined since then, there continue to be several reasons
why the owners of a corporation might wish to sell out (p. 127)."
So, many mergers are not initiated by the acquirer. Is this a
reason for the high failure rate?
Bing (1980) states that "No one questions the desirability of
planning, but the results are often controversial and the activity
still considered by most a luxury that is dispensable in difficult
times... Despite all the difficulties and often poor results, a
management must assume the odds for success are better if an
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endeavor is intelligently planned and the known variables
accommodated instead of relying on whims and chance (p. 11-12)." The
research by Ansoff et al. (1971) and Birley (1974; 1976) seem to
support the importance of planned search, but as noted in the
previous chapter, the results are not clear when perceived success
is used as the dependent variable. The study by Dory (1978) also
supports the importance of planned search. Kitching (1967) found
that firms with an acquisition strategy make more successful
acquisitions than those that just react to opportunities. Finally,
many acquisition experts, like Freier (1981) and Reed (1977),
advocate planned search.
Freier (1981, p. 35-36) identifies three types of acquisition
search approaches. The opportunistic approach involves identifying
companies that are for sale and then developing screening and
selection criteria. In the research approach, the acquiring company
applies the screening and selection processes to determine which
companies it would buy if they were for sale. Then managers
determine which companies are for sale. Freier claims that the most
widely used method is the combination approach. In this approach,
the acquiring company first uses the screening process to define the
minimum size, specific industries, and geographic location of the
target companies. Qualified companies are then contacted to
identify acquisition prospects. Finally, a selection process
determines which prospects should be actively pursued. Apparently
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all of these approaches can be successful, but Freier thinks the
combination method results in the most successful acquisitions.
But Cameron (1977) cautions that acquisitions identified by
chance encounter "can be very successful and any framework for
planning growth should never shut these opportunities out (p.22)."
The evidence seems to suggest that planned search can increase the
success of acquisitions, but it may not be necessary to success.
The issue however, is whether or not planned search is a good
predictor of successful acquisitions. For that reason, the
following hypothesis is stated:
Hypothesis PM 3- Planned initiation and search
for an acquisition prospect results in the most
satisfactory and effective acquisition.
Decision-Process Model Hypotheses
Turning now to the decision-process model hypotheses, many
issues need to be discussed. This section first discusses
descriptive hypotheses about the corporate acquisition decision
process. Then hypotheses about the effects of acquisition
experience, strategic risk, and source initiating the process on
decision-process characteristics are grouped together and discussed.
Finally, the effects of decision-process characteristics on
acquisition success are discussed.
114
Descriptive Hypotheses
Knowing what activities occur during the acquisition decision
process and how frequently may have descriptive and prescriptive
value separate from knowledge about the causes or the consequences
of process characteristics. Each of the following hypotheses states
what is expected about the content of the acquisition decision
process for four of the five decision-process content
characteristics.
What constitutes an activity? According to Lofland (1971),
"Activities refer to collective conduct that (1) takes days, weeks,
or months to play through, (2) encompasses a relatively large
segment of actors' time, and is likely to be engaged in collectively
and conjointly in a social setting, instead of more
individualistically and privately (p. 20)." Many activities occur
as part of the acquisition decision process. Some are closely
related and can be grouped to characterize the content of the
decision process. The following activities are discussed: formal
analytical activity, intensive search activities, CEO activities,
and discussion and group decision-making activities.
So what formal analytical activities occur as part of the
acquisition decision process? Bradley and Korn (1979) state that
"In the past, acquisitions were all too often made on the strength
of a brief analysis of short-term earnings potential, plus some
consideration of it and longer-term issues; frequently it was an
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outside source that brought the prospect to light. While the
services of finders and intermediaries remain important, and while
short-term earnings cannot be overlooked, today's efforts are more
likely to involve heavier staff inputs involving organized prospect
searches and consideration of various strategic possibilities and
post-merger management questions (p. 49-50)."
Many merger experts claim the following activities occur:
evaluating data, coordinating acquisition activity with plans and
objectives of the buyer's enterprise, arranging financing,
investigating tax issues, preparing financial projections, and
making demand forecasts. Experts prescribe many analytical
activities and some of the descriptive research suggest it occurs
(cf., Mace and Montgomery, 1962, and case studies). For these
reasons, the following is expected:
Hypothesis D 1 . Extensive formal analytical activity
occurs during the investigation of acquisition
prospects.
How much intensive search occurs? According to Mace and
Montgomery (1962), during an investigation of a prospect "the
typical procedure is to secure a Dunn 4 Bradstreet report and to
review Thomas' Register of_ American Manufacturers, and Poor's and
Moody' s for pertinent data. If the company has had a public
offering, the prospectus is a most useful document. If the company
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is listed, the 10k form is filed with the stock exchange and with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and this too is public
information. In addition, annual reports, trade literature such as
catalogues and brochures, advertisements in trade journals, special
reports by the many investment services, and newspaper and magazine
stories provide considerable information about the company (p.
106-107)." This study and the case studies suggest that much
intensive search occurs during the investigation of prospects.
Rees1 (1966) hypothesis about more intensive search when the
variation in quality of products in the 'market is high further
supports the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis D 2. Many information sources are
used and used frequently by buyers during the
investigation of an acquisition prospect.
How involved is the CEO? In acquisition decision making, the
final authority and approval for an acquisition must come from the
board of directors, but board committees are rarely involved in
acquisition investigations. The CEO seems to make the major
decisions (cf., Bing, 1980). And many authors suggest that the CEO
should be very actively involved in the investigation of prospects
(cf., Mace and Montgomery, 1962). But in larger organizations, the
role of the CEO may be more limited than in smaller organizations
(this view is supported by some authorities, case study information,
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and interviews conducted as background for this study). In large
organizations, more people hold general management jobs (cf.,
Kotter, 1982) and responsibilities for acquisitions and mergers,
especially small and medium-sized acquisitions, may be delegated to
division presidents or group vice presidents. Kotter (1982)
concluded that differences in the size of organizations, their age,
performance level, product/market diversity, and organizational
diversity may result in significant differences in the general
manager's job (p. 123). The research by Brown and O'Connor (197*0
and O'Connor (1980) summarized in the previous chapter also suggests
differences in the role of planning executives and CEOs in
acquisition programs. The following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis D 3. CEO's are actively involved
in acquisition decision-process activities,
especially in small organizations.
How much discussion and participation occurs? Many authors
argue that acquisitions committees should be established to conduct
acquisitions programs (cf., Mace and Montgomery, 1962; McCarthy,
1966; Bradley and Korn, 1981). Reed (1978) discusses the use of
groups in acquisition decision making. Bing (1980) states that in
large acquisition programs a staff of people is often involved.
Mace and Montgomery's (1962) results also suggest that many people
are often involved. The decision processes at Chamberlain and
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General Signal discussed in Chapter 1 seem to have involved many
participants, much discussion, and some group decision making. The
evidence seems to support the following descriptive hypothesis:
Hypothesis D U. Acquisition decision making is
a participative process with at least some
meetings and one-to-one discussions occurring
about prospects.
Effects of Experience on the Decision Process
Some companies have more experience making acquisition
decisions than do others. For a variety of reasons supported by the
opinions of various authors and prior research studies, it seems
possible to support five hypotheses about how experience alters the
content of the corporate acquisition decision process.
What is the effect on analytical activity? Research and theory
on organizational learning (cf., Duncan, 197U) suggests that the
more experience a firm has making a particular type of decision the
more likely it is that the decision process is programmed or
routinized, this may increase the use of analytical tools like
checklists. Boyd and Summers (1982) asked 75 managers to rate the
extent "to which their strategic management/strategic planning
decisions were based on the following approaches: quantitative
analysis/quantitative models, non-quantitative models, but a
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structured process, and intuitive, entrepreneurial, gut reaction (p.
27). " Their results indicated that "less experienced planning
executives tend to rely more on a formalized strategic planning
process and less on intuitive, entrepreneurial reactions.. .The
experienced managers seem to indicate that all three techniques are
used about equally (p. 27)." They feel their findings might be
explained by the experience of the managers. The evidence is
limited and not definitive, but the following is hypothesized:
Hypothesis DPM 1.1. The more experience managers
in a firm have had making acquisition decisions,
the higher the amount of formal analytical activity
during the investigation of the acquisition
prospect.
What is the effect on intensive search? Again Bing (1980)
notes that "An intelligent decision requires information upon which
to decide. Information gathering takes time, but the time can be
shortened if those collecting data know how to secure the
information, what is really needed and not needed, and how to
assemble it into a useable form (p. 103)." So he feels experience
reduces the duration of the search and makes it more efficient.
Ebert and Mitchell (1975) summarize a study by Kleinmuntz
(1968) that attempted to uncover the structure of neurologists'
search processes as they diagnosed illnesses. They state,
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"Kleinmuntz reveals that search efficiency and diagnosis accuracy
were found to be related to the amount of hospital-ward experience
of the neurologist. Fewer questions (information search) were asked
by and fewer diagnostic errors were made by the more experienced
physicians. Greater experience led to strategies of selectively
discarding data that were irrelevant to the particular diagnosis.
Data were remembered only if that piece of data was relevant to the
diagnostic decision (p. 90)." This study of individual decision
processes also suggests experience makes search more efficient.
A study by Heslin and Streufert (1968) that used 72 students in
a complex tactical and negotiations game suggests that as students
mastered the task situation, they reduced their use of the
environment as a source of influence on their decisions. This
simulation study seems relevant to the acquisition decision process.
As noted previously, acquisition decision processes often involve
extensive interaction and negotiation between buyer and seller.
Hage's model proposes that frequency is positively related to
routinization which is negatively related to information search.
The following is proposed:
Hypothesis DPM 1.2. The more experience managers
in a firm have had making acquisition decisions,
the lower the amount of intensive search about
the acquisition prospect.
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Much of the descriptive literature advocates a uniformly high
involvement for the CEO. Some descriptive research suggests this is
not the case (cf., Brown and O'Connor, 1974). Also the interview
with Sommers at Chamberlain Manufacturing (summarized in the first
chapter) suggests that initially the CEO was very involved in the
acquisition decision process, but that as the company made some
acquisitions, activities got more formalized and staff members did
more of the formal analytical investigation of prospects. The case
study about General Signal Corp. and its president, Nathan Owen,
suggests an opposite relationship. But it is proposed that the
following occurs in most cases:
Hypothesis DPM 1.3. The more experience managers
in a firm have had making acquisition decisions,
the lower the amount of CEO participation in
acquisition decision activities.
Bing (1981) notes that "as an acquisition program progresses, a
combination of confidence in those making the acquisitions and
precedents established in prior acquisitions will increase the
delegation of decision-making and willingness to make quick
decisions (p. 105)." Hage's model also suggests that frequency is
positively related to routinization which is negatively related to
the amount of discussion. Hage also suggests that duration is a
function of amount of information search and discussion. The
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following two hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis DPM 1.4. The more experience managers
in a firm have had making acquisition decisions,
the lower the amount of participation in decision
making during the invesitigation of the acquisition
prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 1.5. The more experience managers
in a firm have had making acquisition decisions,
the shorter the duration of the acquisition
decision process.
Effects o_f Strategic Risk on the Decision Process
Many authors argue that acquiring a company is a high-risk
growth strategy (cf., Fogg, 1976). Because of this high risk,
careful acquisition planning and analysis is often advocated by
acquisition specialists. They suggest that these activities can
minimize the risk and lead to more successful outcomes.
Prescriptive models of strategic analysis and planning (cf.,
Andrews, 1980, p. 39; Lorange, 1980, pp. 116-122) include risk as a
criterion for evaluating strategies and plans, and the risk
associated with a firm is supposedly related to the returns of the
firm (Scherer, 1980, p. 292; Bettis, 1982, p. 22). Nevertheless,
the relationship between expected risk associated with a decision
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and the characteristics of the strategic decision process are not 
discussed in the strategy literature. But in the organization 
theory literature, Hage (1980 and see chapter 2) includes risk as a 
major determinant of decision-process characteristics. 
This section reviews prior research and theory, especially 
prescriptive theory, to develop hypotheses about the effects of the 
strategic risk associated with a specific acquisition on the type of 
decision process that managers will use. The hypotheses may not 
describe practice as much as they state prescribed relationships. 
The first hypothesis in this section is based primarily on 
prescription; i.e., more analytical activities should occur in high 
risk situations. 
Hypothesis DPM 2.1. The higher the strategic risk of an 
acquisition for the buyer, the greater the amount of formal 
analytical activities that will occur during the 
investigation of the acquisition prospect. 
What about intensive search? Both March and Simon (1958) and 
Hage (1980) argue that when managers are faced with high risk 
decisions, they conduct an extensive information search. Cyert and 
March (1963) also argue that when a local search fails, which 
probably happens when a firm decides to evaluate acquisition 
prospects, then a wider-ranging, more global search occurs. 
Therefore based mainly on theory, the following hypothesis is 
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proposed:
Hypothesis DPM 2.2. The higher the strategic risk of an
acquisition for the buyer, the greater the amount of
intensive search for information about the specific
acquisition prospect.
How does the CEO respond in high risk decision situations?
Managers do not always perceive accurately the risk associated with
a specific acquisition. But many organizations have rules and
procedures that require involvement by more influential decision
makers and push decisions up the organizational hierarchy when more
money or resources will be committed by a specific investment
proposal. This programming of the decision process would likely
lead CEOs to be more involved in higher risk acquisitions. But in
some organizations, CEOs may also be actively involved in lower risk
acquisitions because they choose to be involved in them (see
previous sections on CEO involvement). The following hypothesis is
offered:
Hypothesis DPM 2.3. The higher the strategic risk of an
acquisition for the buyer, the greater the amount of
CEO participation in acquisition decision activities.
What about participation? Vroom and Yetton (1973) present a
decision tree for choosing an appropriate decision process. They
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argue that it is both descriptive and prescriptive of managerial
behavior. The first criterion in their model deals with the
importance of the decision. Their model seems to suggest that
participation is more likely for important or high risk decisions.
Duncan's (1974) research also suggests that risk and uncertainty are
related to a more participative decision process. Finally, the Hage
model proposes that involvement is positively related to risk, and
that greater information search and discussion increases the
duration of the process. The following two hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis DPM 2.4. The higher the strategic risk of an
acquisition for the buyer, the greater the amount of
discussion and group participation in decisions during the
investigation of the acquisition prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 2.5. The higher the strategic risk of an
acquisition for the buyer, the longer the duration of the
acquisition decision process.
Effects of Initiating Source
As noted, many sources can identify acquisition prospects and
hence initiate an acquisition decision process. For example, the
source initiating an acquisition decision process may be a planned
search for prospects by managers in the acquiring organization, or a
finder, or managers in the selling organization.
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Ansoff et al. (1971) found that firms were either planners or
non-planners when making acquisitions. Use of planning and search
for prospects seemed linked to formal investigation of the prospects
and planning throughout the process.
Formal planning and search for acquisition prospects probably
indicates that the CEO has tried to rationalize the acquisition
search and decision process. Part of the rationalization of the
process is likely to be delegation of some acquisition-decision
process activities to specialists and other lower-level managers.
The Mintzberg et al. (1976) model seems to suggest a more
extensive process for opportunity situations than for crises. The
process is likely to be of shorter duration when it is initiated by
a crisis or a problem. When sellers approach a company, that can be
either an opportunity or a crisis. Planned search can be associated
with either a problem situation or a perceived opportunity.
The absence of much theory or evidence about the relationship
between the source initiating the prospect and the process leads to
basing hypotheses on the generalization that planned search will be
followed by a more formal and systematic process. The following
five hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis DPM 3.1. When an acquisition prospect
is identified by a planned search rather than by
another source, the amount of formal analytical
activity occuring during the investigation of the
prospect will be greater.
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Hypothesis DPM 3.2. When an acquisition prospect
is identified by a planned search rather than by
another source, the amount of intensive search
occuring during the investigation of the prospect
will be greater.
Hypothesis DPM 3«3« When an acquisition prospect
is identified by a planned search rather than by
another source, the amount of CEO participation in
acquisition decision activities will be lower.
Hypothesis DPM 3.4. When an acquisition prospect
is identified by a planned search rather than by
another source, the amount of discussion
and participation in making decisions during the
investigation of the acquisition prospect will
be greater.
Hypothesis DPM 3.5. When an acquisition prospect
is identified by a planned search rather than by
another source, the duration of the acquisition
decision process will be longer.
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Effects of Process Characteristics
Do decision-process characteristics affect the success and
effectiveness of an acquisition? Can the actions and activities of
managers during the investigation of a prospect have an impact on
the effectiveness of an acquisition? Does more formal analytical
activity have benefits? Baker, Miller, and Ramsperger (1981) state,
"Recent acquisitions are more soundly based than were those of the
1960's. Acquiring firms are placing more attention on long-run
consequences. As a result, emphasis is given to expected earnings
and growth rates in negotiating terms. Discounted cash flow
analysis is being used extensively to determine the value of merger
and acquisition candidates. As a result of more sophisticated
analyses, it is anticipated that the future will not see a rash of
casualties such as those that emerged from the ill-conceived
marriages of the late 1960's (p. 56)."
Bing (1980) also feels formal analytical activity has benefits.
He states "Not only must a prospect be studied and systematically
evaluated, but also the entire industry, economy, environment and
socioeconomic and political climate in which it conducts its
business. In-depth studies are not guarantees that an acquisition
will prove successful, but the odds of success increase immensely if
comprehensive studies of all relative factors have been made and no
significant factors have been discovered that show success to be
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improbable (p. U7)."
McCarthy (1966) holds a similar view. He states, "To most
companies, a corporate acquisition or business combination is far
from a routine matter. Accordingly, it is vital that company
officers and directors have all the facts to enable them to reach an
informed decision on the merits of a proposed transaction. Although
imagination and enthusiasm are important ingredients in the
successful operation of a business enterprise, when it comes to
planning and negotiating for a corporate acquisition or merger
careful investigation and evaluation of pertinent factors are of
even greater importance (p. 577)."
Some formal analytical activity seems to have many benefits.
For example, using checklists and applying criteria may reduce the
halo effect, where several favorable attributes of a prospect
distort a buyer's evaluation of other attributes (cf., Bing, 1980).
But, Ansoff et al. (1971) found that firms doing thorough
investigations reported as many failures as those doing cursory
investigations .
Doing an extensive analysis may also have negative
consequences. The work demanded of both buyer and seller can
discourage completion of the acquisition: the buyer becomes
inundated with data; the seller becomes impatient and begins looking
for other buyers (cf., Bing, 1980).
But as Short (1967) and others, including Andrew Carnegie, have
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noted, good deals are sometimes missed because of extensive
investigation and a failure to act quickly when an opportunity
arose. But bad deals are often avoided by taking extra time for
careful investigation and deliberation. The following hypothesis
argues that benefits do result from greater amounts of formal
analytical activity:
Hypothesis P 1 . The greater the amount of formal
analytical activity during the investigation of the
prospect, the more satisfactory and effective the
acquisition.
Are there benefits of extensive information search? Much of
the material presented for hypothesis P 1 is also relevant to the
issue of information search.
Bing (1980) states, "(A) formal evaluation is necessary and, to
be worthwhile, it must be comprehensive, which will require a real
effort and substantial expense. The belief that the more
information one has about a prospect, and the more extensive the
evaluation, the better will be the buyer's decision is not
necesarily true. Much information about a company can be gathered
that is interesting, but of minor or no importance to making an
acquisition decision (p. 132)."
McCarthy (1966) and others advocate obtaining as much
information as possible on all prospects. O'Connor (1980) notes the
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high cost of this and in the previous section it was noted this
situation can result in data overload for the buyer and impatience
for the seller.
But Linowes (1968) suggests a detailed investigation of the
managers of the acquisition prospect, including how creative they
are, who makes the decisions, and their motivations, can avoid later
implementation problems. And on a similar positive note Hennessy
(1966) argues, "There are a great number of reasons for marginally
successful business combinations-the chief one being inadequate
investigation prior to signing the agreement. During the
preliminary investigative phase, it is quite often difficult to
probe in depth for conditions within an acquisition condidate that
can give rise to later problems (p. 219)." There is little evidence
about this, but based on Rees' (1966) argument, the following is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis P 2. The greater the amount of intensive
search about an acquisition prospect, the more
satisfactory and effective the acquisition.
What about the benefits of CEO involvement? Olm et al. (1981)
note that some CEO's seem to dominate the acquisition decision
process at their companies. For example, they claim Willard F.
Rockwell, Jr. "was recognized as the driving force behind the
company's development because of his philosophy of growth and
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diversification, and his penchant for acquiring companies (p. U78)."
Bing (1980, p. 67), Mace and Montgomery (1962), O'Connor (1980)
and many others argue that the CEO must play a continual and very
active role if acquisitions are to be successful. The CEO must
create an environment where acquisitions have a high priority for
time and other resources. The CEO must make decisions promptly.
The CEO must be accessible to those involved in the acquisition
program. The CEO must meet important sellers.
In the Spectra-Physics Case, (Stanford Business Cases, 1973 in
Paine and Naumes, 1982) the following statement is made
A successful acquisition program requires the
personal involvement of the President. He carries
a selling prestige into all phases of the negotia
tions, especially in making the important, initial
contact to a major potential acquisition. The
involvement of the President gives him first-hand
knowledge he needs to persuade the Board of Directors
to accept a deal. Almost as important, the top
management personnel who will eventually integrate
the acquired company into Spectra-Physics must
involve themselves in the evaluation and negotiation
phase of the acquisition process (p. 195).
The following hypothesis seems to be the consensus of the
normative literature.
Hypothesis P 3. The greater the participation of
the CEO in acquisition decision process activities,
the more satisfactory and effective the acquisition.
What is the consequence of greater participation and of a
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longer decision process? Many experts advocate forming an
acquisitions committee. But greater participation results in costs,
including more time spent on the process. However, the fewer the
participants, the lower the input of different opinions and
viewpoints that may improve the quality of the decision (cf., Huber,
1980, Bing, 1980).
In an early interview during this study, one manager noted that
some acquisition decisions were made by only one person. Once the
deal was completed, those who would implement it were told of the
decision. The manager noted that this approach was not as
successful as a more participative approach that has subsequently
been adopted. Locke and Schweiger (1979) and House and Baetz (1979)
review the literature on participative decision making. Their
reviews suggest that especially at the policy-level it is not clear
what is most desirable. The following hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis P 4. The greater the amount of discussion
and group decision making during the investigation
of the acquisition process, the more satisfactory
and effective the acquisition and the more effective
the integration activities.
Hypothesis P 5. Within limits, the longer the duration
of the acquisition decision process, the more satis
factory and effective the acquisition.
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Conclusions
Many of the above hypotheses (see Table U.1) are speculative and
based on minimal empirical support. In some cases "a flip of the
coin" could have decided the direction of the relationship, but a
choice was made based on the available evidence and based on what
seemed consistent with the theoretical framework that was
developing. The Hage model was especially influential in choosing
the directions of relations in many of the hypotheses.
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Table 4.1
Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis PM 1. The greater the experience of managers in the
buying firm, the more satisfactory and effective the acquisition.
Hypothesis PM 2. The greater the strategic risk associated with a
specific acquisition, the less satisfactory and effective the
acquisition.
Hypothesis PM 3. Planned initiation and search for an acquisition
prospect results in the most satisfactory and effective acquisition.
Hypothesis D 1. Extensive formal analytical activity occurs during
the investigation of acquisition prospects.
Hypothesis D 2. Many information sources are used and used
frequently by buyers during the investigation of an acquisition
prospect.
Hypothesis D 3. CEOs are actively involved in acquisition decision
process activities, especially in small organizations.
Hypothesis D 4. Acquisition decision making is a participative
process with at least some meetings and one-to-one discussions
occurring about prospects.
Hypothesis DPM 1.1. The more experience managers in a firm have had
making acquisition decisions, the higher the amount of formal
analytical activity during the investigation of the acquisition
prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 1.2. The more experience managers in a firm have had
making acquisition decisions, the lower the amount of intensive
search about the acquisition prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 1.3. The more experience managers in a firm have had
making acquisition decisions, the lower the amount of participation
of the CEO in acquisition decision activities.
Hypothesis DPM 1.4. The more experience managers in a firm have had
making acquisition decisions, the lower the amount of discussion and
participation in decision making during the investigation of the
acquisition prospect.
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Hypothesis DPM 1.5. The more experience managers in a firm have had
making acquisition decisions, the shorter the duration of the
acquisition decision process.
Hypothesis DPM 2.1. The higher the strategic risk of an acquisition
for the buyer, the greater the amount of formal analytical
activities that will occur during the investigation of the
acquisition prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 2.2. The higher the strategic risk of an acquisition
for the buyer, the greater the amount of intensive search for
information about the specific acquisition prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 2.3. The higher the strategic risk of an acquisition
for the buyer, the greater the amount of participation of the CEO in
acquisition decision activities.
Hypothesis DPM 2.U. The higher the strategic risk of an acquisition
for the buyer, the greater the amount of discussion and group
participation in decisions during the investigation of the
acquisition prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 2.5. The higher the strategic risk of an acquisition
for the buyer, the longer the duration of the acquisition decision
process.
Hypothesis DPM 3.1. When an acquisition prospect is identified by a
planned search rather than by another source, the amount of formal
analytical activity occurring during the investigation of the
prospect will be greater.
Hypothesis DPM 3.2. When an acquisition prospect is identified by a
planned search rather than by another source, the amount of
intensive search occurring during the investigation of the prospect
will be greater.
Hypothesis DPM 3.3. When an acquisition prospect is identified by a
planned search rather than by another source, the amount of
participation of the CEO in acquisition decision activities will be
lower .
Hypothesis DPM 3.4. When an acquisition prospect is identified by a
planned search rather than by another source, the amount of
discussion and participation in making decisions during the
investigation of the acquisition prospect will be greater.
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Hypothesis DPM 3.5. When an acquisition prospect is identified by a
planned search rather than by another source, the duration of the
acquisition decision process will be longer.
Hypothesis P 1 . The greater the amount of formal analytical
activity during the investigation of the prospect, the more
satisfactory and effective the acquisition.
Hypothesis P 2. The greater the amount of intensive search about an
acquisition prospect, the more satisfactory and effective the
acquisition.
Hypothesis P 3. The greater the participation of the CEO in
acquisition decision process activities, the more satisfactory and
effective the acquisition.
Hypothesis P U. The greater the amount of discussion and group
decision making during the investigation of the acquisition
prospect, the more satisfactory and effective the acquisition and
the more effective the integration activities.
Hypothesis P 5. Within limits, the longer the duration of the
acquisition decision process, the more satisfactory and effective
the acquisition.
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Field studies of organizational decisions often require
compromises on design, method and measures (cf., Mintzberg,
Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976; Witte, 1972). Making such
compromises seems especially necessary for studies of corporate
acquisition decisions (cf., Birley, 1974; 1976; Ansoff et. al,
1971). Studying acquisition decisions can be difficult because
secrecy promoted by the securities laws hides the process from
outside observers. Also, the economic importance of mergers and
acquisitions may further limit retrospective data collection from
participants. The constant interest in these decisions by
government regulators at the Federal Trade Commission and Securities
and Exchange Commission may also lead participants to be cautious
and to make circumspect comments during interviews. Finally, the
relatively few acquisitions of small and medium-sized companies each
year causes additional problems for obtaining a large sample of
participating companies. Of course, the importance of acquisition
decisions and the absence of detailed information about acquisition
decision processes were among the reasons why this study was
considered necessary and was initially proposed. This chapter
discusses how methodological questions and problems were resolved
and explains the compromise methodology used in the study.
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This research project combines historical, interview, survey
research and correlational research methods (Gay, 1976; Gee, 1950;
Kerlinger, 1973). Data were gathered from managers who had
participated in a specific acquisition decision process that was
officially completed between October 1, 1979 and March 31, 1980.
The managers, who are sometimes referred to as key informants,
completed a questionnaire that asked for retrospective information
about acquisition decision activities for that acquisition,
including the activities in which the CEO had participated, the
sources used to gather information about the company that was
eventually acquired, and implementation activities. In the
questionnaire the managers also provided a current assessment of the
performance and outcomes of that same acquisition. The data were
collected using a mail survey instrument. Some data used in
analyses were also collected from published sources.
The remainder of this chapter has five major sections. The
first section summarizes the activities used to find organizations
and collect data; then it explains the overall design that resulted.
The second section presents the characteristics of participating
organizations, their respective acquisitions, and the participating
managers. The third section explains how concepts in the research
hypotheses were measured and discusses the validity of the measures.
The fourth section briefly discusses data analysis procedures for
testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. The final section
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discusses the difficulties and limitations of using retrospective
reports from key informants to gather data; and then the section
explains the strategies used in this study to reduce methodological
problems.
Selection of Companies and Research Design
A number of information sources are available that document
mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. companies. These sources
include a journal, Mergers and Acquisitions, two newsletters, The
Conference Board Report on Mergers and Acquisitions and Mergers and
•
Corporate Policy, an annual publication of the FTC called the
Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions ( 1980 ) , and annual
summaries and a data base of W.T. Grimm and Co.. The quality of
information, its frequency of publication and cost varies among
these sources.
Although the FTC might be considered the official source of
information, it is slow at compiling and publishing information
about mergers and acquisitions (the most recently published report
is for 1979), also its detailed data is limited to mergers where the
acquired company had at least $5 million in assets. But, the
"large" merger series has been compiled for many years and it is a
complete historical record. Also, the FTC classifies mergers and
acquisitions into different categories based on the type of
acquisition that is involved. This classification scheme is briefly
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discussed in the section on concepts and measures.
Both newsletters have more timely information than Mergers and
Acquisitions, but for that reason the information is more likely to
be incomplete and have errors. Mergers and Acquisitions publishes
information on mergers approximately one year after they have been
officially completed. In many cases sales and profit data are
provided for both the buyer and seller and a short description of
the products and services of both companies is included for each
entry. W.T. Grimm's data was costly to obtain. All of these
sources have information about mergers, but after reviewing the
possible sources, the quality, availability and cost of information
from Mergers and Acquisitions led to the decision to use it to
identify and select companies for the study.
What criteria should be used to select companies for the study?
After reviewing some ideas in Kerlinger (1973) it was evident that
appropriate criteria for selecting companies could enhance the
quality of the study. So, selection criteria were chosen that
accomplished one or more of the following purposes: First, the
criteria should maximize systematic variance in the variables that
are hypothesized to account for differences in the characteristics
of corporate acquisition decision processes and if possible they
should maximize variance in the process variables.
Second, the criteria should control any extraneous, yet
systematic variance that may influence the characteristics of
|;»
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corporate acquisition decision processes. Some factors must be
considered extraneous because they cannot be evaluated given
constraints imposed by the hypotheses of interest and because of the
practical limitations on the scope of this study. Examples of
factors that cannot be included that may influence the content of an
acquisition decision process include: social and cultural factors;
differences in laws and government regulations in different
countries; private ownership of the buying firm; and buying and
selling firms with an extremely small number of employees and
limited capital, e.g., purchases of bars or restaurants.
Third, the criteria should reduce or minimize unsystematic
error variance and methodological problems. For example, much of
the information used to test the hypotheses in this study is
collected from retrospective accounts. This type of historical
research using informants is plagued with a number of problems.
This method, its problems and limitations are discussed more
extensively in the fifth section, but two problems, forgetting and
distortion due to later events, can be somewhat dealt with by
establishing appropriate selection criteria. For example, the more
recent the completion of the acquisition given that sufficient time
has elapsed to measure dependent variables the lower the amount of
error due to forgetting. And the closer in time, the more
contemporaneous the acquisitions, the more that methodological
problems will be common to all informants. In addition to selection
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procedures, the measuring instrument was also developed to help
control error variance.
Finally, the selection criteria should increase rather than
unnecessarily restrict the generalizability of the results from the
study. If possible, the results of the study should be
generalizable to firms with characteristics similar to those in the
study. Also, the results should generalize to future acquisition
decisions.
The following rules seemed most likely to maximize systematic
variance in the variables, control extraneous systematic variance,
minimize error variance, and place no unnecessary restrictions on
generalizability .
1. Both the buying and selling companies were chartered in the
United States.
2. The acquisition was completed between October 1, 1979 and
March 31, 1980 and reported in Mergers and Acquisitions.
3. The stock of the acquiring firm was publicly held.
4. Firms buying companies primarily doing business in heavily
regulated industries were excluded, e.g. electric utilities,
banking, insurance, trucking, TV and radio.
5. Some information was available to classify the type of
acquisition, e.g. a related acquisition, product extension
or a totally unrelated acquisition.
6. The sales of the selling firm are greater than $1 million.
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Companies that had completed acquisitions were screened with
the above criteria to create a pool of 92 companies for the study.
Early in the study, a research design was proposed where 8 related
and 8 unrelated acquisitions made by buyers with sales of $5 to $300
million in sales, and 8 related and 8 unrelated acquisitions made by
buyers with sales greater than $300 million would be studied. The
small number of unrelated acquisitions that were made in the 6 month
target period and the low response rate made it impossible to impose
this design constraint. In the next section on data collection
procedures it should be noted that in the initial mailing an effort
was made to meet this constraint and to arrange phone interviews.
Also, in the section on sample and participant characteristics it
should be noted that the final sample had some approximately equal
sized groups. For example, about half of the buyers (respondents)
had sales of $5 to $300 million.
Data Collection
Collecting the data for this study involved numerous contacts
with managers and their secretaries. The steps and activities
presented in Table 5.1 were completed to collect the data. Once the
92 companies that met the selection criteria were identified, the
next activity was to locate names, addresses and phone numbers for
the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the companies. The 1981
Million Dollar Directory was used to gather that information. In
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Table 5.1
Summary of
Data Collection Procedure
1. January 18 to February 1, 1982 — Identified 92
companies meeting selection criteria (used Mergers
& Acquisitions and The Million Dollar Directory).
2. February 1 to February 5 — Mailed letter to Public
Relations Directors requesting annual report and
information on the CEO.
3. February 8 to February 23 — Tried to confirm the
identity of the current CEO.
4. February 23 to March 1 — Mailed, a personalized letter
to the CEO of each company requesting participation
in the study.
5. March 3 — Sent follow-up mailing to those Public
Relations Directors that had not sent annual reports
and background information about the CEO.
6. March 29 to April 2 — Sent follow-up mailing to CEOs
that had not responded to the first letter. A ccpy of
the questionnaire was sent with this letter.
7. March 29 — Mailed a letter and the questionnaire to
14 key informants identified by CEOs in response to the
first mailing.
8. April 1 3 to June 6 — Made follow-up phone calls to
firms that did not respond to the mailings.
9. April 6 to May 15 — Phoned 14 key informants to arrange
an interview.
10. April 6 to June 15 — Conducted interviews or had short
discussions with key informants.
1 1 . January 25 to July 6 — Atempted to obtain data from
securities analysts.
12. July 26 to August 6 — Obtained 1979 and 1 S81 segment
data (Return on Assets) from company annual reports.
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the few cases where the person serving as CEO was not designated in
the directory, the president of the company was chosen as the
contact person.
The next step was to write the Director of Public Relations to
ask for an annual report and background information about the CEO.
The CEOs were then contacted by letter to request their firms'
participation in the study (see Appendix 1). A few weeks following
the initial letter, a follow-up letter was sent to CEOs who had not
responded. Phone calls were also made by a graduate assistant to
the secretaries of the CEOs to determine if the letter had been
received.
The information eventually received from the Public Relations
Directors of all 92 companies identified some changes in the
management of the companies. In perhaps 3 or 4 companies, managers
may not have participated because the initial letter was not sent to
the then current CEO. The annual report also provided important
background information on the companies that was useful during
interviews. Some financial data were checked in the annual reports
and the reports were scanned for information about merger and
acquisition activity.
In the initial letter to the CEOs, the researcher requested "If
you or another manager with primary responsibility for your
acquisition program would consider spending 30-45 minutes talking
with me about one of your acquisitions, then please complete the
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enclosed project participation form". Fourteen companies completed
the project participation forms. Given that managers seemed
hesitant to take the time for an interview, in the follow-up mailing
the research questionnaire (see Appendix 2) was included. In all
cases the CEO (or possibly organizational procedures for routing
mail) designated himself or a subordinate as the key informant for
this study. All of the key informants were known by name to the
researcher and he has corresponded with each of them twice since
data were collected.
A personal letter and the research questionnaire were sent
directly to the key informant in 14 companies on March 29, 1982.
The letter stated that the researcher would be calling the informant
to talk about the study at a specific time and date following
receipt of the letter. Also, the letter mentioned the prior contact
with the company. The researcher attempted to schedule an
appointment with the key informants to discuss their responses to
the questionnaire and to discuss the acquisition of interest in the
study. Even though I was persistant, it was possible to have
complete interviews with only seven informants. Six other
informants spoke with me for 5-10 minutes.
In the original research proposal, plans were made to collect
performance data on the acquisitions included in the study from
securities analysts. Managers at a large New York commercial bank
and a large investment banking firm agreed to ask their securities
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analysts to make the evaluations. The analysts however claimed that
they did not have enough information to make evaluations. A number
of analysts were interviewed by phone about specific aquisitions and
a common remark was "I would have to call someone at the company to
get that information". As a substitute "objective" measure of
performance pre- and post-acquisition segmental data on Return on
Assets was collected from annual reports. The problems with using
this data as a performance measure are discussed under dependent
variables in the section on measurement.
Sample and Participant Characteristics
For this study, twenty-six managers provided information about
28 small and medium-sized acquisitions completed between October 1 ,
1979 and March 31, 1980. Originally, CEOs in 92 companies were
asked to participate in the study. Table 5.2 summarizes the
responses from the CEOs. As a result of the procedure documented in
the previous section, 29 managers eventually agreed that their firms
would participate. This is a positive response rate of 31>.
Questionnaires were completed however by only 26 managers. Two
managers could not identify an informant qualified to complete the
questionnaire (due to turnover). The third manager was interviewed,
but the peculiarities of the "acquisition" and subsequent
divestiture of the unit made use of the research schedule
inappropriate. Despite repeated contacts, twenty eight managers did
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not respond to my letters and thirty five responded negatively to my
request. Negative responses are grouped into the nine categories in
Table 5.2. One reason for the low response rate in this study may
be the sensitivity of corporate acquisition decisions. Concern
about possible actions of government regulators like the FTC and SEC
and concern about giving competitors an advantage and the size of
some acquisitions may have made managers especially reluctant to
provide information about their corporate acquisition decision
processes.
According to the companies' annual reports and data in the
issue of Mergers and Acquisitions that reported the acquisition,
sales prior to the acquisition for the 26 acquiring companies ranged
from about $10 million to more than $4.5 billion. An analysis of
the sales data suggests that there are two distinct groups of
acquiring companies. One group includes 9 very large firms that
acquired 11 of the companies in the study. 1979 sales for this group
ranged from $450 million to more than $4.5 billion. Seven of these
companies had 1979 sales of more than $1 billion. The second group
of acquiring companies included 1 small company with 1979 sales of
approximately $10 million; 11 medium-sized companies with 1979 sales
of approximately $75 million to $200 million; and 5 companies with
1979 sales of $200 to $450 million.
According to data in The Million Dollar Directory (1981), the
group of large companies have an average of 45,000 employees each.
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Table 5.2
Summary of
Responses to Request for
Participation in the Study
Number
Total Positive Responses 29
were able to provide information 26
were not able to provide information 3
Total Negative Responses 35
against company policy to answer questionnaires 5
no time to participate 7
firm was acquired by another company 3
not interested 1 1
acquisition deemed insignificant 2
not in a position to participate 2
cannot participate 3
questionnaire returned 1
against policy to release information 1
Total Failure to Respond 28
OVERALL TOTAL 92
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The range is from more than 9,000 employees to about 115,000
employees. The group of small and medium-sized companies have an
average of 3,000 employees each. The range is from 950 employees to
approximately 6,600.
Table 5.3 compares the sample to the universe of companies
originally selected for the study. The 92 companies completed 10H
acquisitions during the period October 1, 1979 to March 31, 1980.
The table categorizes sellers into six categories based upon sales
along the left side of the table. The buyers are categorized into
five categories along the top of the table. The percentages
indicate how many acquisitions in each cell in the table were
included in the study. Buyers did not provide information about 30
selling firms where no sales information was available. These
companies were probably privately held and very small at the time
when they were acquired. Small and medium-sized sellers and all
classes of buyers are well represented in the sample. A second
significant gap in the data is large firms that acquired sellers
with sales of more than $100 million. Managers were apparently
reluctant to discuss these acquisitions.
Data obtained from the managers participating in the study
provide the following profile of the acquisition activity of
participating companies. The data appear consistent with
information in Mergers jl Acquisitions. During the period 1975 to
1979, each of the companies in the study investigated an average of
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•Able 5.3
Size Comparison of Participating
and Non-Participating Companies
and their Acquisitions
Size of buyer in Sales $
a * total number of companies
b = percentage of participants
Sales of\ Sales
Acquired \pf
Firm \Euyer
Up to
75 M
75 M to
200 M
00 M to
50 M
450 N to
4.5 B
Qreater
than 4.5 B Sub total
No Sales
Information
10
|
3 D 3 D 30
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% ()%
1 million
to 10 M
3 3 3.I 13I JLJ 40
0% 50% 66% 31% 50% 3 7.5%
10 million
to 60 M
2 ±
J
3 | 9 j 2 | 22
50% 66% 100% 44% 0% 5 5%
60 million
to 100 M
0 0 °i 1 jj 2
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
100 million
to 350 M
J>
J
1 n J 3| 7
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
Qreater than
350 M
n 0 LJ 2 J 3
0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 3 3%
Total number 18 | 25 I 9 I 40 | 11
1 104
of Companies
% of
Participants
6% 44% 56% 23% 17% 2 7%
a
i'-
ji
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98 companies as acquisition prospects. Managers in the companies
actually acquired an average of 8 companies during the period. But,
many of the companies acquired only one or two companies during the
period and a few companies each acquired more than 35 companies.
All of the acquiring companies can be classified as primarily
manufacturers, although some of the conglomerates also have
financial and service subsidiaries. Some of the companies produce
high technology products. The range of manufactured products is
diverse and includes industrial products, consumer products, food
products, chemicals and computer products and components. According
to data in The Million Dollar Directory (1981) some of the
companies' products were classified under only one 4-digit SIC code,
which indicates those companies were not diversified. While other
companies had their major product lines in the maximum of six
U-digit classifications provided in the directory, the average
number of 4-digit classifications listed for the participating
companies was 3.U3« These data seem to indicate that most of the
participating companies were diversified.
The headquarters of the participating companies are in 13
states. Twelve companies have headquarters in the East; 12 have
headquarters in the Midwest; 1 company is headquartered in the
Southwest; and 1 in the West. Two of the participating companies
have been acquired since the data for the study were collected.
Based on data about the products of the acquired company, most
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of the acquired companies are best classified as related
acquisitions (Salter and Weinhold, 1980). According to data in
Mergers and Acquisitions and data from the participating managers,
all of the acquired companies had sales prior to the acquisition of
more than $1 million. Fourteen of the acquired companies were
small, with 1979 sales of $1 to $10 million. Thirteen of the
acquired companies were medium-sized with 1979 sales of $10 to $35
million. One acquired company was large with 1979 sales of more
than $350 million.
The managers participating in the study included 6 CEOs from
medium sized companies and 12 acquisition specialists from medium
and large-sized companies (see Table 5.4). All of the participating
managers were men and each had apparently worked for the
participating company a minimum of three years. The participants in
the study reported spending an average of 206 hours on activities
related to the acquisition decision process of interest. Some spent
much more time in acquisition related activities and a few spent
only 10-15 hours in activites related to the specific acquisition.
In the questionnaire each participant was asked to indicate the
amount of his involvement in the acquisition decision process on a
scale where 1 meant low involvement and 10 meant high involvement.
The average level of involvement was very high, 8.7 on the 10 point
scale. The standard deviation of the responses was 2.16 and the
range of responses was from 2 to 10. Ten of the managers indicated
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Table 5.4
Titles of Participating Managers
Title
CEO, Chairman of the Board, President
Vice-Presidnet or Director
of Acquisitions/Corporate Development
Treasurer
Division President or Division
Vice -President
Vice-President and General Counsel
Number
6
12
2
4
2
TOTAL 26
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on the questionnaire that they had consulted records or other
managers in the organization to provide answers for some questions.
How representative is this group of companies and their
respective acquisitions? As noted in the first chapter this is
primarily a study of the decision process associated with acquiring
small and medium-sized companies. This limitation on the
generalizability of the results was not intended, rather it is a
consequence of the decisions made by CEOs who were asked to
participate. Both large, very large and very small acquisitions
have not been adequately sampled in this study.
Measurement of Concepts
At the beginning of this research project, an appropriate
instrument was not available to measure the concepts in the
hypotheses discussed in the prior chapter. Therefore, a major task
of this project was to develop appropriate measures. Prior to
making the decision to develop a new measure, the questionnaires
developed by Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) and by
researchers at the University of Bradford (1981) were reviewed. The
Mintzberg et al. instrument was a set of open-ended questions that
seemed unworkable and inappropriate for the proposed research. The
questionnaire designed by the Bradford group was much more
structured, but it was designed for in-person interviews and the
scales seemed too broad for the proposed study. A third
157
questionnaire used by Birley (1976) seemed more appropriate, but the
actual questions (cf., Birley, 197U) could not be reviewed until
after this research project was almost completed because of the
difficulties in obtaining dissertations from England. In selecting
the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, concern about
measurement issues influenced which concepts were included and which
were excluded from this project.
This section has two main purposes. The first is to explain
how the independent, moderating, decision process and dependent
variables included in this study (see Table 5.5) are measured by
questions in the research schedule developed for the project (see
Appendix 2). Included as part of this discussion is an explanation
of scoring procedures for the measures. The second major purpose is
to discuss the design and development of the research schedule.
Developing new measures for a set of concepts, especially
policy-related concepts, is not a task that should be casually
begun. Duncan (1979) notes that "Policy research questions are
complex and involve a large number of variables that have been very
difficult to measure (p. 429)." Developing valid and reliable
measures is a difficult task, and certainly this one study did not
and could not demonstrate conclusively that the measures that were
developed are useful for investigating the intended concepts. The
measures that were developed are limited to corporate acquisition
decisions, rather than broadly applicable to many decision issues.
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Limiting the scope of the measures made it much easier to research
the domain of each concept. The measures are also more concrete and
possibly more accurate than general measures developed for use with
all types of organizational decisions. Also, the narrow, more
concrete measures provide more useful descriptive information for
managers who are planning and designing acquisition decision
processes. And it seems likely that the acquisition decision
measures had greater face validity for the participating managers.
The major disadvantage of using narrow, limited
operationalizations of concepts is that comparisons of research for
different types of decisions is hindered. But, since no valid,
reliable general measures are available in the literature, direct
comparisons of research results is not presently possible. Also,
developing a narrow, limited measure may contribute to the
development of more general measures. If a number of decision issue
specific research schedules are developed, then a better
understanding of organizational decision making may result. This is
possible because the research schedule can capture many of the
important factors and activities associated with the specific
decision issue.
The greatest danger in constructing measures and defining
concepts is that the very act of constructing the measure will limit
or restrict the observer's perception of the phenomenon (cf. Duncan,
1979; Lofland, 1971). A closely related danger is that the
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informant's perceptions and interpretation of results will be
limited or biased by an incomplete or inadequate measure. In this
study, the characterizations termed rational analytic and
bureaucratic process characterizations probably bias the content of
the questionnaire (of., Pfeffer, 1980). This bias is apparent in
the comments of one of the pre-test reviewers who noted "The
interview schedule you sent looks awfully good. It's well organized
and seems to cover major points — if one assumes that there is some
logic that companies follow in the acquisition process." This bias
makes it unlikely that the present results obtained from using the
research questionnaire will uncover much evidence supporting the
political and "garbage can" characterizations of the organizational
decision process. This limitation is regrettable, but the
questionnaire was intended primarily to measure selected
characteristics of the acquisition decision process, rather than to
provide definitive information about the appropriateness of using
all of the characterizations to describe the process.
To the extent that it was possible, the validity and
reliability of measures in the research schedule were evaluated
using data collected in the study. Those analyses are presented in
succeeding paragraphs and they support the use of most of the
measures for hypothesis testing. The variables in the following
paragraphs are intended to measure concepts presented in the
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4.
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Independent Variables
Three concepts presented in the hypotheses can be classified as
independent variables: experience making acquisition decisions;
strategic risk; and type of initiation of the decision process.
Some additional independent variables suggested by the literature
were also measured but no hypotheses were developed for them in
Chapter 4. The measures for each of the three major concepts are
discussed extensively in the following paragraphs.
Experience making acquisition decisions. When managers
participate in acquisition decisions, they gain experience that is
valuable to them when they participate in and manage future
acquisition decision processes. Managers also gain experience from
seminars, books, and discussions with consultants. Each of these
sources of experience must be considered to some extent in
determining how experienced a company's management group is with
acquisition decision making. One substitute for experience is
procedures and records related to previous acquisitions. Another
substitute for experience is to hire outside experts to assist in
acquisition decision making. In this study, the measures of
experience making acquisition decisions do not capture all of the
factors that may substitute for direct experience making acquisition
decisions.
The concept of experience is related to another important
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concept in the decision making literature, i.e. programmed and
nonprogrammed decision situations (Simon, 1960). To make the
distinction that a decision situation is programmed one needs to
determine if the situation is routine and/or recurring. One
component of the experience concept is how often similar decisions
have been made in the past, so in firms that are making many
acquisition decisions that is more- a programmed than an unprogrammed
decision situation.
Three measures of the experience concept were used in this
study. All of the data were obtained from the participating
managers. Secondary sources were scanned for obvious discrepancies
but none were found. The managers were asked the following three
questions (Questions 2,3 and 5 from the research schedule in
Appendix 2):
Q2. How many companies did your firm investigate
and examine as potential acquisitions during
the period 1975 through 1979?
Q3. And how many companies did your firm actually acquire
during the period 1975 through 1979?
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Q5. Prior to the acquisition of CO. NAME, how experienced
with acquisition decision making, search and negotiations
did you consider the management team at YOUR FIRM?
Please rate your management team on a scale of 1 to 10,
where 1 means no one had experience and we were "flying
by the seat of the pants" and 10 means we had extensive
experience and we were all experts.
There are some deficiencies in these measures as previously
noted, but each certainly includes part of the domain of the
concept. But if one can assume there exists some short-run
stability in the company's management group and that learning occurs
from participating in prior decisions, then measures of acquisition
activity indicate the experience of the management team. The best
indicator may therefore be the number of potential acquisitions
investigated and examined. But, the difficulty with this measure is
that some managers in the personal interviews had difficulty
determining the meaning of the phrase "investigate and examine".
There appeared to be no ambiguity about how many companies were
actually acquired and the responses seem consistent with published
information. Also, in other studies this has been used as a measure
of experience (e.g. Kelly, 1967; Allan, 1966; Brockhaus, 1975). The
single item perceptual measure is a more global and perhaps a more
direct indicator of overall experience, but some managers may have
found it difficult to admit that the management team at their
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company was inexperienced.
The fact that the questions were presented sequentially may
have created an order effect. Certainly managers were likely to
perceive a relationship between the number of firms investigated and
number of firms acquired and the subsequent question about
experience making acquisition decisions. The variables, number
investigated and number acquired, are highly correlated, r = .62
(p<= .01). Perceived experience is correlated with the number of
companies acquired, i.e. r = .36 (p<s= .05), but it is not
significantly correlated with the number investigated. Correlations
of the three experience variables with other independent variables
are presented in Table 5.6. Theoretical ranges and the type of
scaling for these variables are included in Table 5.5. Because of
scaling differences, no attempt was made to aggregate these
variables into a single scale. Each variable is used in tests of
relevant hypotheses. A fourth experience variable concerning the
acquisition decision experience of the CEO was included in the
questionnaire (Q4), but informants had difficulty with the wording
of the question and it is not used in the analyses of the
hypotheses.
Strategic Risk. Most acquisition decision outcomes probably
have at least moderate levels of risk associated with them and some
are very high risk decisions. As noted in Chapter 2, Hage
(1980) suggests that risk is an important predictor of decision
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Table 5.6
Intel-correlations among Independent Variables
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 . Perceived 1 .000
Risk *»
2. Business .17 -1.000
Relation- (.208)*
ship
3. Acquisition .30 .39 1.000
Strategy (.058) (.029)
n-24
4. Ratio of .25 -.27 -.14 1.000
Seller Sales (.097) (.101) (.235)
to Buyer n-24
Sales
1.000
.02\ 1 .000
(.466T
.36 .62\1.000
(.029) (.000)
i — — — — — —— — _
5. Perceived , .04 -.50 -.19 .05
Experience (.427) (.007) (.166) (.406)
n-24
6. Number of I-.10 -.003 -.02 -.12
Companies |(.314) (.494) (.457) (.273)
Investigated) n-24
7. Number of -.04 -.03 -.21 -.06 '
Companies '(.421) (.444) (.142) (.374)1
Acquired ' n»24 •
8. Type of .12 .12 .11 .29 -.02 -.10 -.08 1.000
Initiation (.269) (.289) (.285) (.066) (.461) (.312) (.349)
of the n-24
Acquisition
9. Financial .36 -.27 -.36 .12 .22 .12 .20 -.32 1.000
Problems of (.033) (.099) (.034) (.273) (.133) (.276) (.162) (.054)
Acquired n-24 n-27 n-27 n-27 n-27 n»27 n«27
Company
10 . Competition .12 -.1895 -.02 -.14 .29 .09 .29 -.11 .11 1.000
for the (.275) (.188) (.456) (.243) (.067) (.317) (.066) (.294) (.288)
Acquisition n-24 n-27
•Numbers in the () are the significance levels of the correlation coeff icient*.
Number of observations equals 28 unless otherwise indicated.
** Original scale reversed.
Intercorrelation among experience and risk variables.
Intercorrelation among experience variables.
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process characteristics. Also, Rage's ideas help define the domain
of the risk concept. He notes, "Risk refers to the predictability
of outcome. .. (p. 110)." He also notes that "the high-risk decision
is not only one where the outcome is uncertain but where cost is
high, experience is limited because the decision occurs infrequently
and usually but not always there is a considerable discontinuity
with previous strategic decisions (p. 111)." According to Bettis
(1982), "Risk is usually taken to indicate some degree of hazard.
For a firm the hazard is financial in nature. While bankruptcy and
insolvency are extreme examples, lesser hazards such as modest
earnings declines are more common (p. 22)."
The amount of strategic risk of corporate acquisition decisions
seems to depend on the type of acquisition contemplated and
subsequently made. Although firms often make diversifying
acquisitions in unrelated products to reduce the overall risk of the
firm's portfolio, the actual acquisition of a specific firm with
unrelated products may be very risky because the company making the
acquisition is not experienced managing that type of firm, the
products and competitors are unfamiliar, and/or the customers and
channels of distribution differ (Reed, 1979). Although some
previous research suggests that diversifying or conglomerate mergers
have higher risk than horizontal or vertical mergers (Kitching,
1967), Paine and Power's (1982) review suggests that restricting
acquisitions to those with a "common core of unity" (Drucker, 1981)
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would not guarantee successful acquisitions. The evidence was
summarized in Chapter U.
In this study, type of acquisition strategy was used as one
measure of risk. This was a nominal variable with two categories,
related and unrelated acquisitions. Salter and Weinhold's (1980)
definition of these two categories was given to three raters. They
had information from Mergers and Acquisitions on the products of the
buyer and seller and based on that information, they determined the
acquisition strategy. The raters were given the following
definitions from Salter and Weinhold (1980):
Diversification can be said to be related if the following
hold:
1 ) if diversification involves businesses serving similar
markets;
2) if the businesses employ similar distribution systems;
3) if the businesses exploit similar science-based
research; and;
4) if the businesses operate at different stages of the
same commercial chain.
Unrelated diversification involves a move into businesses
that do not share any one of these four characteristics.
The interrater reliability of the judges was low. And even
though after trying to reconcile the judgements there was a positive
and significant correlation with the next variable, type of business
relationship, this variable was not used to test hypotheses.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also attempts to determine
the type of acquisition that has occurred for larger acquisitions
and mergers. These data were not available for the companies in the
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study, but the categories helped to create a variable called type of
business relationship. The FTC's five categories are mutually
exclusive. Mergers are horizontal when the companies involved
produce one or more of the same, or closely related, products in the
same geographic market. A vertical merger means the two companies
involved had a potential buyer-seller relationship prior to the
merger. Conglomerate mergers are classified into three
subcategories: product extension, market extension, and other.
Product extension mergers occur when the acquiring and acquired
companies are functionally related in production and/or distribution
but sell products that do not compete directly with one another. An
example of a product extension merger would be a soap manufacturer
acquiring a bleach manufacturer. Market extension mergers occur
when the acquiring and acquired companies manufacture the same
products, but sell them in a different geographic markets. An
example of a market extension merger would be a fluid milk processor
in Washington acquiring a fluid milk processor in Chicago. Other
conglomerate mergers involve the consolidation of two essentially
unrelated firms. An example would be a shipbuilding company buying
an ice cream manufacturer (FTC, 1981, pp. 108-109).
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In the questionnaire to measure type of business relationship,
informants were asked Question 12:
Q 12. What was the business relationship of CO. NAME
to YOUR FIRM?
1) A customer or supplier of OUR FIRM
2) A company with the same customers and products/services
as OUR FIRM or a unit of our firm
3) A company that had customers and products/services with
characteristics similar to those of OUR FIRM
4) A company that had customers and products/services with
characteristics new to OUR FIRM
For analysis purposes, responses 1 and 2 were combined to
indicate low risk acquisitions (n=5). Response 3 indicates medium
risk acquisitions (n=13). Response 4 indicates high risk
acquisitions (n=6). Four acquisition decisions could not be
analyzed for this variable.
The third measure of risk, perceived risk, is a subjective one.
The scaling is reversed in the tables in Chapter 6, i.e., 10 means
high risk and 1 means low risk. The informant was asked Question 8:
Q 8. When CO. NAME was initially identified as an acquisition
prospect, what did you think the chances in ten were that
the consequences of an acquisition would be favorable
to YOUR FIRM? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 10 where
1 means a very small chance of favorable consequences
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and 10 means it was certain that the consequences would
be favorable.
A fourth measure of risk used in the study was the ratio of
gross sales of the seller to gross sales of the buyer. Kitching
(196?) used this type of a measure and found that it was very highly
correlated with failure of acquisitions, but he found that when the
ratio was small (less than 1 in 20), the acquired firms were more
likely to fail, whereas larger acquisitions were more likely to be
successful. This result is opposite what would be expected if sales
ratio is a measure of risk. For the data from this study the sales
ratio has a low negative correlation with perceived risk, i.e. r =
-.25. But, it is intuitively appealing to conclude that there is a
greater risk associated with proportionately larger than smaller
acquisitions. This ratio has a range from a small positive number
(.01) to approximately 3 or 4. Numbers greater than 1 indicate the
selling firm was larger than the buying firm and that rarely occurs.
Sales ratio seems like a more reasonable way to account for the cost
of the acquisition than would gross sales of the acquired company.
For example, in an early interview as part of this study, the
statement was made that "The size of the acquired company doesn't
necessarily define risk— Company Z was a $300 million purchase, but
it involved very little risk, it is one of only a few firms that can
do what they do, and there is little chance of entry." Sales ratio
indicates what proportion of the output of the buyer would be at
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risk if an acquisition was made. In many cases this indicator seems
a component of the concept called strategic risk.
The validity of these measures of risk is difficult to
determine. The correlation matrix in Table 5.6 suggests that
different components of the domain of the risk concept are being
measured. But note that predicted risk is likely to be very
different from recalled risk. The measure of perceived risk is
especially subject to errors of recall and distortion. One would
expect that informants would have a tendency to report higher risk
for acquisitions that subsequently failed. The distortion of risk
perceptions of acquisitions that succeeded may be in either
direction depending upon attitudes and characteristics of the
informant. Also, the more objective measures of risk may tell us
little about the risks that were anticipated and recognized by the
decision makers and therefore influenced the decision process
variables (see Bettis, 1982 for his discussion on measuring risk).
It is important to note that according to Hage, risk is likely
to be highly related to experience making acquisition decisions.
The correlations between the risk and experience measures averaged
-.09, with a range from -.50 to .10. In general it seems that the
less experience that the management team had, the more likely they
were to make high risk acquisitions. But, they did not perceive the
greater risk of the decision outcome. In this study the cost of the
companies acquired ranges from $1 million to $400 million, but as
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noted previously the range on the size of the acquired companies is
restricted to small and medium-sized companies. Nevertheless
compared to many organization decisions, based on money committed,
all of the acquisitions are high risk decisions.
Type of_ Initiation £f the Decision Process. As was discussed
previously, the identification of an acquisition prospect may occur
in a number of different ways. One is for the acquiring firm to
plan an acquisition program, conduct a rigorous search for
acquisition prospects, and during that search identify the
acquisition prospect that is eventually acquired. This type of
initiation can be called "internal planning and search." A second
means of identifying acquisition prospects is through intermediaries
or finders. A third means that cannot be forecasted and should be
considered opportunistic, is where a selling firm approaches a
buying firm and suggests acquisition. A fourth source of initiation
is some type of fortuitous identification of the prospect within the
acquiring firm by a lower-level manager, member of the Board of
Directors, or possibly the Acquisition Director or Chief Executive
Officer when they are not actually searching for acquisition
prospects. Type of initiation is a nominal variable.
Question 6 in Appendix 2 was used to gather information about
the type of initiation.
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Q 6. How was CO. NAME originally brought to the attention of
managers at YOUR FIRM as a potential acquisition prospect?
1) A formal search for companies was conducted in-house
at OUR FIRM, we identified CO. NAME
2) We were looking for companies and a finder brought
CO. NMAE to our attention
3) We weren't looking for companies, but a finder
brought CO. NAME to our attention
4) We were looking for companies and CO. NAME
approached us
5) We weren't looking for companies, but CO. NAME
approached us
6) We had previously made investments in CO. NAME and
based on our knowledge we decided to consider them
for acquisition
7) Don't know, don't recall
8) Other
Nine of the managers reported that his company conducted a
formal search and identified the acquisition prospect. Finders
identified 6 of the prospects for the eventual buyers and 6 sellers
made the initial approach to the prospective buyers. Seven of the
types of initiation are classified into a category called "other".
The interviews suggested that informants were not having problems
answering this question. Birley's (1976) data also suggest that
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managers should be able to accurately recall this information. But,
they may misinterpret what category is most appropriate.
Other Independent Variables. In the questionnaire, managers
were asked four additional yes/no questions that indicate other
independent variables. Managers were asked the following four
questions:
Q 9. Were formal acqusition objectives established prior to
identification of CO. NAME as an acquisition prospect?
Q 10. Prior to the identifiction of CO. NAME as a prospect,
did YOUR FIRM have a formal strategy and plan for
finding suitable acquisition prospects?
Q 13. Were other companies aggressively competing with you to
acquire CO. NAME?
Q 14. Was CO. NAME having financial problems at the time of
the acquisition?
Moderating Variables
The two concepts called moderating variables in the decision
process model, size and implementation, are also independent
variables in the prediction model presented in Chapter 4. Specific
hypotheses were not developed in Chapter 4 about the effects of
these variables, but some post hoc tests were made. The small
sample size makes it difficult to test for moderating variables.
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Size. Kimberly (1976) states "Conceptual definitions of size
are lacking. There is very little discussion in the literature
about how size should or might be defined in a conceptual sense,
although there is considerable consensus on how it should be
operationally defined" (p. 574). Some of the various definitions of
size include: "the scope of an organization and its
responsibilities," the scale of operations, and the magnitude of the
labor force. After reviewing these definitions and empirical
studies, Kimberly concludes "By far the most common measure of size
found in the literature is the number of employees" (p. 582).
Are any of the operationalizations of size correlated? Child
(1973) correlated five possible measures of size and found a range
of intercorrelations from .31 to .88. The highest correlation was
between number of employees and net assets. Based mainly on
Kimberly's analysis, this study used the number of personnel of the
organization and the volume of organizational output as measures of
size. Published sources were used to gather this information.
Total sales was obtained from Mergers and Acquisitions for the
fiscal year prior to the acquisition and from the Annual Report for
fiscal year 1979. The number of employees was obtained from The
Million Dollar Directory. Total sales in 1979 and the number of
employees of the buyer were used to determine the effect of size on
CEO involvement. Because of high intercorrelations and scale
differences, no attempt was made to create a single size variable.
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The average correlation among the three size variables was .98, with
a range of .97 to .998.
Implementation . Implementation success and integration
activities were included as moderating variables for the
relationship between decision process variables and short-run
outcomes in the decision process model in Chapter 4. Specific
hypotheses were not developed. Implementation is a vague concept
that is perceived by many as more important than decision making.
Implementation deals with what occurs once a decision is made and
how well those activities are performed. The participating managers
provided the only information about implementation effectiveness and
activities. The effectiveness of implementation activities was
measured using a single item in the research schedule, Question 58.
A global rating was made by the informant in response to the
following question:
Q 58. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means very ineffective
and 10 means very effective, how effective were the
activities to integrate CO. NAME with YOUR FIRM?
A second variable was also used to measure the concept of
implementation. The amount of implementation activity was measured
by a checklist of activities that the key informant reported did or
did not occur. The list included installing a new control system,
establishing specific objectives, establishing incentive and profit
sharing programs, providing information to the labor force and
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resolving policy differences (see Questions 57. a -.e in Appendix 2).
This variable was created by summing the yes answers of the
informant that indicated the activity had occurred. The specific
activities in the list were selected because various authors
suggested that they were necessary if an acquired firm was to be
successfully integrated with the buyer (cf., Bing, 1980; Parsons and
Baumgartner, 1970; Mace and Montgomery, 1962).
These measures probably encompass only part of the concept
called implementation. The hackneyed assertion that "how a decision
is implemented is as important; as what decision was made" can not
really be tested, but these two measures probably incorporate part
of the domain of that global concept.
Process Intervening Variables
This study includes a number of process variables: amount of
intensive search, amount of analytical activity, amount of
discussion and participation in decision making, amount of CEO
direct involvement in acquisition activities, and duration of the
decision process. The duration of the process is also a summary
variable that can be considered an outcome of decision process
activities.
Amount £f Intensive Search. Intensive search refers to the
amount of examination and investigation of the acquisition prospect
by the acquiring firm and specifically the sources used to obtain
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information about the prospect. A number of managers in the
acquiring company and sometimes external consultants and advisors
gather information about the prospect and then the organization
evaluates this information. Amount of intensive search refers to
how many different sources are used to collect information about the
prospect. This is similar to Rees' (1966) use of the term
"intensive search."
Hage (1980) identifies a similar variable that he called the
amount of information search. It is the extent to which interest
groups seek facts relative to a decision issue. Only one interest
group is explicitly considered in this study, the group known to the
informant. The researchers in The Bradford Group (1981) identify a
variable called scrutiny that refers to the examination of and
production of information related to a decision topic. Scrutiny is
a much more inclusive variable than the intensive search variable
used in this study. The Bradford measure of scrutiny includes the
following: searching for facts, involving experts, soliciting
opinions about the alternatives and holding meetings to discuss the
alternatives. The fourth component "holding meetings to discuss the
alternatives" is not included in the measure of intensive search
used in this study.
A list of information sources was provided the informants who
were asked to indicate if each source was used during the
investigation of the prospect. Some of the sources listed include:
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brokers, investment bankers, industry experts, discussions with
managers in selling firm, trade association reports and analyses,
and plant visits. A complete list of the 13 sources is cited in
Questions 38 to 50, Appendix 2. If the source was not used it is
scored zero, if used on one occasion it receives a score of one; few
occasions two, and many occasions three. The amount of search is
determined by equally weighting the sources and summing the scores
for each source. The theoretical range for this variable is from 0
to 39. Three subscales were created in a similar manner; use of
experts (Questions 38 - 42), use of secondary sources (Questions U3
- 47) and use of direct contact (Questions 48 - 50).
The use of experts subscale includes five external sources of
information: 1) business brokers; 2) management consultants; 3)
stock brokers/analysts; 4) discussions with suppliers/customers of
the prospect; and 5) industry experts. Secondary sources meeasures
the amount of use of secondary information sources. The sources in
the questionnaire were: 1) computerized data bases; 2)
newspapers/magazines; 3) annual reports; 4) trade association
reports: and 5) in house files/reports. The third subscale measures
the amount of direct contact with the managers at the prospect
company to obtain information. Three types of direct contact were
identified: 1) discussions with managers in the selling firm; 2)
visits to selling firm plants and offices; and 3) dinner and social
meetings with managers in the selling firm. The subscales were
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scored in the same manner as the overall intensive search variable.
Table 5.7 has the intercorrelations between the overall intensive
search scale and the subscales. Some of the subscales are not
correlated, so the overall measure and the subscales were used in
tests of hypotheses.
Amount of Formal Analytical Activity. Especially for
important decisions, managers engage in some activities which they
perceive to be rational and analytical. The actual importance of
these activities in influencing decisions is arguable, but to some
extent they can be observed in most organizational decision
processes. The amount of formal analytical activity associated with
investigating acquisition prospects is considered an important
process variable.
This variable was measured by presenting the informants with a
list of fourteen activities judged as analytical. The list was
derived from Mace and Montgomery (1962), Scharf (1971), Bing (1980),
Parsons and Baumgartner (1970) and acquisition checklists from
various companies. These sources recommend the use of some or all
of the activities prior to every merger and acquisition decision
made by managers at the buying company.
The informant was asked if each activity did or did not occur
during the investigation of the company eventually acquired. Some
of the activities include: market research study, made sales and
earnings forecasts, prepared written plans to integrate company
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Table 5.7
Intel-correlations among Process Characteristics
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5 10
•, Amount of
Formal 1 .000
Analytical
Activity
2. Amount of
Intensive .48 1 .000
Search (.005)*
3. Use of
Outside .09 .60 1 .000
Experts (.332) (.000)
4. Use of
Secondary .38 .80 .17 1.000
Sources of (.024) (.00) (.197)
Information
5 . Direct
Contact .58 .67 .02 .43 1 .000
with the (.001) (.000) (.456) (.011)
Company
6. Amount, of
CEO Invol- -.15 -.17 .08 -.23 -.22 1.000
vement in (.217) (.195) (.335) (.121) (.134)
Activities
7. Perceived -.25 -.30 .05 -.31 -.38 .82 1 .000
CEO Invol- (.100) (.066) (.405) (.060) (.024) (.000)
vement n-27 n-27 n-27 n-27 n=27 n-27
g Number of
hours of -.32 .07 .39 .12 -.41 .48 .54 1.000
CEO Invol- (.055) (.376) (.023) (.276) (.019) (.066) (.003)
vement n-26 n-26 n-26 n-26 n-26 n-26 n-25
9_ Amount of
Participa- .31 .41 .34 .09 .45 .02 .03 -.01 1.000
tion in (.056) (.016) (.058) (.331) (.008) (.466) (.438) (.480)
Decision n-27 n-26
Making
10. Duration .04 .09 -.22 .14 .25 -.16 -.23 -.16 .01 1.000
(in ratha) (.421) (.322) (.134) (.242) (.102) (.214) (.134) (.222) (.471)
n-27 n-27 n-27 n-27 n-27 n-27 n-26 n-26 n-27
•Numbers in ( ) are the significance levels of the correlation
ccef ficienta. Number of observations equals 28 unless otherwise indicated.
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following the merger (a complete list is shown in Questions 15 - 28
in Appendix 2). The fourteen activities are scored and summed to
yield a measure of analytical activity. If the activity occurred, 1
was added to the total score, if it did not, then nothing was added.
The theoretical range of the variable is 0 to 14. The number of
these activities reported to have occurred in the firm represents a
measure of the amount of formal analytical activity. This variable
is positively correlated with the amount of intensive search,
especially direct contact with the company and with the amount of
discussion and participation in decisions discussed in the next
section. It is negatively correlated with the number of hours of
CEO involvement (see Table 5.7).
Amount £f Discussion and Participation jin Decisions. The third
process variable is similar to one suggested by Hage (1980) that he
called amount of discussion. He defines that concept as the amount
of time spent verbally considering the decision issue. The variable
in this study, the amount of discussion and participation in
subdecisions, refers to how much managers are consulted on decision
issues as individuals and in group meetings. So rather than asking
about the amount of time in discussions, the question deals with
specific decisions related to the acquisitions (that were either
made explicitly or implicitly). The informants were asked to
specify if few or many meetings and discussions were held with other
managers for the following issues (Questions 29 - 37 in Appendix 2):
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to make direct contact with the company, to submit a proposal and
enter negotiations, to make an offer, the amount of the offer, the
negotiating strategy, the person to conduct negotiations, to accept
an agreement-in-principal, the financing plan and to accept the
final deal. Many of the decisions in this list were derived from
Bing (1980, pp. 104-105). The scoring procedure is: if no meetings
or discussions were held, then 0 was scored in the total; few
meetings was scored 1; and many meetings was scored 2. The
theoretical range of this variable is from 0 to 18.
Amount £f CEO Involvement. The fourth process variable is the
amount of involvement of the chief executive officer in the
corporate acquisition decision process. This variable should not
vary directly with amount of discussion and participation in
decisions. Although the two variables both indicate how centralized
control of decision making is in a firm, they reflect different
components of this more global concept. High CEO involvement is
associated with centralization on a centralization/decentralization
continuum. Hage (1980) defines degree of delegation as the extent
to which the bulk of the process occurs at lower echelons (p. 117).
The researchers at the University of Bradford (1981) define
centrality as the degree to which decision making is located at the
summit of the organizational hierarchy. In this study participation
of the CEO refers to his direct involvement in activities related to
the acquisition process, rather than who was making the ultimate
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decision.
This variable was operationalized in three ways. First, it was
determined in what activities the CEO participated. A list of six
activities was presented to the informants. It included the
following: conducted negotiations, made visits to offices/plants of
company being investigated (see Questions 47 - 53 in Appendix 2).
Summing the affirmative responses provides a numerical measure of
the amount of CEO involvement. The theoretical range of this
variable is 0 to 6. Second, the informant was asked how involved
the CEO was in acquisition related activities (on a ten point scale
where 1 means low involvement and 10 means high involvement) .
Finally, an estimate was made by the informant of how many hours the
CEO spent on activities directly related to the specific acquisition
(see Question 53 in Appendix 2). The average correlation among
these three variables is .6, with a range of .48 to .82 (see Table
5.7).
Duration c_f Activities. Duration is the final decision-process
content variable. It is discussed by both Hage (1980) and The
Bradford Group. Duration simply refers to the length of time
between pairs of events. Duration does not do anything per se
rather it is a characteristic of what was done. Hage is concerned
with the time between the first proposal and the final decision
outcome. This definition corresponds to some extent with the time
between when the acquisition prospect is first identified and when
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the actual acquisition deal is completed (an agreement-in-principal
is reached). The Bradford Group's definition of duration is the
time between the original inception of a decision to the final
authorization. This is a much broader concept of the duration of
the decision process than that used in this study.
The duration variable was operationalized in this study as the
time in months from the identification of an acquisition prospect to
the final completion of the agreement-in-principal. An
agreement-in-principal is "an accord between two public corporations
concerning the practical feasibility of one acquiring or absorbing
the other." To calculate the value of this variable, the date given
for question 7 was subtracted from the date given for Question 56
(Appendix 2). Actually completing the legal details and auditing
the financial records of the acquired company and receiving final
approval from shareholders can require many months more and so the
end of the decision process is not the completion of the financial
transaction.
Dependent Variables
What does it mean to say that an acquisition is a failure or
that an acquisition is unsatisfactory? Bing (1980) suggests that
one way of measuring acquisition success or failure is to "compare
an evaluation of the results with the objectives and expectations of
the buyer when the business was acquired. . .Another approach would be
a straight economic one in which the acquired company's contribution
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to earning per share is the measure but this yardstick often does
not include all costs or all benefits from ownership. . .Perhaps,
failure may best be defined as simply an acquisition the buyer
wishes he had not made (p. 72)."
The primary dependent variable in this study is perceived
acquisition effectiveness. This variable was measured using seven
effectiveness dimensions. The key informant rated the acquisition
for each dimension on a 10 point scale where 1 meant very
dissatisfied and 10 meant very satisfied. The variable (Questions
59 - 65, Appendix 2) includes the following dimensions: financial
performance, contribution to goals, labor relations, investment
demand, performance of managers, price paid and future prospects.
All of the assessments were made at least two years following
completion of the acquisition. This measure therefore emphasized
mainly short-run performance of the acquired company. Table 5.8
indicates that the dimensions are highly correlated and therefore it
seems reasonable to create a single scale for use in testing the
hypotheses. The theoretical range of the scale is from 7 to 70.
There are two major objective measures that might be used to
indicate the effectiveness of an acquisition: measures of
profitability and market value for common stock. In this study, the
measures are not appropriate because of the relatively small size of
the selling companies when compared to the buyers. So data for
business segments were collected to calculate a second dependent
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Table 5.8
Intel-correlations among Items in the
Acquisition Effectiveness Scale
Scale Items
1 . Financial 1 .000
2. Contribution .89 1 .000
to Goals (.000)*
3. Labor .42 .30 1 .000
Relations (.014) (.058)
4. Investment .70 .76 .42 1 .000
Demand (.000) (.000) (.014)
5. Performance .74 .66 .37 .58 1.000
of Managers (.000) (.000) (.026) (.001)
6. Price Paid .72 .74 .50 .57 .49 1.000
(.000) (.000) (.003) (.001) (.004)
7. Future .82 .78 .40 .76 .57 .55 1 .000
Prospects (.000) (.000) (.018) (.000) (.001) (.001)
*Numbers in () are significance levels for the correlation
coefficients when the number of observations is 28.
189
variable, the pre- and post-acquisition return on assets for the
segment that currently includes the acquired company, but the
usefulness and reliability of these data are minimal.
Using segment data, specifically return on assets for the
segment that includes the acquired company, is sometimes very
inaccurate and unrepresentative of the performance of the acquired
company. Certainly when the segment is very large relative to the
acquired company many other factors than the performance of the
acquired company account for changes in ROA from the year prior to
the acquisition to 2 years following the acquisition. But when the
acquired company is larger, the segment data should be more
meaningful. In some small companies no segmental data is available.
Also the issue of relative impact of the acquisition on company
performance must be considered.
So how useful is the segment data? It is probably useful for
large firms that acquired medium-sized companies and possibly useful
for all of the acquisitions of medium-sized companies. But
following collection and analysis of the segment data, the decision
was made not to use it to test hypotheses for a subsample of 14
companies.
Development of_ the Research Schedule
The research schedule went through four preliminary versions
before it was finalized. Initially the prescriptive literature,
case studies and the schedules developed by Mintzberg et al . , and
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the Bradford Group were reviewed. Based on this material the first
draft of the research schedule was prepared. It was reviewed by
faculty members in the School of Business at the University of
Wisconsin. Based on their feedback and comments of two managers
involved in making acquisition decisions the questions were revised
and Version 2 was then tested. More feedback from faculty members,
Harold Stieglitz at The Conference Board, and a review of Ansoff et
al.'s (1971) questionnaire resulted in the design for Version 3.
The third version of the questionnaire was reviewed by four people
involved in merger and acquisition related activities, an
acquisition broker, a vice president of an investment banking firm
specializing in acquisitions, a corporate lawyer specializing in
acquisitions and an investment analyst for a large insurance
company. Based on their comments and those of faculty members, the
fourth version was developed.
Three people, in addition to members of the faculty at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, reviewed Version 4 of the research
schedule. The Director of the Survey Research Lab at the University
of Wisconsin, Dr. Harry P. Sharp, critiqued the technical aspects of
the questionnaire, especially question wording. And actual
interviews, using Version U of the research questionnaire, were
conducted with two managers, one a vice president in a small
manufacturing company, and the other, the director of acquisitions
in a large holding company. The results of the critique of Version
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U were incorporated in Version 5, the version used in the study.
Based on feedback received in interviews during the study, this
extensive questionnaire development effort apparently resulted in a
reasonably clear and unambiguous questionnaire (See Appendix 2).
Data Analysis
Two approaches were used to check the quality of the
information provided by the key informants. First, informants were
asked if records were consulted. Second, some of the data provided
by the key informant werea matter of public record so for that data
t
published sources were consulted (i.e. number of acquisitions
completed in a specific period). Both approaches suggest the
managers attempted to provide reliable and accurate data.
For many issues related to this research project descriptive
statistics provide useful and necessary information. Specifically,
descriptive statistics provide an overview of current acquisition
and merger practices and they can clarify which activities were
relatively more important in decision processes that resulted in
successful acquisitions. Means and standard deviations are reported
for the four decision process variable scales and other interval
scaled variables. The frequency of use of activities and sources of
information about prospects are also reported for formal analytical
activities, intensive search and those activities in which the CEO
participated. Response frequencies are also reported for variables
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that had a nominal scale, e.g. yes/no or categories, such as use of
objectives and type of business relationship. The code book for the
data gathered in this study is in Appendix 3.
Many of the hypotheses in the study state a simple relationship
between only two variables. The magnitude and direction of these
relationships was tested using Pearson product-moment correlations.
A data set of size 28 permits a statistical test of significance for
the correlation coefficient, but to be statistically significant
with a probability level of less than .10 the coefficient must be
greater than +/- .25. Although some of the assumptions for using
the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient are clearly
violated by variables in the study, prior research suggests that it
is robust and can be used with ordinal data (Havlicek and Peterson,
1977; Labovitz, 1970).
Differences between means for decision process variables were
statistically tested for the 10 most successful and the 10 least
successful acquisitions, planned and unplanned acquisitions, and for
types of business relationship. The very small number of companies
in some categories limits the usefulness of this analysis.
Parametric tests of significance are reported in Chapter 6,
because the advantage of using nonparametric statistics does not
seem to justify the loss of information that occurs. Also, given
the violations of assumptions for making statistical inferences, all
results must be interpreted conservatively. In Chapter 6, tests of
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statistical significance are reported, but practical significance is
also discussed.
Regression analysis (Darlington, 1968) was used to compare the
prediction and decision-process models. Both models assume a weak
causal ordering of variables and causal closure. The covariation in
acquisition effectiveness is assumed to be either a direct result of
an independent or process variable or to be a result of a mutual
dependence of the variables in the models on some outside variable.
A combination of these two factors may determine the level of the
dependent variable. To avoid problems with multicollinearity, the
objective and perceptual measures of experience and risk are used
separately in analyses. Risk and experience are however
significantly correlated. Forward stepwise inclusion of variables
was used in the regression analyses. With this procedure order of
entry of variables is determined by the respective contribution of
each variable to explained variance. It should be noted that there
are likely to be problems with the stability of the regression
equations because of the small sample size and multicollinearity
among variables.
Discussion of Methodological Limitations
Much of the data for this research study were collected using a
historical methodology or what might be called retrospective
reports. Participating managers provided answers to questions about
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events that occurred anywhere from two to four years prior to when
the questions were answered.
Using key informants and retrospective reports certainly has
limitations, as well as strengths. The strengths are quite obvious.
One can collect information about a process that extends over time
using only one contact with an informant. This method therefore,
reduces the amount of time and the financial resources needed for
data collection. Second, the researcher does not have to wait for
the events to occur, rather it is possible to collect data about
prior events. Third, the informant has had a chance to gain some
perspective and overview of the process that has occurred, so that
major events can be sorted out from minor events. Therefore, the
informant can provide general information rather than very detailed
information that would then have to be aggregated and evaluated by
the researcher.
The disadvantages or limitations of this method follow almost
directly from its strengths. Certainly the opportunity given the
informants to aggregate information also gives informants the
opportunity to bias or distort information. Bauer (1972) notes that
in assessing process models "the interview would require persons to
recall what they had done in the past —a task which in complicated
situations such as these is cursed with the problem of retrospective
bias (p. 4)." And it is known from the cognitive psychology
literature (see Simon 1979; Slovic, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff,
195
1977) that individuals do forget and distort information. There is
no reason to expect that some loss of information and distortion did
not occur in this study. But, research by both Birley (1974) and
Fischhoff and Beyeth (1975) indicate that facts are recalled more
accurately than expectations, opinions or preferences. Also, some
people are better able to recall information than others (Hyatt,
Riley 4 Sederstrom, 1978). The research questionnaire in this study
used primarily fact-oriented questions and the informants held
important, responsible positions where good recall would be an
asset. Both of these features of the study should have improved the
accuracy of the information collected. Ideally multiple informants
should have evaluated the more subjective questions, such as
acquisition effectiveness and risk.
Deliberate distortion and selective recall are related problems
that are more difficult to overcome. Another related problem is the
tendency of people to infer missing information and to fill out and
generalize incomplete memories before responding (Ericsson and
Simon, 1978, p. 32). Ericsson and Simon also note that "what
information can be recalled depends on what cues and probes are
provided. Hence, the completeness of the information retrieved will
vary with the probing procedure" (p. 26). Although these
observations were based on research about individual decision making
and the questions were asked a short-time following a task, the
issue they raise is relevant to informants recalling information
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from long-term memory to provide retrospective reports of an
organizational decision process. Actually, it seems reasonable to
assume that the greater the elapsed time following an event, the
more important are the questions asked the informant.
A second major limitation of using key informants and
retrospective reports is that in a given organization, different
informants may have perceived the decision process differently and
had access to different information. Because of this, it is always
difficult to determine which informant is most qualified to provide
a specific item of information and which informant should be
believed about activities and events. In this study, the Chief
Executive Officer designated a key informant. A single informant
was used because the two means of resolving differences between
multiple informants, i.e. qualitative reconciliation and averaging,
would have created additional problems. Qualitative reconciliation
of differences would have required the researcher or a judge to make
highly subjective judgments. Averaging responses of different
informants would have reduced variance and would not necessarily
have resulted in more accurate information.
This study can provide useful information for hypothesis
testing, but the limitations of using informants and retrospective
reports should not be ignored. In many ways using a research
questionnaire, retrospective reports, and key informants in multiple
organizations is analogous to multiple case study research. Gee
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(1950) also notes the very close relationship between the case study
method and the survey method.
Following are strategies used in this study to overcome
limitations of the research method:
1. Pretested, structured, and somewhat wordy questions were
used. The need to pre-test questions is widely recognized in social
science research, but it is especially critical in strategic
managment research. The difficulty of obtaining access to key
informants causes the "opportunity costs" associated with an
unusable interview or survey questionnaire to be very high.
In addition, unstructured questions increase the danger that
the researcher will inadvertently interpret answers. Thus,
perceptual distortion may take place when the respondent interprets
an ambiguous question and a second distortion may take place when
the researcher interprets an ambiguous answer.
Nevertheless, intuition suggests that policy-level informants
may resent the structure imposed upon them. This resentment can
effectively be overcome by using wordy questions that do not contain
significantly more information, but that do impart an image of
richness and contain redundancies to aid in understanding. The
efficacy of this approach has been demonstrated by Cannel and Henson
(1974) and others.
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2. The elapsed time between the events of interest and the
data-collection effort was minimized. Increases in the elapsed time
following an event cause information to be less recallable (Ericsson
and Simon, 1978; Hyatt, Riley and Sederstrom, 1978) and very
probably increase the impact of cognitive biases. To get
assessments of the success of the acquisitions two years seemed the
minimum elapsed time. For example, in an unstructured interview
early in this project, it was noted that it took a company "2 years
to become aware of problems, initially they were rationalizing
problems as part of the learning process or simply a management
problem. "
3. An attempt was made _to demonstrate a clear need for the
research study, _to stress confidentiality and £o communicate
enthusiasm for the study _to the CEO and the informant. This tactic
can increase the likelihood that the informant will be motivated to
be as helpful as possible. Common sense suggests that the
completeness and accuracy of an informant's responses will be a
function of his or her motivation. Most policy-level informants
cannot be motivated by financial incentives and it is unlikely that
they would be motivated by a desire to affiliate with academic
researchers. Also, the heavy demands on the time of policy level
informants (Mintzberg, 1973) may cause norms of good citizenship,
politeness, or acquiesence to requests for information to have less
influence than is the case for many other informant groups.
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Using this tactic should have encouraged the informants to
admit when they did not have specific information. And the
informant should have been more likely to perceive benefits from the
project, both personal and organizational. Also, managers in
participating companies were promised a report of results from the
study.
Other problems with using retrospective reports and key
informants and means to overcome some of the limitations of the
method for strategic management research are discussed by Power and
Huber (1982).
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Chapter 6
A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS
Material in prior chapters has established a framework for
investigating corporate acquisition decision processes. The purpose
of this chapter is to report the results of a research study that
has spanned the past 2 years. Both qualitative and quantitative
information was gathered as part of this study. Qualitative
information was gathered from both primary and secondary sources.
Quantitative information was gathered using a mailed questionnaire.
Scales used to test hypotheses were derived from information in the
questionnaires .
This chapter has two major sections. First, descriptive
results from the questionnaires are presented. And some anecdotal
information from interviews is included to help interpret that
information. Second, tests of relationships are reported for both
the prediction and decision process models.
Descriptive Results
Table 6.1 summarizes the means, standard deviations and actual
ranges for the variables used in this study. An analysis of the
table suggests the following descriptive statements:
Looking back, managers reported that on average the risk of
failure for the acquisitions was perceived as high during the
investigation. But both the standard deviation and range indicate
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high variability in the perceptions of risk during the acquisition
decision process.
The ratio of sales of seller to buyer indicates that most of
the acquiring companies were much larger than the companies they
acquired. Actually, only one buyer was smaller in sales than the
company it bought.
Most managers perceived that the management team at their firm
was experienced with acquisition decision making prior to the
acquisition included in this study. The small standard deviation in
responses indicates that most managers reported about the same level
of prior experience on the scale. Both the number of companies
investigated and the number actually acquired suggest that there may
have been much greater variability in experience than that perceived
by the managers.
Integration activities were generally perceived as effective,
although there is a wide range and some variability for responses.
All of the process variables except amount of formal analytical
activity have high variability. On average about nine analytical
activities are used to evaluate prospects. Some meetings and
one-to-one discussions occur about subdecisions. The level of
intensive search suggests some use of all sources, but especially
direct contact. CEOs, on average, participate in about 3 of the 6
activities included in the questionnaire. The perceived level of
CEO involvement and the hours of involvement are high, but the
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variability is also large.
Most investigations of prospects took many months. And many of
the decision processed spanned more than 9 months. Finally, the
acquisitions were generally perceived as more satisfactory than
unsatisfactory. This makes sense because none of the buyers had
divested the acquisitions at the time of the study. Divestiture
would have been one of a few likely responses to an acquisition that
was clearly unsuccessful.
Use of. Formal Analytical Activities
All of the formal analytical activities provided in a list to
the informants were used by managers in at least 8 companies as part
of their acquisition decision process. Some of the activities were
used by almost all companies. These frequently used analytical
activities include: investigating managers of the prospect;
examining dilution of earnings per share and debt/equity ratios; and
determining payback period, cash flows and/or projected Return on
Investment. Many of the managers that were interviewed commented on
the importance of examining the financial implications of making a
proposed acquisition.
Some activities that one might expect for normative reasons to
be important to good decision making were not used very frequently.
For example, only one third of the companies compared purchasing the
prospect to other investment opportunities. And in only 12
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decisions were written plans to integrate the companies prepared
before a decision was made. One manager noted in an interview that
his firm was only looking at one prospect so it could not be
compared with other acquisition prospects. He did not consider it
possible to compare the acquisition prospect with non-acquisition
investment opportunities. Another manager noted that he did not
want to formally plan the integration of the companies until after
he knew for sure that a deal was made. Table 6.2 tabulates the
frequency of use of the 1U formal analytical activities.
Not as much formal analytical activity occurred during the
investigation of the acquisitions included in this study as had been
expected. Many activities that have been recommended by acquisition
specialists and authors in the normative literature on decision
making were not frequently included in corporate acquisition
decision processes. Analysis of prospects seems to heavily stress
financial questions. Hypothesis D 1 was not supported.
Information Sources
The responses tabulated in Table 6.3 indicate that experts and
secondary sources were rarely used to gather information on
prospects. Managers seemed to rely primarily on direct contacts
with managers in the selling firm for information. In interviews,
some managers pointed out that it was difficult to use secondary
sources to obtain information about privately held firms, especially
small firms. Also, it was noted that a concern for secrecy often
206
Table 6.2
Formal Analytical Activities
Which of the following activities occurred prior to reaching an agreement-in-
principle with CO. NAME?
15. Prepared detailed demand forecasts for CO.
NAME'S products/services
16. Prepared a report comparing CO. NAME to
other investment opportunities
17. Evaluated CO. NAME against written acquisition
objectives
18. Completed a written checklist for evaluating
acquisition candidates
19. Investigated the managers of CO. NAME
20. Prepared a. report on compatibility of marketing,
production, accounting, and information systems
21. Had a specialist investigate tax issues
22. Investigated worker satisfaction, employee
turnover, pensions and contracts
23. Developed written plans for utilizing
top-management personnel of CO. NAME
24. Prepared written plans to integrate the
companies following a merger
25. Examined dilution of earnings per share, and
debt/equity ratios 25 1 2 no resp.
26. Determined payback period, cash flows and/or
projected Return on Investment
27. Prepared a report on CO. NAME's competitors
and environmental factors affecting CO. NAME
28. Analyzed unsettled litigation, claims and
long-term contracts of CO. NAME
*number of managers responding "yes" to this question.
**number of managers responding "no" to this question.
Yes No
* *
18 10
8 20
19 9
17 11
23 3
19 9
19 9
23 5
14 14
12 16
27 1
18 10
24 4
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Table 6.3
Intensive Search - Use of Sources
How frequently were each of the following Information sources used by you
and other managers at your firm during the investigation of CO. NAME prior
to reaching an agreement-in-principle to make the acquisition?
Never
One
Occasion
Few
Occasions
Many
Occasions
38. business brokers or A
Investment bankers 16 4
39. management consultants 21 3
40. stock brokers/analysts 26 1
41. discussions with suppliers/
customers of CO. NAME 9 1
42. industry experts, e.g.
retired executives 16 3
43. computerized data bases,
MERGEX, COMPUSTAT 26 0
44. newspapers /magazines 20 3
45. annual reports/lOKs/
Moody 's /credit reports 13 5
46. trade association
reports and analyses 13 5
47. in-house files/reports 8 3
48. discussions with managers
in selling firm 0 1
49. visits to selling firm
plants and offices 1 2
50. dinner and social
meetings with managers
in selling firm 4 0
5 3
1 3
1 0
10 8
9 0
2 0
4 1
8
11
12
13
2
6
18
13
11
*number of responses.
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precluded using outside experts.
Hypothesis D 2 was not supported. Many fewer information
sources were used and they were used much less frequently by buyers
during the investigation of an acquisition prospect than was
expected.
CEO Involvement
The mean level of perceived CEO involvement was on the high
side of the scale, but the variability was very large. Table 6.U
summarizes the descriptive information about CEO involvement. CEOs
were rarely involved in making initial contacts with prospects or in
conducting negotiations. Most CEOs did hold regular meetings to
evaluate information about the prospect and they personally
presented the final deal to the board of directors. An analysis of
the relationship between size and perceived CEO involvement and
number of hours of CEO involvement shows a significant correlation
(average r = -.UU). This correlation indicates that CEO involvement
is greater in medium-sized companies than in larger companies.
Hypothesis D 3 needs to be modified as a result of the findings
of this study. CEOs, primarily in medium-sized organizations, are
actively involved in acquisition decision process activities during
the purchase of small and medium-sized companies. In large
organizations, the CEO's role seems more one of ratification than
decision making and investigation.
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Table 6.4
CEO Involvement
31. In general, using a ten-point scale, how involved was THE CEO of your
firm in acquisition activities related to CO. NAME? On the scale 1 means
very little direct involvement and 10 means extensive direct involvement in
acquisition activities.123456789 10
Very little Extensive involvement
mean - 6.0 SD - 3.6
52. In which of the following acquisition related tasks did THE CEO at the
time of the acquisition actively participate? Did the CEO ...
Yes No
52. a. Make initial contact with managers A
at CO. NAME 5 23
52. b. Conduct negotiations 8 20
52. c. Hold regular meetings to evaluate
information about CO. NAME 19 9
52. d. Plan and direct staff investigations 11 17
52. e. Make visits to offices/plants of
CO. NAME 15 13
52. f. Present the "deal" to YOUR FIRM's
Board of Directors 23 5
53. Approximately how many hours did THE CEO spend on activities directly
related to the acquisition of CO. NAME?
mean » 71 hours SD « 103.5
54. During the investigation of CO. NAME, was there a separate department
of staff person at YOUR FIRM specifically responsible for acquisitions and
mergers?
1) Yes - 19 2) No • 8 1 no response
55. What was the title of the person in charge of the investigation and
negotiations with CO. NAME?
Frequency
4 1) Chairman of the Board
4 2) President
2 3) Executive or administrative vice president
6 4) Head of acquisitions unit
4 5) Other Vice-President
2 6) Special Staff Person
5 7) Other (please specify)
*number of responses.
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Amount of Participation
Table 6.5 indicates that at least a few meetings and
discussions occurred about all of the subdecisions in most of the
companies. The least amount of discussion and participation
occurred for the decisions on the financing plan and the negotiating
strategy. The most participation occurred on the decisions to
submit a proposal, make an offer and the amount of the offer.
Hypothesis D U was supported. Acquisition decision making is a
participative process with at least some meetings and one-to-one
discussions occurring about prospects.
Integration Activities
No hypothesis was developed for integration activity, but Table
6.6 indicates that most of the listed activities were completed as
part of the integration process for all of the acquisitions. Also,
as noted, the integration activities were generally perceived as
effective. In the interviews one manager noted that his firm did
not want to integrate the acquired company with the primary
operations so few of the activities were used.
Tests of Relationships
Two models were presented in Chapter 4. The models are
alternative explanations of why acquisitions succeed or fail, but
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Table 6.5
Participation in Decision Making
Did no, few, or many meetings and discussions occur about the decision
29. To make direct contact with
CO. NAME
None Few
21
Many
1 13 14
1 IS 12
1 17 10
2 17 9
9 18 1
2 19 7
9 15 k
3 19 6
30. To submit a. proposal and
enter negotiations
31. To make an offer
32. The amount of the offer
33. The negotiating strategy
34. The person to conduct negotiations
35. To accept an agreement- in-principle
36. The financing plan
37. To accept the final deal
2 no response
*number of responses.
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Table 6.6
Integration Activities
57. Which of the following integration activities occurred after CO. NAME
was acquired?
Mo
57. a. Installed a new financial control
system
57. b. Established specific objectives
for managers of the acquired firm
57. c. Established incentive and profit-
sharing programs
57. d. Developed stable reporting
relationship to one manager at
our company headquarters
57. e. Had meetings between our top-managers
and managers at the acquired firm to
resolve policy differences
57. f. Provided the labor force at CO. NAME
with detailed information about the
acquisition and OUR FIRM
Tea
*
19
27
23
25
23
22
3
1
4
1 no response
1 no response
58. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means very ineffective and 10 means
very effective, how effective were the activities to integrate CO. NAME
with YOUR FIRM?
1 2
ineffective
3
7.2
6
3D
7
1.9
8 9 10
effective
mean
*number of responses.
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the models are not necessarily incompatible. The major difference
between the models is that process variables are treated explicitly
in the decision-process model and considered implicitly in the
prediction model.
Prediction Model Hypotheses
In the prediction model, experience, strategic risk and source
initiating the decision process are hypothesized as predictors of
management satisfaction with and the effectiveness of the
acquisition. A variable called perceived acquisition effectiveness
was used as the dependent variable in the test of hypotheses.
Chapter 5 discusses this variable in more detail, but briefly it is
the sum of a manager's ratings of the acquisition on seven
effectiveness dimensions. The variable includes the following
dimensions: financial performance, contribution to goals, labor
relations, investment demand, performance of managers, price paid
and future prospects. All of the assessments were made at least two
years following completion of the acquisition. This variable
therefore, emphasizes mainly short-run performance of the acquired
company.
An examination of Table 6.7 shows that two of the three
experience variables are significantly correlated with perceived
acquisition effectiveness. The number of firms acquired from 1975
to 1979 and perceived experience are both positively correlated with
perceived effectiveness. A significant effect of strategic risk on
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Table 6.7
Examination of Relations Between
Prediction Variables and Acquisition Effectiveness
Perceived
Acquisition
Effectiveness
Correlations with
Experience and Risk Determinants
Mmber of
firms inves
tigated
1975-1979
.14
Notnber of
firms
acquired
1975-1979
.38**
Perceived
experience
making
acquisitions
.28*
Perceived
risk of
the
acquisition
-.24
1979 Sales of
seller divided
by 1979 sales
of Buyer
.11
Means on Business
Relationship Categories123
Cust/ Similar New
Supp
(n-5 ) (n-13 ) (n-6 )
Significant T-Ttest
Comparisons
1-2 2-3 1-3
Perceived
Acquisition
Effectiveness 64.6 50.2 47.3 ***a
Perceived
Acquisition
Effectiveness
Means on Initiation
Categories123
In-house Aided by Approached
Search
(n-9)
Finder
(n-6)
by Co.
(n-7)
50.4
* - p less than .10 **
49.3 52.3
• p less than .05
Other
(n-6)
Significant T-Ttest
Comparisons
1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4
51.8
*** - p less than .01
a - a separate variance estimate of T was used
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acquisition effectiveness was found using the business relationship
variables and the relationship approached significance for the
perceived risk variable. Acquisitions of customers and suppliers
were evaluated as much more effective than other types of
acquisitions. The source initiating the process or identifying the
prospect was not related to acquisition effectiveness. Appendix U
has scattergrams for the relationships of the independent variables
with perceived effectiveness.
Hypotheses PM 1 and PM 2 were supported by the results of this
study. The results support a positive relationship between
experience of managers in the buying firm and the strategic risk
associated with a specific acquisition, and the level of management
satisfaction with and perceived effectiveness of an acquisition.
Both experience and low strategic risk predict successful
acquisitions.
The scattergrams (See Appendix U) indicate that firms that had
made more than six acquisitions had generally effective
acquisitions. They also indicate that if the top one-third of the
actual range of the acquisition effectiveness variable is used to
indicate highly effective acquistions, then the base rate
probabilities for highly effective acquisitions are: 1/3 for
unrelated acquisitions; 6/13 for acquisitions of companies with
similar customers or technologies; and 1 for acquisitions of
customers/suppliers or competitors.
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Hypothesis PM 3 was not supported. There did not appear to be
a relationship between planned initiation and search for an
acquisition prospect and the level of management satisfaction with
and perceived effectiveness of the acquisition.
Decision-Process Model Hypotheses
Prior descriptive research on corporate acquisition decision
processes provided a starting point for this project. Issues that
had not been previously studied were examined. Issues that had been
investigated by two or more researchers who found differing results
were again examined. And some counter-intuitive findings of single
research studies were also studied. Major research studies related
to corporate acquisition search and decision processes were
summarized in Chapter 3-
A number of decision process variables were used in this study.
The section on descriptive results in this chapter provided some
information about the content of the acquisition decision process,
but it is probably helpful to briefly summarize the process
variables. Intensive search refers to the amount of examination and
investigation of the acquisition prospect by the acquiring firm and
specifically the sources used for information. A list of
information sources was provided the informant who indicated if each
source was used during the investigation of the prospect (see Table
6.3). Three subscales were created: use of experts; use of
secondary sources; and use of direct contact.
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Amount of formal analytical activity was measured by presenting
the informants with a list of activities judged as analytical. The
informant was asked if each activity did or did not occur during the
investigation of the company eventually acquired. Some of the
activities include: market research study, made sales and earnings
forecasts, and prepared written plans to integrate company following
the merger.
Amount of discussion and participation in decisions was
measured for specific subdecisions related to the acquisition
decision process.
Amount of CEO involvement was measured in three ways. First,
six activities were included in a checklist, e.g., conducted
negotiations, made visits to offices/plants of company being
investigated. Second, the informant was asked how involved the CEO
was in acquisition related activities. Finally, an estimate was
made by the informant of how many hours the CEO spent on activities
directly related to the acquisition of interest in the study.
Duration of Activities was operationalized in this study as the
time in months from the identification of an acquisition prospect to
the final completion of the acquisition agreement-in-principle.
Effects £f Experience. Do managers who are experienced making
acquisitions design and use substantially different decision
processes than inexperienced managers? Companies that made the most
acquisitions prior to the one included in the study had different
218
decision process characteristics. For example as indicated in Table
6.8, more experienced firms had lower levels of participation in the
decision process and made less use of information sources to obtain
information about the prospect. Also, the managers in firms that
had made the most acquisitions perceived that the acquisition
included in the study had been more effective.
Hypotheses DPM 1.1 and DPM 1.5 received no support in this
study. The other three hypotheses, DPM 1.2, DPM 1.3 and DPM 1.U,
were supported. More experience resulted in: 1) a lower amount of
intensive search about the acquisition prospect; 2) a lower amount
of participation by the CEO in acquisition decision activities; and
3) a lower amount of discussion and participation in decision making
during the investigation of the acquisition prospect.
Effects of Strategic Risk. Do managers use more complex and
extensive decision processes when an unrelated business is acquired?
Managers making unrelated acquisitions appear to use more complex
and extensive decision processes (See Table 6.9). When new and
unrelated businesses are acquired companies engage in significantly
more intensive information search and are more likely to use experts
to obtain information about prospects. Also there are higher levels
of participation when new businesses are acquired and the mean
amount of CEO hours is much greater than for other types of
acquisitions. But, as Table 6.9 indicates, the perceived
effectiveness of the acquisition of the new business is
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Table 6.8
Relationships between Experience and Risk Ceterminants
and Process Variables
Process Variables Experience and Risk Determinants
Number of Number of
firms inves- firms
tigated acquired
1975-1979 1975-1979
Amount of Formal
Analytical Activity
Amount of
Participation
in Decision Making
Amount of Intensive
Search
Use of Outside
Experts
Direct Contact with
the Company
Uses of Secondary
Sources of
Information
Amount of CEO
Involvement
in Activities
.12
-.05
-.20
-.16
.05
-.25*
-.30*
-.22
-.46***
-.26*
Perceived Perceived
experience risk of
making the
acquisitions acquisition
-.01
-.49***
-.07
-.19
.26*
-.35** -.18 .03
-.38** -.38** -.08
-.17 .15 .18
-.17 -.10 -.001
.05
1979 Sales of
seller divided
by 1979 sales
of Buyer
-.38**
-.11
-.25*
.10
-.37**
-.29*
.40**
-.22
.11
Duration
Perceived Acquisition
Effectiveness
-.12
.14
.OS
.38**
.23
.28*
.17
-.24
p less than .10 p less than .05 *** » p less than .01
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Table 6.9
Examination of Relationships between Business
Relation Categories and Process Variables :
Means on Business Significant T-Test
Relationship Categories Comparison
Variables
1 2 3
Cust/ Similar New
Supp
(n=5) (n=13) (n=6 )
1-2 2-3 1-3
Mount of Formal
Analytical Activity
Amount of Intensive
Search
9.4 9.8
13.2 14.2
10.0
19.5 **a
Use of Outside
Experts
Use of Secondary
Sources
2.2
3.6
3.4
3.8
6.2
5.8
Direct Contact with 7.4 7.0 7.5
the Company
Amount of CEO 3.6 2.8 3.2
Involvement with
Activities
Perceived CEO
Involvement
6.8 6.0 6.0
Number of CEO
Hours
59.9 65.0 160.4
Amount of
Participation
in Decision Making
8.2 10.6 12.0
8.6Duration
Perceived Acquisition 64.6
Effectiveness
10.5
50.2
8.8
47.3 ***a **a
* = p less than .10 ** = p less than .05 *** = p less than .01
a = a separate variance estimate of T was used
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significantly less than when customers or suppliers are acquired.
Table 6.8 presents results for perceived risk and the ratio of sales
of the seller and buyer. The amount of formal analytical activity
was higher when the sales ratio was low, indicating that lower risk
acquisitions were examined with more formal analytical activity than
higher risk acquisitions.
Hypothesis DPM 2.1 was disconfirmed. Higher strategic risk of
an acquisition for the buyer, if there is a relationships, leads to
lower, not greater, amounts of formal analytical activities during
the investigation of the acquisition prospect.
The results for hypothesis DPM 2.2 were not consistent. The
hypothesis was confirmed if business relation is used as the risk
variable and disconfirmed when sales ratio is considered the best
measure of risk. Higher strategic risk may result in a greater
amount of intensive search for information about a specific
acquisition prospect.
Hypothesis DPM 2.3 was confirmed for the sales ratio variable,
but not for the other two risk variables. It was found that the
larger the acquisition prospect in terms of the buyer's sales, the
greater the amount of participation of the CEO in acquisition
decision activities.
The results support hypothesis DPM 2.4. Higher strategic risk
results in a greater amount of discussion and group participation in
decisions during the investigation of an acquisition prospect.
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Finally, hypothesis DPM 2.5 was not confirmed. Higher
strategic risk did not result in a longer acquisition decision
process.
Effects of Initiating Source. Does the decision process differ
when the organization initiates and plans a search for acquisition
prospects as compared to the process that follows an unplanned
initiation by the seller or a broker. Acquisitions that are
initiated by unusual means encompased in the "other" category in
Table 6.10 seem to lead to greater search for information about the
prospect. Also, when the acquisition decision process is initiated
by an in-house search as compared to when it is initiated by an
approach from the selling company, the number of hours of CEO
involvement is significantly greater. Finally, the duration of the
decision process is much longer for in-house search and approach by
the seller than for unusual and non-standard means of initiating the
decision process.
Hypotheses DPM 3.1 and DPM 3.U were not confirmed. Planned
search for prospects did not result in a greater amount of formal
analytical activity or a greater amount of discussion and
participation in making acquisition subdecisions.
Hypothesis DPM 3.2 was disconfirmed. Prospects identified by
planned search were not subject to greater amounts of intensive
search, rather the amount of search was lower than for prospects
identified by other means.
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Hypothesis DPM 3-3 was also disconfirmed. When an acquisition
prospect is identified by a planned search rather than by another
source, there is greater, rather than lower, participation by the
CEO in acquisition decision activities.
Finally, hypothesis DPM 3.5 was partially confirmed. When an
acquisition prospect is identified by a planned search rather than
by another source, the duration of the acquisition decision process
is longer.
Process Effects en Acquisition Effectiveness. Do some decision
process activities predict short-run success for an acquisition?
Are some activities unrelated to success or related to failure? An
analysis of Table 6.11 suggests that in the short-run an acquisition
is more likely to be perceived as effective:
a) In firms that have only some meetings and discussions
during the investigation rather than many
meetings .
b) In companies that make only some use of outside experts and
direct contacts with the acquisition prospect rather than
extensive use.
Tables 6.12, 6.13, and 6.15 indicate that formal analytical
activities, use of integration activities and use of information
sources differ little between the 10 most effective and the 10 least
effective acquisitions.
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Table 6.11
Relationships Between Decision Process
Variables and Perceived Acquisition Effectiveness
Correlation with Significance
Perceived Acquisition Level
Process Variables Effectiveness
Amount of Formal -.10
Analytical Activity
Amount of Participation -.68 ***
in Decision Making
Amount of Intensive Search -.37 **
Use of Cutside Experts -.35 **
Amount of Direct Contact -.25 *
with the Prospect
Uses of Secondary Sources -.18
of Information
Amount of CEO Involvement -.08
in Activities
Duration .22
* = p less than .10 ** = p less than .05
*** = p less than .01
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Table 6.15
Comparison of Integration Activities for the
10 Most and 10 Least Effective Acquisitions
Percentage of Companies
Responding Activity Completed
10 Most Effective 10 Least Effective
Integration Activity Acquisitions Acquisitions
Installed a new financial 70% 70%
control system
Established specific objectives 90% 100%
for managers of the acquired
firm
Established incentive and 90% 80%
profit-sharing programs
Developed stable reporting 80% 90%
relationship to one manager
at our company headquarters
Had meetings between our top- 90% 80%
managers and managers at the
acquired firm to resolve
policy differences
Provided the labor force at CO. 80% 70%
NAME with detailed information
about the acquisition and OUR
FIRM
None of these frequencies are significantly different
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Does the amount of CEO involvement predict success? The mean
number of hours of CEO involvement was 77 (SD = 105). Overall the
managers in the study indicated the perceived level of involvement
of CEO was 6.3 (SD = 3.5) on a scale where 1 = very low involvement
and 10 = very high involvement. Of the 6 activities CEO's are
sometimes involved in, the mean involvement was 3 activities (SD =
1.8). Almost all CEO's were involved in presenting the "deals" to
their Board of Directors.
Table 6.1U suggests that the amount of CEO involvement in
activities is not a good predictor of success. Also the correlation
coefficients with perceived acquisition effectiveness are not
significant for any of the 3 CEO involvement variables.
The analyses of the risk determinants suggest that CEOs are
most involved when the ratio of the sales of the selling firm to the
buying firm is large. This indicates that higher risk and larger
acquisitions are the ones in which the CEO is most involved (See
Table 6.8 and the previous section on strategic risk effects).
Does participation in the decision process by the management
team predict short-run success? When managers have participated in
decision making, is implementation of the decision evaluated as more
successful? Greater participation in acquisition decisions does not
lead to greater acquisition effectiveness. Quite the opposite was
found. Lower levels of participation indicate higher effectiveness
(See Table 6.11). Also the amount of participation in decision
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making is negatively correlated with the perceived effectiveness of
the integration activities (R = -.U; p level less than .05).
None of the hypotheses about the effects of process variables
on effectiveness were confirmed.
The relation opposite to that predicted was found for
hypothesis P 2. A greater amount of intensive search about an
acquisition prospect was related to less, not more, satisfactory
evaluations of acquisition effectiveness.
The results for hypothesis P U are similary contradictory to
what was expected. A greater amount of discussion and group
decision making during the investigation of the acquisition prospect
was related to less, not more, satisfactory evaluations of
acquisition effectiveness.
Comparison £f Models
In this study there was an implicit hypothesis that including
process characteristics in the prediction model could improve
predictions and understanding of the mechanism influencing
acquisition outcomes. Forward stepwise regression models were
analyzed to compare the prediction and decision-process models.
Table 6.16 reports the regression results for the prediction model.
The objective measures of risk and experience accounted for more of
the variance in perceived acquisition success than did the
perceptual measures. In the regression equation with the objective
measures, Type of Business Relationship accounted for 18 percent of
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Table 6.16
Regression Analysis for the Prediction Model
1. Multiple Regression results with Perceived Acquisition
Effectiveness as the dependent variable (Objective
Measures of independent variables)
Multiple , R2
R R" Change 3 F
Type of Business Relationship .42 .18 .18 -.31 5. OS
Nimber of Acquisitions 1975-79 .53 .28 .10 .41 3.02
Constant .66
2. Multiple Regression results with Perceived Acquisition
Effectiveness as the dependent variable (Perceptual
Measures of Independent variables)
Multiple , R2
R R Change B F
Perceived Experience .33 .11 .11 .19 2.9
Perceived Risk .45 .20 .09 -.19 2.6
Constant .49
*n equals 24
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the variance and adding number of acquisitions accounted for an
additional 10 percent of the variance in acquisition effectiveness
(See Table 6.16).
The decision-process model was tested with four regression
equations. Using the objective measures and four process variables,
stepwise regression was used to determine which variable initially
entered the equation and how much variance was accounted for by each
variable. Amount of participation in decision making and amount of
intensive search were significant in the regression equations.
Table 6.17 summarizes the regression analyses for the
decision-process model.
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Table 6.17
Regression Analyses for the Decision-Process Model
1. With Formal Analytical Activity*
Type of Business Relationship
Number of Acquisitions 1975-1979
Amount of Formal Analytical Activity
Constant
2. With Participation in Decision Making*
Amount of Participation in Decision Making . 74
Type or Business Relationshio
Number of Acquisitions 1975-1979
Constant
3. With Intensive Search*
Amount of Intensive Search
Type of Business Relationship
Number of Acquisitions 1975-1979
Constant
4. With CEO Involvement*
Type of Business Relationship
Number of Acquisitions 1975-1979
Amount of CEO Involvement
Constant
Multiple
R R Change B F
.43 .18 .18 -.81 4.7
.53 .28 .10 .40 2.9
.53 .28 .0 -.27 .04
.69
j 7 .55 .55 -.28 13.9
.75 .56 .01 -.30 .93
.76 .58 .02 .17 .75
.87
.45 .20 .20 -.64 1.3
.52 .27 .07 -.60 .2.3
.57 .33 .06 .32 1.8
.72
.43 .13 .18 -.33 4.9
.53 .28 .10 .38 2.S
.54 .29 .01 -.53 .14
.63
^Perceived Acquisition Effectiveness is the dependent variable.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION PROCESSES
This research project has identified some factors that seem to
predict the success of an acquisition. It suggests that managers
and acquisition specialists can increase the success rate of
acquisition programs. The models tested in this study may also help
organization theorists develop and refine theories of organizational
decision making.
This chapter addresses a number of major issues. First,
tentative answers are provided for the research questions posed in
Chapter 1. Second, alternative explanations for some of the
findings are suggested. Third, the accuracy of the data collected
in the study is evaluated. Fourth, the implications of the research
results for managing corporate acquisition decision processes are
presented. Fifth, the implications for improving and expanding
organizational dec is ion -making theories are considered. Finally,
the needs for future research and the limitations of this research
project are discussed.
Answers to Research Questions
This research project has primarily gathered information about
small and medium-sized acquisitions. Because of this limitation, it
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is important not to over generalize the following conclusions and
implications.
What are the answers to the major research questions posed in
Chapter 1? First, do some decision process activities predict
short-run success for an acquisition? Yes, participation and
intensive search do, but not in the predicted direction. The amount
of formal analytical activity and the amount of CEO involvement are
not related to acquisition success.
Second, how involved is the CEO? The CEO is not as involved in
making small and medium-sized acquisitions as had been expected from
the research discussed in Chapter 3. The amount of CEO involvement
seems to depend on the size of the buyer, with CEOs in small
companies more involved in making small and medium-sized
acquisitions than CEOs in large companies. Since CEO involvement is
related to the ratio of sales of the seller divided by sales of the
buyer, this indicates that CEO involvement increases for
proportionately larger and probably more significant acquisitions.
Third, what is the effect of participation in decision making?
Greater participation in the decision process by the management team
is negatively related to short-run success. Increased participation
in decision making also did not increase the perceived effectiveness
of implementation activities.
Fourth, do managers use more complex and extensive decision
processes when an unrelated business is acquired? The results
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indicate this occurs, but the process changes do not increase the
success of unrelated acquisitions.
Fifth, what is the effect of experience? The number of prior
acquisitions made by a firm is a good predictor of the success of an
acquisition. Firms that have made more acquisitions use different
decision processes, including lower levels of participation in
subdecisions and less use of information sources.
Finally, does it matter how an acquisition prospect is found?
How a prospect is identified does not seem to change the decision
process, except when an unusual 'source identifies a prospect and
then more CEO involvement and intensive search occurs. The source
of prospects does not predict acquisition effectiveness.
As noted in Chapter 1 , some decision processes may be both more
effective and more efficient than others. This study found that
participation in decision making and intensive search for
information did not effectively reduce the risks associated with
unrelated acquisitions or compensate for an inexperienced management
team. The possible ineffectiveness of these activities in some
companies should be a matter of concern, but it does not suggest
that participation in acquisition decisions and intensive search are
either unneccessary or without significant benefits in acquisition
decision processes. Rather, one must ask how these activities can
be improved in organizations. One must also ask what other
activities can be included in the decision process to help managers
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who have completed few acquisitions or who are considering
especially high risk acquisitions to evaluate and gather information
more efficiently and effectively.
Alternative Explanations of Findings
This section discusses hypotheses that were not supported in
this study. Both relationships that were not significant and
significant relationships that were opposite of those predicted are
discussed.
As noted in the prior section, the number of meetings and
one-to-one discussions about an acquisition prospect was negatively
related to the perceived effectiveness of the acquisition. This
result may seem counter intuitive. However, it may be noted that
only the quantity of meetings and discussions and not the quality of
meetings, the length of meetings or who participated was measured.
These measurement issues are discussed further in the next section,
but they are mentioned here because they suggest substantive
explanations for the findings. Greater participation seemed to be a
response to a high risk decision and lack of experience of the
management in making acquisitions. As noted above this strategy was
not successful. It may not have been successful because the
participants in the meetings lacked important knowledge. Or a group
mind-set and rationalizing may have developed in the management
team. Another related explanation is that because of inexperience
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the group members had vague or inappropriate decision criteria.
Interpreting causality in this relationship is also a problem.
One may conclude that having more meetings caused the lower level of
perceived effectiveness, but despite the explanations just mentioned
that causal explanation seems implausible to people who have
examined the results of this study. An alternative causal
explanation is that participation in decision making only covaries
with perceived effectiveness, but does not cause changes in levels
of effectiveness. Variables that may cause both the level of
participation and perceived effectiveness to change include the
experience of the management team and the risk associated with the
acquisition. This hypothesis is tenable, but it is not supported by
the regression results reported in chapter 6. Even so, an
unmeasured predictor variable may not be accounted for in the model.
Another explanation of the relationship between participation
and perceived effectiveness is that it is an artifact of the
measures and represents variance due to the measures rather than an
actual relationship. This possibility cannot be completely
eliminated and measurement problems are discussed more extensively
in the next section.
Planned search did not result in more successful acquisitions.
This result is not consistent with prior research by Ansoff et al.
(1971) and Birley (1974; 1976) . A number of reasons may account for
this. First, the measures used in this study were different.
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Planning was a broad concept in prior studies, but was limited to
planned initiation in this study. In twenty-two of the cases
managers reported having a formal strategy and plan for finding
suitable acquisition prospects. In twenty-one case managers
reported having formal acquisition objectives. Thus, most of the
companies could be classified as planners. Second, the
characteristics of the decision process may have a greater effect on
success than the source initiating the process, such as formal
planning. Finally, planned search may not be oriented toward
reducing the risks of an acquisition. Other reasons and motives may
have guided the search and resulted in identifying prospects that
met needs not directly translatable into the success dimensions used
in this study.
Formal analytical activity was less extensive than had been
expected and none of the three independent variables predicted the
amount of formal analytical activities. A number of reasons may
explain why hypotheses D 1, DPM 1.1, DPM 2.1, and DPM 3.1 were not
supported. First, managers may have misreported the amount and
types of activities. Second, the bias toward rationality and
analysis in our culture would certainly encourage managers to
overstate the amount of analytical activity. And, finally the
general nature of some of the activity statements could have
resulted in some misinterpretation and under or over reporting of
activities (see the next section).
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Despite these problems, some correlation coefficients
approached significance, but the relationship was in the opposite
direction to that predicted. Greater experience and risk were
associated with less, not more, formal analytical activity. These
relationships make some sense if one suspects that some of the
analytical activities of the inexperienced management teams were
unnecessary and motivated more by insecurity than actual need. An
explanation for the risk relationship is that inexperienced managers
were making the high risk acquisitions. It is plausible that
experienced managers knew what activities were necessary for
evaluating prospects. But, a comparison of the activities used for
those acquisitions that were most and least successful suggests no
difference in activities.
Formal analytical activity and CEO involvement were not
predictors of successful acquisitions. This may result from a
number of factors. First, size of the acquiring company affects the
level of CEO involvement. Size may also moderate the use of formal
analytical activities. The small sample size limits the
possibilities of testing moderators like size. Second, since most
firms used approximately the same amount of formal analytical
activity, the quality of the activities may be much more important
than what is done or how many activities are included in the
process.
Duration of the decision process was not affected by the levels
245
of the three independent variables. This may be due to the effects
of other variables not included in the study, e.g., unexpected
delays and problems finding information. A scattergram of the
independent variables with the duration variable suggests that some
observations were very different from the overall pattern. If these
observations are excluded, then the process is much shorter in
duration when a seller approaches a buyer and for unrelated
acquisitions. It had been hypothesized that for unrelated
acquisitions the process would be of longer duration than for other
types of acquisitions. Some interaction between risk and source
initiating the process may cause this unexpected finding. For
example, pressure from the seller may shorten the process when the
seller has initiated it and in that case the seller may be more
willing to provide information and that too may shorten the process.
Data Accuracy
At the end of Chapter 5 the potential limitations of using key
informants and retrospective reports as a means of gathering data
were discussed. The issue at this point is the reliability and
accuracy of the data collected. In other words, the findings of
this study should be evaluated in the context of both what was found
and the accuracy of the information. A number of possible sources
of data inaccuracy, that may result in random and/or systematic
error, are discussed and evaluated in this section.
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First, did the informants have the knowledge to provide
accurate information? All of the informants reported that they had
been highly involved in the investigation of the prospect about
which they were providing information. Also, the CEOs of the
organizations (when the CEO was not the informant) designated the
informant as the most knowledgeable person to ask about the
acquisition. In those cases where the informants did not have
information or could not remember certain facts, many of them used
secondary sources to obtain the information. For these reasons it
seems reasonable to conclude that the informants had knowledge of
the acquisition and could thus provide accurate information.
Second, were the informants motivated to provide accurate
information? Completing the questionnaire was an officially
sanctioned activity and that should have helped motivate
subordinates delegated the task. Also, the CEOs who participated
chose to provide information. All of the participants were assured
confidentiality which may have reassured some people and motivated
them to provide accurate information. But, lower-level managers
responsible for acquisitions that turned out poorly may have been
motivated to protect themselves. The informants knew that they
would receive the results of the study prior to publication. Thus,
they should have realized that intentionally providing inaccurate
information meant that they were wasting their time and that they
would not receive benefits from the study. It seems unlikely that
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any of the informants would have wanted to intentionally sabotage
the results by providing misleading information. None of the
questionnaires seemed hastily completed and the responses seemed
plausible. Two additional facts suggest the informants were highly
motivated to provide accurate information: most informants returned
the questionnaires promptly and many of them consulted secondary
sources for information. It seems reasonable to conclude that
motivational factors did not cause data inaccuracy.
Third, did cognitive limitations cause data inaccuracy? Some
cognitive limitations such as hindsight bias, recalling what should
have been rather than what was, and forgetting, certainly may have
caused data inaccuracy. But, most of that error should have been
randomly distributed rather than systematic. Since all of the
informants were recalling events approximately equidistant in the
past, that should have controlled some systematic error. Questions
of fact were used in many measures and, based upon Birley's (1976)
results, that information should have been recalled more accurately
than motives or opinions. Finally, highly detailed information was
not requested and that should have made recall easier for the
informants. Errors from cognitive limitations may have occurred,
but these errors should have reduced the chances of finding
relationships rather than resulting in incorrect findings.
Finally, did inaccuracies result from the instrumentation used
to gather information? The questionnaire was pre-tested and revised
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four times prior to use, but because a new questionnaire was
developed this issue must be a concern. First, some of the response
scales may have been interpreted differently by some informants.
For example, the responses to the participation scale - "none",
"some" and "many" - can be interpreted in a number of ways, e.g., is
five meetings "some" or "many"? These scales made it easier for
managers to respond, but the responses represent their perceptions
and they may not have all had the same referent. The tendency of
managers may have been to answer "some" or a "few" as the socially
desirable response. However, one can also argue that because of the
normative bias toward participation in decisions and high
information search, that managers in companies where an acquisition
turned out poorly may have been led to respond that many meetings
and discussions took place because that seemed more socially
desirable.
Using structured questions with predefined responses may also
have resulted in errors of omission and commission. Activities may
have been left out of lists and including an activity on a list may
have encouraged some informants to report that it occurred when in
fact it had not. The responses to questions may also have been
misunderstood or misinterpreted, although the phone interviews
suggested that informants were having few problems understanding and
interpreting the questionnaire.
It is possible that only random rather than systematic errors
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were generated by the instrumentation. But, statistically assessing
the reliability and validity of the measures will be difficult given
the type of scaling used and the complexity of the constructs. A
qualitative assessment, as noted in the prior section, suggests that
the participation in decision making variable includes only part of
the domain of that construct. Also, that measure is somewhat
subject to interpretation and it is not specific about the length of
meetings and discussions, the participants, or the actual number.
More research and further measurement development will certainly be
needed for the process variables if the meaning and accuracy of the
data are to be assured.
Implications for Managing
Corporate Acquisition Decision Processes
The following recommendations may improve corporate acquisition
decision making:
1 ) Comparing number of acquisitions and perceived experience
indicated that managers tended to overestimate the perceived
experience of the management team. If a company has made fewer than
six acquisitions, managers should question the experience of their
management team in finding, investigating and negotiating with
acquisition prospects.
2) Experienced acquisition specialists can probably improve
the quality of acquisition decision processes and may reduce the
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learning time of the management group. Direct management of
programs by experts may be beneficial if they know the business of
the acquiring company. Indirectly the expert can affect the success
of the program by helping to determine information needs and by
helping develop acquisition criteria and decision rules.
3) Inexperienced management teams are likely to attain greater
success if they confine their acquisitions to related businesses,
especially customers, suppliers and competitors. All managers must
exercise caution when making unrelated acquisitions. The expected
returns from an unrelated acquisition must be adjusted to reflect
the greater risk. This study suggests that as many as 2 out of 3
completely unrelated acquisitions will not be totally satisfactory
in the short-run, given current behaviors.
4) Participation and discussion about acquisition-related
decisions does not guarantee that better decisions will be made.
The quality of the decision is probably more a function of the
expertise of the people consulted than of the amount of discussion
and participation.
5) The quality of formal analyses of acquisition prospects
should apparently be stressed rather than the type and amount of
analysis. Because some analytical activities are used infrequently
and may be poorly prepared, managers may be neglecting important
activities that could improve the quality of acquisition decision
making.
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6) While managers can reduce costs in many acquisition
investigations by relying solely on information obtained from the
prospect, inexperienced management teams may have difficulty
evaluating that information. A note of caution seems warranted here
about using experts and secondary sources for information about
prospects. Managers should recognize that even though this study
did not show external verification or data was necessary, they incur
additional risks when the facts provided by the prospect are not
confirmed by external sources. Some problems of misrepresentation
can be dealt with in the acquisition agreement, but perceptions
about markets, demand, etc. are especially susceptible to distortion
and these misrepresentations can not usually be dealt with
adequately in contracts.
7) CEOs in large firms do not need to be actively involved in
decisions to acquire small and medium-sized firms. Rather, they can
establish objectives, delegate responsibility and then ratify
acquisition decisions.
8) Managers pursuing an acquisition strategy should search for
prospects, but prospects identified opportunistically should not be
avoided or evaluated differently than those identified by formal
search.
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Implications for Organizational
Decision Making Theories
The theories of organizational decision making discussed in
Chapter 2 provided a theoretical framework for this study. The
hypotheses in Chapter 4 were developed primarily from a decision
characteristics approach. The decision-process model includes
decision process activities associated with what Mintzberg et al.
(1976) term the evaluation-choice part of the selection phase of
their model. The theoretical implications of this research must
therefore be evaluated within this somewhat limited context.
The literature review and interviews suggest that there are
some patterns in acquisition decision processes. The patterns do not
emerge directly from the survey results. At least four types of
acquisition decision processes can be identified:
1) The impulsive decision process or "impulse buyer". When
managers in a company are presented with a "good" opportunity to
acquire a company, they conduct very little intensive search,
analytical activity is minimal, and the decision process is of short
duration.
2) The rational analytical decision process or "analytical
buyer". The managers search extensively for prospects, they
conduct an intensive and often efficient search for information
using a wide variety of sources, and they conduct a systematic
analysis of more than one prospect or investment opportunity.
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3) The confirmatory decision process or "pre-sold buyer".
Based on prior information or political considerations, the buyer
knows what company to purchase. The decision process involves
rationalizing and justifying the purchase using minimal information
gathering and confirmatory analytical activity. Dissention and
negative information are probably surpressed by managers.
4) The cycling decision process or "indecisve buyer". The
managers want to make an acquisition. So the buyer collects
extensive information on prospects and that data is screened and
processed. The indecisive buyer often applies constraints that are
unrealistically high so more prospects are usually sought after
screening those in the initial pool. A prospect that is identified
is extensively analyzed, it is often rejected, much discussion
occurs, the managers vacillate on goals for the acquisition.
Indecisive buyers rarely acquire companies.
These characterizations have many similarities to those
presented in Chapter 2, but different companies at different times
will use only one of these processes. While no one character iztion
is descriptive of all acquisition decision processes, rather all do
describe types of acquisition decision making. At present, there is
no evidence that any of these approaches is more effective for
making successful acquisitions.
254
The following recommendations are based upon my reflections and
review of current theories of organizational decision making. They
are offered for your consideration:
1) Theories should incorporate the great variability that
exists in the evaluation-choice phase of the decision process.
2) The many subdecisions in a broadly defined decision process
should be more adequately incorporated into theories of
organizational decision making.
3) Process characteristics are interesting, but they may not
be the best predictors of decision outcomes. Organizational
learning may permit companies with processes that appear
dysfunctional to make decisions that have successful outcomes. For
example, an impulse buyer may have incorporated programs and
routines for efficiently identifying good prospects that are hard to
discern. Some of the "programs" may be stored in the memories of
managers involved in acquisition decision making and they may not
know what information cues and rules they are applying.
4) Context and situational factors are useful for predicting
the content of decision processes.
Needs for Future Research
This research project has a number of methodological
limitations that warrant a replication with a larger sample,
different measures and, if possible, some data gathering concurrent
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with actual acquisition decision processes. A number of other
questions that are not resolved by this research also need to be
investigated.
Experienced firms had greater success with the acquisition
included in this study. Is this an inherent problem? Can training
programs for managers with less experience help them make better
acquisition decisions? How much help can consultants and outside
experts provide?
Greater participation in decisions was related to less
successful acquisitions. Is this a cause and effect relationship?
Or is it more a function of the types of companies the managers were
trying to acquire? In this study high risk and participation were
positively related. Would more participation or involvement of
experts have reduced the risk? Can anything be changed about the
characteristics of the decision process or the activities of
managers to reduce the risk of unrelated acquisitions?
CEO involvement is relatively unimportant in small and
medium-sized acquisitions made by large firms. What is the
appropriate role for the CEO? When should responsibility be
delegated? How do managers in the selling companies respond when
the CEO is not actively involved? Are good opportunities missed
because of the low level of CEO involvement? Do companies pay more
when the CEO is not actively involved?
Few external information sources were used to gather
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information about a prospect. Is this information really needed?
What is the quality of external information? What sources are most
helpful?
Formal analytical activity occurs in acquisition decision
making. How much does the board of directors rely on the formal
analyses? What is the impact of formal analysis on the choice? How
effective are the tools that managers use to evaluate prospects?
Summary
This thesis has reviewed descriptive characterizations of the
decision process and presented a number of examples of acquisition
decision making. The decision process is not always rational and
analytical; most often in the larger companies the process seems
bureaucratic. Little evidence was found to support the political or
incremental characterization. Some evidence can be interpreted as
supporting the garbage can characterization. Some of the
relationships in the Hage Model (1980) were supported by this
research, but a number of issues not discussed previously in the
characteristics models have been demonstrated as important, e.g.,
the effect of participation and intensive search on decision
outcomes.
Some prior research findings have been confirmed by this study.
One example is Kitching's (196?) finding that unrelated and
concentric acquisitions are less successful than horizontal and
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vertical acquisitions. Also, Allan's (1966) conclusion that firms
that have made 6 to 7 acquisitions make more successful acquisitions
was confirmed.
The prediction model presented in Chapter 4 was substantially
confirmed by this research, but the importance of the decision
process model was also demonstrated. The two models are not
mutually exclusive.
The research methodology seemed adequate for the project,
although as in all studies a larger sample size would have been
desirable and it would be informative to gather comparable data on
large and very large mergers.
Finally, the project has assembled much descriptive information
about corporate acquisition decision making and this thesis should
serve as a good starting point for future research studies.
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APPENDIX 1 — LETTERS AND MATERIALS
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
University of Maryland at College Park 20742
282
February 23, 1982
Mr.
President
Corp.
Ri.
, MI 48092
Dear Mr. :
Your help is critically important to the success of my research
project on corporate acquisition decision processes. Results of the
research will be reported in my Ph.D. dissertation and hopefully in journal
articles. Also, if your firm participates in the project, you will receive
a confidential report on how screening and evaluation of an aquisition
prospect by your firm compares with norms from the project. Both you and I
can benefit from successful completion of this project.
This research project has many benefits and small costs for you and
your firm. The aggregated results and the confidential report can suggest
new activities to increase the success rate of your acquisition program.
Also, the results may help you eliminate unnecessary activities and reduce
the skyrocketing costs of acquisition programs .
Because of resource constraints, only a few companies can be asked to
provide information for the study . Your company has made an important
acquisition in the past three years and I think you could benefit from
results of the study . If you or another manager with primary
responsibility for your acquisition program would consider spending 30-45
minutes talking with me about one of your acquisitions, then please
complete the enclosed project participation form (blue sheet).
All of the company -specific information obtained in this study will be
kept confidential, and published results will be presented for groups of
companies rather than single companies . Results of the study would be sent
directly to you within a few months of its completion .
Qiclosed is a brief sketch of my background, a list of references, and
a short description of the project. If you have questions, please call me
at (301 ) 454-6725.
I hope that you agree that this type of research yields results that
are mutually beneficial.
Sincerely,
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
University of Maryland at College Park 20742
283
To: Director of Public Relations
Buyer ( Co . Name )
Address
City and Zip Code
From: Daniel J. Power
Subject: Request for information
Date : February 1 , 1 982
For the past 15 months > I have been studying corporate acquisition
decision processes. At this point in my research, I need additional
information about your firm. If it is possible, I would like a copy
of your firm's most recent annual report (or a similar document).
Also, I would like to read about the background and achievements of
Mr. CEO or President (Name) and other major officers at your firm.
Thank you for your assistance,
Daniel J. Power
Please mail any materials to :
Professor Daniel Power
College of Business and Management
University of Maryland
Rm. 1135E Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
284
March 3 , 1 982
Tb : Director of Public Relations
From: Daniel J. Power
Subject: Request for Information
Recently, I requested an annual report and background information about
major officers at your firm. I had hoped to read these materials before
writing the CEO of your company, but my schedule of activities dictated
that I write him before I had heard from you. I am however still
interested in receiving the materials.
Please send materials to:
Professor Daniel Power
College of Business and Management
University of Maryland
Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
University of Maryland at College Park 20742
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May 18, 1982
To:
From : Daniel Power
Subject: Completion of data collection
With your help my research on corporate acquisition decision making will be
completed successfully. In the past five weeks I have received questionnaires
from 25 major U.S. corporations. Some CEO's have filled out the questionnaire;
others have been completed by directors of acquisitions or corporate
development; and some by corporate treasurers or corporate counsel. The very
favorable response has been encouraging, but I can perform much more meaningful
statistical analyses with the participation of 10 more companies.
If you complete the questionnaire in the next few weeks, I can include your
data in my study. Also, I will provide you with a confidential report comparing
the decision process that you completed with that of similar firms participating
in the study. A cooperative research study, like this one, can benefit both
of us .
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
University of Maryland at College Park 20742
Corporate Acquisition Decision Behavior in U.S. Conglomerate
and Manufacturing Firms : Determinants and Consequences
Fact Sheet
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participating firms can receive a confidential report comparing
their screening and evaluation of a acquisition prospect with
norms from the study
all of the deals included in the study were completed between
October 1979 and April 1980
— resource constraints limit the number of companies that can participate
information is being collected from CEO's and top specialists in
acquisitions and mergers
— the largest investment banking acquisitions and mergers unit is
cooperating with the study and providing performance information
— the research department of a large New York bank is cooperating with
the study and providing performance information
— more than 20 major U.S. firms are presently providing information
about an aquisition completed during the time frame for the study
all of the company -specific information obtained in the study will
be kept confidential, published results will be presented for groups
of companies rather than single companies
— results of the study would be sent directly to you within a few
months of the completion of the study
PROJECT SUMMARY 287
Corporate Acquisition Decision Behavior in
U.S. Conglomerate and Manufacturing Firms:
Determinants and Consequences
Many U.S. managers consider growth and diversification by acquisition
and merger as the best strategy for their firms. Given the commitment to
this strategy, it is necessary for organizational scientists to investigate
the management and decision processes that precede business acquisitions.
Some decision processes may be both more effective, resulting in
acquisitions that meet more organizational goals and needs, and more
efficient, producing desired results with a lower expenditure of resources,
than others. Also, some decision processes may be more appropriate in one
type of organization or decision situation than in another. This paper
summarizes a research project to investigate these issues related to the
management and design of corporate acquisition decision processes and
programs .
Research Questions
•
Prior descriptive research on corporate acquisition decision processes
provided a starting point for this project. Issues that have not been
previously studied are examined . Issues that have been investigated by two
or more researchers who found differing results are again examined. And
some counter -intuitive findings of single research studies are also
studied. Some of the major questions investigated include:
1 ) Do some decision process activities predict short-run
success for an acquisition? Are some activities
unrelated to success or related to failure?
2) How involved is the Chief Executive Officer in acquisition
decision processes? Does the amount of CEO involvement
predict success? In what circumstances are CEO's involved?
3) Does participation in the decision process by the
management team predict short-run success? When managers
have participated in decision making, is implementation of
the decision evaluated as more successful?
4) Do managers use more complex and extensive decision
processes when an unrelated business is acquired?
5) Do managers who are experienced making acquisitions design
and use substantially different decision processes than
inexperienced managers?
6) Does the decision process differ when the organization
initiates and plans a search for acquisition prospects
as compared to the process that follows an unplanned
initiation by the seller or a broker?
Overview of Research Method 288
To gather information about these questions, this research project
combines historical, interview, survey research and correlational
methodologies. Data for the study will be obtained from published sources,
from managers in firms that have recently made aquisitions and from experts
in the securities industry.
Managers in 32 business organizations will be asked to provide
retrospective accounts and answers to structured questions for a specific,
recent acquisition made by their firm. A 30-45 minute research schedule
has been designed and pre-tested for the study. The schedule gathers
information from the managers about possible determinants of corporate
acquisition decision behavior i.e., the amount of experience of managers at
the firm making acquisition decisions, the perceived risk of the
acquisition (belief held during the decision process) and the type of
initiation of the decision process (planned vs. unplanned). Also,
information is gathered on the decision process used in the firm i.e., the
amount of analytical activity, the amount of participation in the decision
process by the management team, the amount of CEO involvement and the
amount of intensive search for information about the acquisition prospect.
Managers will also be asked to evaluate the current performance of the
acquired firm.
The experts in the securities industry will also evaluate the current
performance of the acquired firms and assess the long-run prospects for the
acquisition .
The data from the managers will be obtained in phone interviews and
the data from the securities analysts and investment bankers will be
obtained during in-person interviews. All of the data obtained in the
study is considered confidential. Only aggregate results, correlation
analyses, descriptive statistics and cross -tabulations, will be reported.
Some individual reports will be prepared for companies participating in the
study, but this information is intended only for use by companies
requesting a company -specific analysis and comparison of their program with
others in the study .
D. Power /1 982
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The following people have agreed to answer general questions about the
research project titled — "Corporate Acquisition Decision Behavior in
U.S. Conglomerate and Manufacturing Firms: Determinants and Consequences".
Please contact them directly or contact the Project Director, Daniel Power,
at (301 ) 454-6725.
Robert H. Bock
Dean, School of Business
University of Wisconsin-Madison
1155 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
(608) 262-1553
George P. Huber
Professor of Business and Industrial Engineering
University of Wisconsin -Madison
Graduate School of Business
1155 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
(608) 263-2041
Rudolph P. Lamone
Dean, College of Business and Management
University of Maryland at College Park
lydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
(301 ) 454-5383
Harold Stieglitz
Vice President - Management Research
The Conference Board
845 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 759-0900
290
PROJECT PARTICIPATION FORM
Please identify a manager who is familiar with the activities that occurred
during the investigation, decision process, and negotiations with:
O
O
You should send me your guestionnaire and then interview me by phone
You should contact another manager for an interview, please contact :
Name :
Address :
Phone :
Zip Code
area code number
O
O
Please prepare an individual analysis comparing the decision process
we used with that of other companies in your study.
Send me only a summary of your results. I do not want an individual
analysis of our decision process.
signature
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APPENDIX 2 — RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
Corporate Acquisition Decision Process Research Schedule
Copyright D. Power, 1982
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All of the information provided for this study is confidential ; it will not
be released to the public or to private companies in any way that would
permit identification of you or your company.
In this study, the decision process for one specific acquisition is
examined. In the questions that follow the company that your firm acquired
is referred to as CO. NAME. Most of the questions are about YOUR FIRM'S
acquisition of :
(CO. NAME)
1 . Who was THE CEO at YOUR FIRM during the acquisition of CO. NAME?
2. How many companies did your firm investigate and examine as
potential acquisitions during the period 1975 through 1979?
3. And how many companies did your firm actually acquire during the
period 1975 through 1979?
4. In how many acquisition decisions had THE CEO participated prior
to the acquisition of CO. NAME?
Prior to the acquisition of CO. NAME, how experienced with
acquisition decision making, search and negotiations did you
consider the management team at YOUR FIRM? Please rate your
management team on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means no one had
any experience and we were "flying by the seat of the pants " and
10 means we had extensive experience and we were all experts.
1 23456789 10
no experience extensive experience
293
Page 2
6. How was CO. NAME originally brought to the attention of managers at YOUR
FIRM as a potential acquisition prospect?
1 ) A formal search for companies was conducted in-house
at OUR FIRM, we identified CO. NAME
2 ) We were looking for companies and a finder brought
CO. NAME to our attention
3) We weren't looking for companies, but a finder brought
CO. NAME to our attention
4) We were looking for companies and CO. NAME
approached us
5) We weren't looking for companies, but CO. NAME
approached us
6 ) We had previously made investments in CO. NAME and based
on our knowledge we decided to consider them for
acquisition
7) Don't know, don't recall
8) Other
Approximately what month and year was CO. NAME brought to the
attention of managers at your firm as an aquisition prospect?
Month : 1 9
8. When CO. NAME was initially identified as an acquisition prospect,
what did you think the chances in ten were that the consequences
of an acquisition would be favorable to YOUR FIRM? Please answer
on a scale from 1 to 1 0 , where 1 means a very small chance of
favorable consequences and 1 0 means it was certain the
consequences would be favorable.12345678910 (chances in 1 0 )
9. Were formal acquisition objectives established prior to
identification of CO. NAME as an acquisition prospect?
1 ) Yes 2 ) No
10. Prior to the identification of CO. NAME as a prospect, did YOUR
FIRM have a formal strategy and plan for finding suitable
acquisition prospects?
1 ) Yes (Go to Q. 1 1 ) 2 ) No (Go to Q. 1 2 )
1 1 . Please state briefly what your strategy and plan were for finding
prospects prior to the identification of CO. NAME?
12. What was the business relationship of CO. NAME to YOUR FIRM?
1 ) A customer or supplier of OUR FIRM
2) A company with the same customers and products /services as
OUR FIRM or a unit of our firm
3) A company that had customers and products /services with
characteristics similar to those of OUR FIRM
4) A company that had customers and products /services with
characteristics new to OUR FIRM
13. Were other companies aggressively competing with you to acguire
CO. NAME?
1 ) Yes 2 ) No
14. Was CO. NAME having financial problems at the time of the
acquisition?
1 ) Yes 2 ) No
306
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FORMAL
Column
23
24
25
26
27
28
ANALYTICAL ACTIVITIES
Question
15. Prepared detailed demand forecasts
for CO. NAME's products /services
16. Prepared a report comparing CO. NAME
to other investment opportunities
17. Evaluated CO. NAME against written
acquisition objectives
18. Completed a written checklist for
evaluating acquisition candidates
19. Investigated the managers of CO. NAME
20. Prepared a report on compatibility
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
of marketing, production, accounting,
and information systems
21. Had a specialist investigate tax issues
22. Investigated worker satisfaction,
employee turnover, pensions and contracts
23. Developed written plans for utilizing
top-management personnel of CO. NAME
24. Prepared written plans to integrate
the companies following a merger
25. Examined dilution of earnings per share,
and debt/equity ratios
26. Determined payback period, cash flows
and/or projected Return on Investment
27. Prepared a report on CO. NAME's competitors
and environmental factors affecting CO. NAME
28. Analyzed unsettled litigation, claims
and long-term contracts of CO. NAME
Code
Code same as Col. 18
307-4-
AMOUNT OF PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING
Column Question
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
29. To make direct contact with
CO. NAME
30. To submit a proposal and
enter negotiations
31. To make an offer
32. The amount of the offer
33. The negotiating strategy
34. The person to conduct negotiations
35. To accept an agreement-in-principle
36. The financing plan
37. To accept the final deal
Code
0. None
1. Few
2. Many
7. DK
8. Decision not made
by us
9. No Answer
Code same as Col. 37
308
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AMOUNT OF INTENSIVE SEARCH— EXPERTS (Q38-42) , SECONDARY SOURCES (Q43-47) , DIRECT
CONTACT (Q48-50)
Column
46
Question
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
38. business brokers or investment
bankers
39. management consultants
40. stock brokers/analysts
41. discussions with suppliers/
customers of CO. NAME
42. industry experts, e.g.,
retired executives
43. computerized data bases,
MERGEX, COMPUSTAT
44. newspapers /magazines
45. annual reports/lOKs/
Moody 's /credit reports
46. trade association reports
and analyses
47. in-house files/reports
48. discussions with managers
in selling firm
49. visits to selling firm
plants and offices
50. dinner and social meetings with
managers in selling firm
Code
0. Never
1. One occasion
2. Few occasions
3. Many occasions
7. DK
9. NA
Code same as col. 46
-6-
AMOUNT OF CEO INVOLVEMENT 309
Column
59-60
Question
51. (overall level of involvement)
61
62
63
64
65
66
67-69
70
71
52. a. Make initial contact with
managers at CO. NAME
52. b. Conduct negotiations
52. c. Hold regular meetings to
evaluate information about
CO. NAME
52. d. Plan and direct staff
investigations
52. e. Make visits to offices/plants
of CO. NAME
52. f . Present the "deal" to YOUR
FIRM's Board of Directors
53. (CEO hours involvement)
54. (separate dept.)
55. (in charge)
Code
Code 2 digit number
01. very little
involvement
10. extensive
involvement
00. NA
Code same as Col. 13
Code 3 digit number
000. NA
Code same as Col. 18
1. CEO
2. President
3. Exec. V.P.
4. Head acq. unit
5. other V.P.
6. staff person
7. other
310
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CAED 2
Column
1 Card i
2-3 Compai
4-6 7 and
INTEGRATION ACTIVITIES
7 57 a.
8 57. b.
9 57. c.
10 57. d.
11 57. e.
12 57. f.
13-14 58 (e
Question
56 (Duration in months
of Decision Process)
ffectiveness of integration
activities)
Code
Code 2
Code 2 digit number
Code 3 digit number
1.
2.
7.
9.
Yes
No
DK
NA
Code same as Col. 7
Code 2 digit number
01. ineffective
10. effective
00. NA
311
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ACQUISITION EFFECTIVENESS
Column Question Code
15-16 59. (Financial) Code 2 digit number
01. very dissatisfied
10. very satisfied
00. NA
17-18 60. (Contribution to Goals) Code same as Col. 15-16
19-20 61. (labor relations) "
21-22 62. (investment demand) "
23-24 63. (performance of managers) "
25-26 64. (price paid) "
27-28 65. (future prospects) "
-9- 312
REASONS FOR MAKING ACQUISITION
Column Question
29-30 66. a.
31-32
33-34
35-36
37-38
39-40
41-42
43-44
45-46
47-48
49-50
51-52
53-54
55-56
66. b.
66. c.
66. d.
66. e.
66. f.
66. g.
66. h.
66.1.
66. j.
66. k.
66.1.
66. m.
66. n.
Code
Code 2 digit number
01. very important
10. very trivial
00. NA
Code same as Col. 29-30
-10- 313
Column Question Code
57 CEO complete questionnaire Code same as Col. 7
58 Records, used in completing Code same as Col. 7
questionnaire
59-60 Respondent involvement (repeat 01. very little
if CEO) overall involvement 10. extensive
00. NA
61-63 Hours spent on acquisition Code 3 digit number
related activities 000. NA
-11- 314
CARD 3
Column Question Code
1 Card Number Code 3
2-3 Company Number Code 2 digit numbe
4-10 Sales (000) Buyer Code 7 digit numbe
11-16 # Employees Buyer Code 6 digit numbe
17-22 Sales (000) Seller Code 6 digit numbe
23 # of SIC Codes Code 1 digit numbe
24 Type of Acquisition Code 1 digit numbe
1. Related
2. Unrelated
3. Can't determine
25 //SIC major categories Code 1 digit numbe
-12-
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Column
1
2-3
4-5
6-7
8-9
10-11
12-13
14-20
21-24
25-28
29
30
31
CARD 4
Question
Card Number
Company Number
Mount of Analytical Activity
Amount of Participation in Decision Making
Amount of Intensive Search
Amount of CEO Involvement
Amount of Integration Activity
Total Revenue (000) for 1979
(from annual report )
Return on Assets 1979
Return on Assets 1 981
Segmented Data
Type of Acquisition
(determined by Barbara Pfitzner)
Code
Code 4
Code 2 digit
Code 2 digit
Code 2 digit
Code 2 digit
Code 2 digit
Code 2 digit
Code 7 digit
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
Code 4 digit number
Code 4 digit number
Code 1 digit number
1 . yes
2 . no
Code 1 digit number
1 . related
2. unrelated
Relative Segment Size Problem Code 1 digit number
1 . yes
2. no
3 . maybe
316
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